No. 2016 IL App (1st) 142088 People
v. Diggins Filed 5-31-16 (TJJ)
Defendant Shawan Diggins was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) after a bench trial and was sentenced to 13 months in prison. Defendant appeals, alleging that his right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when the State was allowed to admit a certified letter that amounted to a testimonial affidavit from a nontestifying witness for its truth, which established an element of AUUW. For the following reasons, we reverse.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 150923 BMO
Harris Bank, N.A. v. K and K Holdings, LLC
Filed 5-31-16 (TJJ)
Defendants Frank Kaldis and John Karagiannis appeal from an order of the circuit court of Du Page County granting summary judgment against them on claims that they breached a written guaranty. They contend that the claims against them, which arose out of the same guaranty that provided the basis for similar claims against them in Kane County, are barred by res judicata. Because the claims, although based on the same guaranty, arose out of separate transactions, res judicata does not apply, and we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (5th) 130573 In
re Debra B. Filed 5-31-16 (TJJ)
The respondent, Debra B., appeals a trial court order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to her. See 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West 2012). She argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) she was suffering as a result of her mental illness; or (2) her ability to function had deteriorated since the onset of her symptoms. She also argues that the State failed to prove that she was unable to make a reasoned decision regarding the medications because the record does not establish that she was informed about alternatives to medication. The State argues that we should dismiss this appeal because it is moot. We find that review is appropriate under the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine, and we reverse the trial court's order.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 152204 PSI
Resources, LLC v. MB Financial Bank Filed
This appeal arises from plaintiff PSI Resources, LLC’s breach of contract action against defendant MB Financial Bank, National Association, which the circuit court below dismissed as time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations prescribed in section 4-111 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (810 ILCS 5/4-111 (West 2012)). Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the circuit court erred in subjecting its claim to the 3-year limitations period governing claims arising from banking transactions involving negotiable instruments (810 ILCS 5/4-111 (West 2012)) rather than the 10-year limitations period governing claims arising from written contracts (735 ILCS 5/13-206 (West 2012)) and (2) whether the circuit court erred in finding that plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts supporting the tolling of the limitations period pursuant to the discovery rule. ¶ 3 For the reasons set forth below we affirm the circuit court’s ruling dismissing plaintiff’s claim as time-barred.
No. 2016 IL App (3d) 150312 Diane
P. v. M.R. Filed 5-17-16 (TJJ)
Respondent, M.R., appeals from the trial court’s entry of an order of protection against him pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986. On appeal, respondent argues: (1) the trial court erroneously found that the petitioner’s 18-year-old daughter was unable to prosecute the petition against him due to her “age, health, disability or inaccessibility”; (2) the court’s order is based on unsubstantiated findings of abuse; and (3) the court’s order is unconstitutional because it imposes unintelligible restraints on his right to engage in protected first amendment activity. For the following reasons, we vacate the court’s order of protection.
No. 2016 IL App (5th) 150222 Crouch
v. Smick Filed 5-17-16 (TJJ)
On January 8, 2015, the attorney for the respondent, Gabriel Smick, filed a petition for attorney fees pursuant to section 508 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. On April 14, 2015, the trial court denied the petition. On April 21, 2015, Gabriel filed a motion to reconsider or for a Supreme Court Rule 304(a) order allowing an interlocutory appeal. On May 15, 2015, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to reconsider. The court found that section 508 of the Marriage Act did not apply to termination and adoption proceedings. It held that the "American Rule" applied and that each party must bear his or her own attorney fees and costs. The court entered a finding under Rule 304(a) allowing for an interlocutory appeal. Gabriel filed a timely notice of appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 134012 People
v. Gray Filed 5-18-16 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial, defendant Matthew Gray was found guilty of aggravated battery and two counts of aggravated domestic battery. On appeal, he asserts that we must vacate his aggravated domestic battery convictions because his romantic relationship with the victim ended 15 years before the offense. Specifically, he asserts that the statute defining "family or household members" is unconstitutional as applied to his relationship with the victim. Defendant also challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements; (3) the State's closing argument; and (4) the imposition of multiple convictions in violation of the one-act, one-crime doctrine. We agree that defendant's aggravated domestic battery convictions are unconstitutional as applied to these facts, and reverse and remand for a new trial on aggravated battery.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 143694 National
Waste & Recycling Ass'n v. County of Cook
Filed 5-26-16 (TJJ)
The instant appeal arises from a complaint filed by plaintiff National Waste & Recycling Association,1 an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, which challenged certain provisions of the Cook County Solid Waste and Recycling Ordinance (SWRO), recently enacted by defendant Cook County (County). Cook County Code of Ordinances § 30-776 (approved Jan. 15, 2014). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, finding that the County had the authority to enact the SWRO, and as such, it was enforceable. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in finding that the SWRO was enforceable because the County has neither home rule nor statutory authority to enact the challenged provisions of the SWRO, which renders it void as a matter of law. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (4th) 120721-B People
v. Warren Filed 5-26-16 (TJJ)
Following a May 2012 trial, the jury found defendant guilty of unlawful possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, a Class 1 felony, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, a Class 3 felony. In July 2012, the trial court sentenced defendant to a 30-year term on count I and a concurrent 10-year term on count II. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on count I; (2) he was entitled to a vacation of certain assessments imposed pursuant to his conviction; and (3) he was entitled to additional sentencing credit for time served. On January 20, 2016, the supreme court denied defendant's petition for leave to appeal but issued a supervisory order (People v. Warren, No. 118322 (Ill. Jan. 20, 2016) (nonprecedential supervisory order)) directing this court to vacate our prior judgment and reconsider our decision in light of People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, 43 N.E.3d 932. In accordance with the supreme court's direction, we vacate our prior judgment and reconsider in light of Castleberry to determine whether a different result is warranted. We again affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.
No. 2016 IL 117424 People
v. McFadden Filed 6-16-16 (TJJ)
This case involves an appeal from a conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUW by a felon). 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2008). The conviction was based on defendant Onaffia McFadden’s possession of a firearm at a time when he had been convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). The appellate court vacated the conviction for UUW by a felon based on this court’s decision in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, which declared section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute unconstitutional and void ab initio. 2014 IL App (1st) 102939. For the following reasons, we reverse that part of the appellate court judgment and reinstate defendant’s UUW by a felon conviction.
No. 2016 IL 118599 People
v. Rizzo Filed 6-16-16 (TJJ)
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the 2012 version of section 5-6-1(p) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which, in pertinent part, precluded a disposition of supervision for those who have violated the speed parameters of section 11-601.5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. Defendant was charged with, inter alia, a violation of section 11-601.5(b) and moved to dismiss that charge on constitutional grounds. The circuit court of Cook County ultimately entered an order concluding that section 5-6-1(p)’s prohibition of supervision as a disposition in this context is “unconstitutional as violating the proportionate penalties clause, Article I, Section 11 of the Illinois Constitution.” The State appealed. Because the circuit court’s judgment invalidated a statute of the state of Illinois, the appeal was taken directly to this court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). We reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2016 IL 119704 Moline
School District v. Quinn Filed 6-16-16 (TJJ)
At issue on this appeal is the constitutionality of Public Act 97-1161 (eff. June 1, 2013), which amended the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-1 et seq. (West 2014)) to create an exemption from property taxes on leasehold interests and improvements on real estate owned by the Metropolitan Airport Authority of Rock Island County and used by a so-called fixed base operator (FBO) to provide aeronautical services to the public. When the law was enacted, there was only one FBO leasing land from the Metropolitan Airport Authority, Elliott Aviation, Inc. The new law was specifically designed to provide a financial incentive for that particular company to expand its operations at the Metropolitan Airport Authority’s facilities rather than its operations in Des Moines, Iowa, which were not subject to property tax. The appellate court reversed and remanded with directions, holding that the law contravenes the article IV, section 13 prohibition against special legislation. 2015 IL App (3d) 140535. Elliott Aviation appealed to our court as a matter of right. Ill. S. Ct. R. 317 (eff. July 1, 2006). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.
No. 2016 IL 118422 State
of Illinois v. American Federation of State, County
& Municipal Employees, Council 31 Filed
This case arises out of the entry of an arbitration award directing the State of Illinois to pay a 2% wage increase to state employees covered by a multiyear collective bargaining agreement between the State of Illinois, Department of Central Management Services (the State), and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME). For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the arbitration award violates Illinois public policy, as reflected in the appropriations clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, § 2(b)), and section 21 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS 315/21 (West 2014)). Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the appellate court (2014 IL App (1st) 130262) and the circuit court of Cook County, and vacate the arbitration award.
No. 2016 IL 118562 Petrovic
v. Department of Employment Security Filed
The plaintiff, Zlata Petrovic, applied for unemployment insurance benefits with the Department of Employment Security (Department) following the termination of her employment with American Airlines (American). American filed a protest alleging that plaintiff was ineligible for benefits because she was “discharged for misconduct connected with [her] work,” pursuant to section 602(A) of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (820 ILCS 405/602(A) (West 2012)). Following a hearing, a referee for the Department denied plaintiff’s application. The referee’s determination was affirmed by the Board of Review (Board). In this court, plaintiff contends that the Board’s decision finding her ineligible for benefits is clearly erroneous. We agree. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 143432 Negron
v. City of Chicago Filed 5-15-16 (TJJ)
This case arises out of a slip-and-fall incident that occurred as plaintiff Melanie Negron was walking home on July 26, 2010. There was a crowd across the street, and Negron heard someone behind her shouting obscenities and yelling, “Everybody hit the floor.” She looked over her shoulder at the crowd as she kept walking, and while her attention was diverted, she tripped over a two-inch-high uneven piece of sidewalk, fracturing both elbows. Negron brought a negligence suit against the City of Chicago for failing to properly maintain the sidewalk. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city, finding that the city did not have a duty to protect Negron from an open and obvious sidewalk defect. The court also rejected Negron’s argument that the open-and-obvious doctrine did not apply because she was distracted by the individual who was shouting at the time she tripped. We agree with the trial court and affirm, finding that although the evidence shows that Negron was actually distracted, the distraction was not something that the city was legally required to anticipate and guard against.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 150913 Abbington
Trace Condominium Ass'n v. McKeller Filed
In this forcible entry and detainer action, defendant, Christine McKeller, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to quash service. She contends that the court erred in crediting the testimony of the process server to find that she was served by substitute service on a member of her household. We affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 134006 People
v. Billups Filed 5-24-16 (TJJ)
The trial court, in a bench trial, found Jermaine Billups guilty of delivering more than one gram of heroin, and sentenced him to six years in prison. Billups contends on appeal that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the court's consideration in sentencing of two prior convictions for violations of statutes later held unconstitutional. We agree that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that Billups showed a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a lesser sentence if his counsel had not erred. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 140328 People
v. Freneey Filed 5-24-16 (TJJ)
Ronnie Freneey was involved in a scuffle with a courtroom deputy at the Daley Center, following a probate proceeding in which Freneey was a litigant. After a bench trial, he was convicted of attempting to disarm a peace officer and aggravated battery of a peace officer, and sentenced to a total of three years in prison. Freneey contends that the evidence used to convict him was insufficient because (i) the State witnesses were impeached and contradicted by the defense witnesses' testimony, and (ii) there was insufficient evidence of his intent. We find that on the basis of all the evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could credit the State witnesses over the defense witnesses and draw inferences of Freneey's intent to disarm and batter the deputy. Freneey also argues that the State's evidence was not enough to defeat his affirmative defense of self-defense to excessive force by the deputy. We reject this contention because Freneey did not raise a valid self-defense claim.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 140421 People
v. Bryant Filed 5-24-16 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial, Levie Bryant, the defendant, was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal and was sentenced to 21 years in prison. The trial court also imposed $779 in fines and fees. On appeal, defendant contends his sentence should be reduced because the trial court imposed a sentence near the statutory maximum without explaining its reasons for that sentence or considering his rehabilitative potential. In addition, defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly assessed a $100 trauma
fund fine (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.10 (West 2012)) against him. We affirm defendant's conviction and sentence but vacate the trauma fund fine and order the clerk of the circuit court to correct the fines and fees order.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 140332 People
v. Sandoval-Carrillo Filed 5-24-16 (TJJ)
Defendant, Gustavo Sandoval-Carrillo, appeals the denial, after an evidentiary hearing, of his petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Defendant contends that (1) his conviction, on a guilty plea, of unlawful possession of more than 10 but not more than 30 grams of cannabis with the intent to deliver, a Class 4 felony, is void, because the State never charged him by indictment or information, as required by statute (725 ILCS 5/111-2(a) (West 2008)); and (2) his guilty plea violated due process, as the trial court did not admonish him properly. We affirm.
No. 2016 IL 118672 People
v. Hernandez Filed 5-19-16 (TJJ)
Defendant, Gregory Hernandez, was found guilty following a Du Page County bench trial of several charges, including armed robbery, a Class X felony under section 18-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961. Defendant was eventually sentenced, as pertinent here, to an extended term of 40 years’ imprisonment for armed robbery. Following a 2014 evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claim that the 40-year term imposed for armed robbery violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the circuit court granted defendant a new sentencing hearing. The court’s order stated the armed robbery statute used to sentence defendant was “facially unconstitutional” because it carried a harsher penalty than the penalty for “armed violence with a Category III weapon (bludgeon) 720 ILCS 5/33A-1 (1998). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and affirm defendant’s 40-year term of imprisonment for armed robbery.
No. 2016 IL 119006 People
v. Cotto Filed 5-19-16 (TJJ)
This appeal asks this court to decide if every postconviction petitioner represented by counsel is entitled to a reasonable level of assistance from counsel after first-stage proceedings, regardless of whether counsel was appointed or privately retained. The appellate court is split on the issue. Compare People v. Csaszar, 2013 IL App (1st) 100467, ¶ 25 (reasonable level of assistance standard does not apply to privately retained counsel), with People v. Anguiano, 2013 IL App (1st) 113458, ¶ 31 (reasonable level of assistance standard applicable to both retained and appointed counsel). The circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s postconviction petition, and a divided appellate court affirmed. 2015 IL App (1st) 123489, ¶ 13. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the reasonable level of assistance standard applies to both retained and appointed postconviction counsel. We reject the appellate court’s contrary conclusion but affirm its judgment on an alternative basis.
No. 2016 IL 119162 People
v. Grant Filed 5-19-16 (TJJ)
At issue is whether in a recovery proceeding under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, the State is entitled to have an independent psychiatric expert evaluate the respondent and testify at trial. In this recovery proceeding, the Johnson County circuit court appointed a psychiatric expert at the State’s request. The expert testified at trial that respondent, James E. Grant, had not recovered and was substantially likely to commit future sex offenses. A jury found that respondent was still a sexually dangerous person. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the SDPA does not contemplate the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert for the State in a recovery proceeding. 2015 IL App (5th) 130416. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
No. 2016 IL 119220 Valfer
v. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Filed
Plaintiff, Steven I. Valfer, M.D., brought an action in Cook County circuit court seeking civil damages against defendant, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, n/k/a NorthShore University HealthSystem (the hospital), based on the revocation of his privileges to practice at the hospital following a peer review conducted pursuant to the Illinois Hospital Licensing Act. The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from damages under the Licensing Act and that it did not violate its bylaws in connection with deciding not to reappoint plaintiff. The trial court agreed, finding that the hospital was immune from suit and that it had complied with its bylaws and had not engaged in any wilful and wanton conduct. The appellate court affirmed. 2015 IL App (1st) 142284. We allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal and now affirm the appellate court.
No. 2016 IL 119365 Fattah
v. Bim Filed 5-19-16 (TJJ)
In Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31 (1979), this court held that, in a contract for sale from a builder-vendor to the first purchaser of a newly constructed house, there is an implied warranty that the house will be free from latent defects that unreasonably interfere with its intended use. We also held that this “implied warranty of habitability” may be waived by the purchaser if certain conditions are met. Id. at 43. Three years after Petersen, in Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171 (1982), we held, in a case where there was no waiver of the implied warranty of habitability by the first purchaser of a house, that the warranty should be extended to a second purchaser of the house. In this case, we address a question left unanswered by Redarowicz: May the implied warranty of habitability be extended to a second purchaser of a house when a valid, bargained-for waiver of the warranty was executed between the builder-vendor and the first purchaser? For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it may not.
No. 2016 IL 119518 Richter
v. Prairie Farms Dairy Filed 5-19-16 (TJJ)
Following a voluntary dismissal, plaintiffs, Michael Richter and Denise Richter, doing business as Rich-Lane Farms, refiled their civil action against defendant, Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc. The circuit court of Macoupin County dismissed the refiled action pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds of res judicata and the statute of limitations. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4), (a)(5) (West 2012). The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 2015 IL App (4th) 140613. This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
No. 2016 IL 118129 Commonwealth
Edison Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission
Filed 5-19-16 (TJJ)
The subject of this case is the FutureGen 2.0 “clean coal” project in Illinois. The issue brought before this court is whether the Illinois Commerce Commission (the Commission) has the authority to require Commonwealth Edison and Ameren, the two largest utility companies in Illinois, to negotiate energy procurement from the FutureGen 2.0 power plant on behalf of themselves as well as the state’s smaller Area Retail Electric Suppliers (ARES). After we allowed the petition for leave to appeal, federal funding for the FutureGen 2.0 project was suspended, project development efforts were ceased, and the sourcing agreements that are the subject of this appeal were terminated. We dismiss this appeal as moot and vacate the judgment of the appellate court without expressing an opinion on the merits of the appellate court opinion.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 150433 Prospect
Development, LLC v. Kreger Filed 5-23-16 (TJJ)
Plaintiffs brought this legal malpractice suit against defendant attorney and the law firm that employed him. Prior to this lawsuit, plaintiff had previously filed a breach of contract action against the city of Prospect Heights, Illinois, stemming from the collapse of a deal to develop a sports arena for the city. The defendant attorney in this action was general counsel for the city until the arena deal collapsed in 2004. In the previous lawsuit, the plaintiffs were successful in proving their claim for breach of contract but were denied recovery based on the doctrine of unclean hands. The court in the breach of contract action found plaintiffs' undisclosed loans to defendant attorney barred recovery on the breach of contract action. Plaintiffs then instituted this action against defendant attorney and his former firm for legal malpractice. The previous court made a factual determination that in January 2005 the plaintiffs had knowledge the loan advice they last received in October 2001 may not have been proper. The court ruled such a determination barred relitigation of the issue in this case. Because over two years remained before the statute of repose ran when plaintiffs obtained this knowledge in 2005, the circuit court found the suit barred by plaintiffs' failure to file within this period. Affirmed.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 150919 Cincinnati
Insurance Company v. Chapman Filed 5-23-16
Before this court, Cincinnati raises the following issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred in finding that no conflict exists between Illinois and Indiana regarding the notice required when an exclusion is added to an insurance policy at the time of renewal; (2) whether there is a conflict between Indiana and Illinois regarding application of estoppel when an insurer fails to defend an action; and (3) whether the circuit court's decision violated the fundamental fairness test of constitutional due process.We hold that there is an actual conflict between the notice required under Illinois and Indiana laws when a new exclusion is added to an insurance policy upon renewal. After determining that an actual conflict exists, we find that the relevant factors require the use of Indiana laws to determine whether the exclusion can be invoked to deny coverage to Phoenix. Accordingly, we vacate the entry of summary judgment in favor of Chapman and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 150718 Cook
County Sheriff's Office v. Cook County Comm'n on Human
Rights Filed 5-20-16 (TJJ)
The petitioner, Cynthia Walker, filed a claim with the Cook County Commission on Human Rights, alleging that she was subjected to ongoing sexual and age discrimination and harassment in violation of section 42-35 of the Cook County Human Rights Ordinance, while at her job at the Department of Corrections. The Commission found in favor of the petitioner, and the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision on review pursuant to a writ of certiorari. The Cook County Sheriff's Office now appeals, raising as issues whether: (1) the Commission's determination that the petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the Commission erred in expanding the definition of age discrimination under the Ordinance to include harassment based upon age, or, alternatively (3) its finding of age-related harassment was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (4) the Commission exceeded its authority under the Ordinance in issuing certain injunctive relief, or (5) the injunctive relief as ordered was clearly erroneous. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 151799 People
v. Guillermo Filed 5-20-16 (TJJ)
The defendant, Mario Guillermo, appeals the circuit court's order denying his petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges filed pursuant to section 2- 118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the court erred by holding a hearing on his petition to rescind because the matter was not ripe for adjudication; and (3) the hearing on his petition to rescind was untimely because it took place more than 30 days after he filed the petition. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 141392 Country
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dahms Filed 5-19-16
This declaratory-judgment action involves an insurance coverage dispute as to whether plaintiff-counterdefendant, Country Mutual Insurance Company (Country Mutual), has a duty to defend its insured, defendant-counterplaintiff, Charles Dahms, in an underlying tort lawsuit. The plaintiff in the tort lawsuit against Dahms pleaded causes of action for negligence and battery. About six months after the tort action against Dahms was filed, Dahms was convicted of aggravated battery stemming from the same events. We agree with the trial court that Country Mutual owed a duty to defend Dahms in the tort action, but we hold that this duty arose the moment the tort lawsuit was filed, not when Dahms pleaded his affirmative defenses in that lawsuit. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as so modified. We further hold, however, that Country Mutual’s duty terminated on the date that Dahms was criminally convicted for the same conduct because, as of that moment, his conduct fit with the policy’s criminal-act exclusion. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part as modified and reverse in part.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 153047 In
re A.C. Filed 5-19-16 (TJJ)
Following a hearing in Juvenile Court, the circuit court adjudicated respondent, A.C., delinquent of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and he was ordered to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act. Respondent appeals, contending that the provisions of SORA and the Sex Offender Community Notification Law which are applicable to juveniles, violate federal and state substantive due process and procedural due process. In addition, respondent contends that both of these statutes violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause of the federal constitution. This court subsequently allowed the Children & Family Justice Center of the Bluhm Legal Clinic at Northwestern University School of Law and the Juvenile Law Center to file a joint amicus curiae brief on behalf of A.C. Affirmed.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 140039 People
v. Smith Filed 5-18-16 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial, defendant Dr. Bruce Smith, M.D. was found guilty of two counts of criminal sexual assault. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of 11 and 7 years imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that the State's prosecution of him was barred by the applicable statute of limitations because he had a "professional" relationship with the victim. Defendant also contends that the trial court failed to properly address his posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing a three-year mandatory supervised release term because the statutory MSR for such cases was only two years. We affirm the judgment, but order the mittimus to be corrected.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 143924 First
Mercury Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Security Services,
Inc. Filed 5-18-16 (TJJ)
This declaratory action involves a "blast fax" insurance coverage dispute and requires us to determine whether the insurer has a duty to indemnify the insured and therefore the assignee of the insured. In a separate underlying class action lawsuit, the plaintiff sued the insured for sending unwanted faxes, but the parties ultimately settled. The settlement agreement purported to obligate the insurance company to cover the settlement costs of some $4 million even though the insurance company was not a party to the settlement and had opposed the previous settlement offer. As part of the settlement, the plaintiff in the underlying matter was assigned the insured's rights under the policy. The insurance company filed the present declaratory action asserting the insured and thus the assignee were not entitled to be indemnified under the policy. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the declaratory action with the trial court ruling for the insurance company. On appeal, the plaintiff/assignee from the underlying class action lawsuit now seeks to obtain insurance coverage so as to recover the $4 million settlement amount. We affirm the trial court's ruling in favor of the insurance company.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 122954 People
v. Viverette Filed 5-17-16 (TJJ)
By way of information, defendant Keith Viverette was charged with 12 counts of driving while his license was suspended or revoked (DWLR) in violation of five different subsections of section 6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. Defendant now appeals and argues: (1) his felony conviction must be reduced to a misdemeanor conviction because the first revocation of his driver's license was not for a specified offense listed in section 6-303(d-5) of the Code and, because his license was never reinstated, any subsequent license revocations listed on his driving abstract had no effect; (2) his 3-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) should be vacated because it was improperly imposed by the Department of Corrections (DOC); and (3) his mittimus should be corrected to reflect only one conviction for DWLR. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, remand with directions to correct the sentencing order in conformity with section 5-8-1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections and correct the mittimus to show only one conviction for DWLR.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 140435 People
v. Mujica Filed 5-17-16 (TJJ)
Defendant, Victor F. Mujica, appeals the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. He contends that it stated the gist of a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate defendant’s desire to accept the State’s plea offer. We affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (5th) 140334 People
v. Bryant Filed 5-17-16 (TJJ)
The defendant, John L. Bryant, appeals from the circuit court's order denying his second motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court's judgment but remand for a new sentencing hearing.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 140792 People
v. Buffkin Filed 5-16-16 (TJJ)
Defendant, Deveer D. Buffkin, appeals from the dismissal of his postconviction petition. However, he does not assert any error in that dismissal; instead, for the first time, he raises two claims attacking certain financial aspects of his sentence. The State confesses error. We accept that confession and grant the requested relief, though the precise grounds on which we may do so on his second claim require an explanation that neither party provides.
No. 2016 IL App (3d) 140523 McGrath
v. City of Kankakee Filed 5-16-16 (TJJ)
Plaintiff Barbara McGrath filed an amended class action complaint against defendant City of Kankakee (City) alleging that its impoundment ordinance was unconstitutional because it violated due process and was an unlawful attempt to use police powers to produce revenue. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her amended complaint. We affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (5th) 140056 Zagorski
v. Allstate Insurance Co. Filed 5-16-16 (TJJ)
The plaintiffs, Valentine Zagorski and Christina Zagorski, filed an action in the circuit court of St. Clair County, against the defendant, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), alleging a vexatious breach of contract and common law fraud in the handling of their homeowners' insurance claim. At the request of Allstate, and its attorney, Robert Brady, the circuit court held Brady in civil contempt for refusing to comply with a discovery order. The court also imposed a fine of $25 per day, which was stayed pending appeal. Allstate and Brady appeal the contempt order and the underlying discovery order. They contend that the circuit court erred in requiring them to answer interrogatories which seek information that is irrelevant to the plaintiffs' action or protected by a statutory privilege. For reasons that follow, we vacate the contempt order and monetary sanction, we affirm in part and reverse in part the underlying discovery order, and we remand this case with directions.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 142853 Trutin
v. Adam Filed 5-12-16 (TJJ)
This appeal arises from a landlord-tenant dispute brought under the Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (RLTO). The tenant, the plaintiff in this action, prevailed at trial and was awarded attorney fees and costs as a "prevailing plaintiff" under the RLTO. The landlords later brought a postjudgment petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2- 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the tenant opposed and the circuit court denied. The question presented is whether, under the RLTO, the tenant is entitled to fees and costs for successfully opposing that postjudgment petition in the circuit court. We hold that she is.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 143908 Khan
v. Department of Healthcare & Family Services
Filed 5-13-16 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Gowhar Khan, M.D., appeals the order of the circuit court affirming the decision of defendant, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (Healthcare Department), finding plaintiff provided medical care in the Illinois Medical Assistance Program (Medicaid) that was of grossly inferior quality, placed recipients at risk of harm, and was in excess of patient needs. Based on defendant's findings, plaintiff was suspended from the Medicaid program for 12 months. Plaintiff contends: (1) defendant's witness was not qualified to provide expert medical testimony: (2) the expert witness' testimony was speculative; (3) defendant failed to demonstrate harm as required by the statute; and (4) the administrative law judge (ALJ) made multiple factual errors. Based on the following, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 152479 In
re J.L. Filed 5-13-16 (TJJ)
Mario L. (Mario)1 appeals from (a) adjudication orders entered by the circuit court of Cook County finding that he abused and neglected three of his minor children and (b) a disposition order finding him unfit and adjudging the children wards of the court. Mario contends that the trial court's finding that his younger daughter was sexually abused was against the manifest weight of the evidence "because it was based on inadmissible hearsay evidence regarding statements made by" his older daughter. He also argues that his due process rights were violated because "he was denied the right to defend himself against the allegations and subsequent findings of sexual abuse against" the older daughter (C.L.). The Office of the Cook County Public Guardian (the Public Guardian) and the State assert that the findings were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence and that Mario's due process rights were not violated. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the orders of the circuit court.
No. 2016 IL App (4th) 150193 Diocese
of Quincy v. Episcopal Church Filed 5-13-16
Defendant-counterplaintiff, the Episcopal Church, and counterplaintiff-inintervention, the Diocese of Quincy of the Episcopal Church (Episcopal Diocese), n/k/a the Diocese of Chicago (collectively, the Church), appeal the trial court's order granting a motion to enforce a prior judgment filed by plaintiffs, the Diocese of Quincy (Diocese) and the Trustees of Funds and Property of the Diocese of Quincy (Trustees), and counterdefendants, Edward A. Den Blaauwen, Chris Potthoff, Leah Day, Le Roy Groff, Frank Dunaway, Mark L. Gamage, Bryce Dexter, Michael S. Brooks, Linda Terlesky, Warren Wilkins, Ronald R. Damewood, Jr., Nell German, Oscar P. Seara, Andrew Ainley, Kathi King, Ramsey Easterling, and Alberto Morales. The Church also appeals the trial court's award of sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. July 1, 2013). We affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 140486-B In
re H.L. Filed 5-12-16
Beginning in approximately 2010, respondent, H.L., became involved in the juvenile justice system, admitting to an allegation of mob action, for which he received a five-year term of probation. Respondent’s behavior would appear to improve, but then respondent would continue to take backward steps. In 2012, respondent admitted to an allegation of robbery, for which he received a modified term of probation to continue until his twenty-first birthday. In 2013, respondent admitted to a charge of unlawful possession of cannabis, and this time, the circuit court of De Kalb County sentenced respondent to an indeterminate term in the Department of Juvenile Justice (Department). In this appeal, respondent’s remaining issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in committing respondent to the Department for an indeterminate term. Respondent argues that the trial court failed to first consider less restrictive alternatives to indeterminate incarceration with the Department and that the trial court failed to address the appropriate factors in passing sentence. We vacate and remand for resentencing.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 150118 Libolt
v. Wiender Circle, Inc. Filed 5-11-16 (TJJ)
Plaintiff Leah Libolt sued defendant restaurant Wiener Circle, Inc., for injuries allegedly sustained in a fall at the restaurant. Wiener Circle filed a motion for summary judgment under section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After a full briefing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wiener Circle. Plaintiff appeals, contending summary judgment was improper because: (1) Wiener Circle owed her a duty of care as its invitee to protect her from or warn her of the dangers associated with the late night nature of its business; and (2) the issue of proximate cause should be presented to the jury. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2016 IL App (4th) 140502 People
v. Williams Filed 5-11-16 (TJJ)
This appeal arises from the trial court's May 2014 second-stage dismissal of an amended petition that defendant, James Williams, Jr., raised under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. In his October 2012 amended postconviction petition, defendant argued, in pertinent part, that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during guilty-plea negotiations with the State. Specifically, defendant contended that his counsel failed to accurately inform him of the possible penalties he faced on the State's charges for (1) attempt (first degree murder), (2) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, and (3) attempt (armed robbery). Defendant claimed that, as a result of counsel's failure, he rejected the State's 18-year guilty-plea offer and, instead, proceeded to trial where a jury found him guilty of all three charges. The trial court later imposed an aggregate sentence of 45 years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing his amended postconviction petition because he had alleged a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.We agree and reverse and remand with directions.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 150360 Naughton
v. Pfaff Filed 5-10-16 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Richard P. Naughton, appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, Bruce R. Pfaff and Pfaff & Gill, Ltd. Naughton argues that the trial court erred in ruling that an attorney who refers an individual to another attorney may not prevail on a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the receiving attorney if the client did not sign a contract complying with Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(f). We affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (3d) 150433 In
re Marriage of Van Ert Filed 5-10-16 (TJJ)
The marriage of respondent, Janet Van Ert, and petitioner, Larry Van Ert, was dissolved in 2005. Respondent filed a petition to vacate the judgment of dissolution pursuant to section 2- 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Respondent appeals from the dismissal of her petition on due diligence grounds. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2016 IL App (4th) 121049-B People
v. Breeden Filed 5-10-16 (TJJ)
The trial court sentenced defendant, Thomas Breeden, to 58 months' imprisonment for failure to register as a sex offender. He appealed, arguing the sentence was excessive. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court's sentencing decision, finding no abuse of discretion. People v. Breeden, 2014 IL App (4th) 121049, ¶ 59. On January 20, 2016, the supreme court denied a petition for leave to appeal filed by defendant but directed this court to vacate our judgment in the case and reconsider the matter in light of People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, to determine whether a different result is warranted. In accordance with the supreme court's direction, we vacate our prior judgment and reconsider the matter in light of Castleberry. After reconsideration, we vacate the three fines identified by the parties as improperly assessed by the circuit clerk (the $10 "Arrestee's Medical" fine, the $10 "St Police Services" fine, and the $5 "Drug Court Program" fine) and remand to the trial court for imposition of the mandatory fines and the application of appropriate credit against those fines. We otherwise affirm the trial court's judgment.
No. 2016 IL App (5th) 130514 People
v. Pollard Filed 5-10-16 (TJJ)
The defendant, Cedric Pollard, appeals the constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registration Act, the Sex Offender Community Notification Law (the Notification Law), and additional statutes, including those restricting his residency and presence in areas frequented by children, requiring him to renew his driver's license annually, and precluding him from petitioning for a name change. The defendant argues that this statutory scheme, which he labels as "the SORA Statutory Scheme," imposes lifelong affirmative disabilities and restraints that violate the due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2), in addition to the proportionate penalties guarantees of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). Following the persuasive, well-reasoned opinion in People v. Avila-Briones, 2015 IL App (1st) 132221, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 142143 People
v. Montgomery Filed 5-9-16 (TJJ)
After a bench trial, defendant, James Montgomery, was found guilty of being an armed habitual criminal, and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, after police seized guns and ammunition at defendant's home during the execution of a search warrant. The court sentenced defendant to two concurrent seven-year sentences. On appeal, defendant argues that the AHC and UUWF statutes are unconstitutional because they infringe on his second amendment right to bear arms in self-defense. U.S. Const., amend. II. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 142790 Mizyed
v. Palos Community Hospital Filed 5-9-16 (TJJ)
Plaintiff-appellant Saleh Mizyed appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment dismissing his medical malpractice complaint against the defendant-appellant Palos Community Hospital (Palos), which was premised on Palos' vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of Mizyed's treating physicians. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 140357 People
v. Walsh Filed 5-9-16 (TJJ)
Defendant, Kody Walsh, while seated in the Ford Explorer of Ebert Davison, a friend of his, shot Lori Daniels in the back of the head. He then, at gunpoint, made Davison continue driving; forced Davison out of the car once they arrived at Davison’s house in Beloit; led police on a high-speed chase, taking a selfie while doing so; and shot at police after crashing Davison’s car and while fleeing the scene. Based on these facts, a jury found defendant guilty of numerous offenses, including first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 110 years’ imprisonment. On his murder conviction, the court sentenced defendant to 55 years’ imprisonment and imposed an additional 45-year term based on the fact that defendant personally discharged a firearm that caused Daniels’ death (firearm add-on) Defendant moved the court to reconsider his sentence, arguing that it was excessive, and the court denied the motion. In this timely appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in imposing the 45-year firearm add-on, because (1) that term was based on unrelated firearm offenses, not the murder of Daniels; and (2) the court had already considered those offenses in assessing the 55-year sentence for the murder. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 150340 People
v. Swanson Filed 5-9-16 (TJJ)
The State appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County granting defendant Scott S. Swanson’s motion to suppress evidence and his petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension. Because the warrantless entry into defendant’s home, which was justified by neither consent nor the need for emergency aid, violated the fourth amendment, the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress and the petition to rescind. Thus, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 133497 People
v. Boston Filed 5-6-16 (TJJ)
Defendant Sylvester Boston was charged by indictment with possession of contraband in a penal institution. The indictment specifically alleged he possessed a shank that was discovered in his waist band while in the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) on July 23, 2010.1 After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of that offense and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury regarding the defense of necessity and that his right to present a meaningful defense was violated when the trial court limited or excluded certain evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 152738 Wells
Fargo Bank N.A. v. Bednarz Filed 5-6-16 (TJJ)
The plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., filed an action under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, seeking to foreclose on residential property owned by the defendant, Chester Bednarz. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that it relied upon form allegations contained in section 15- 1504(c) of the Foreclosure Law which violate the procedural due process guarantees of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV), and the separation of powers doctrine of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion and subsequently entered summary judgment for Wells Fargo. The defendant now appeals, challenging only the court's denial of his motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (3d) 140262 People
v. Jordan Filed 5-6-16 (TJJ)
Defendant, David Jordan, pled guilty to first degree murder. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. Defendant appeals arguing that postplea counsel failed to strictly comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) because he did not certify that he consulted with defendant to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the entry of the guilty plea. We reverse and remand for new postplea proceedings.
No. 2016 IL App (3d) 150519 Eizenga
v. Unity Christian School of Fulton, Illinois
Filed 5-6-16 (TJJ)
The plaintiff, Dale A. Eizenga, as the Trustee of the Walter B. Westendorf Trust, filed an interpleader action against numerous defendants, including Unity Christian School of Fulton and Camp Courageous of Iowa, and alleged that Westendorf’s attorney, Russell J. Holesinger, exerted undue influence over Westendorf regarding the gift of nearly the entirety of the Trust estate to Unity Christian School. Holesinger refused to disclose certain documents in discovery, alleging that they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The circuit court disagreed and ordered Holesinger to produce the documents. Holesinger appealed after he was found in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s order. On appeal, Holesinger argues that the circuit court erred when it ruled that the documents were not protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. He also requests that we vacate the order finding him in contempt for failing to comply with the circuit court’s order to disclose the documents. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 141388 Jackson
v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago
Filed 5-3-16 (TJJ)
Defendant Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Board) terminated petitioner Victor Jackson's employment as a tenured teacher for violation of Board's rules and policy finding that he failed to immediately report that his principal asked him to cheat on the Illinois Standard Achievement Test (ISAT) and for falsifying his employment application by omitting his previous employment and discharge with the Chicago police department (CPD). After a hearing, the hearing officer found the Board did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence any of the charges against Jackson and recommended reinstatement. The Board accepted the hearing officer's findings of fact and the conclusion that Jackson did not participate in the cheating, but terminated Jackson's employment for failing to report the test irregularities and for falsifying his employment application. Following Jackson's complaint for administrative review, the circuit court held that the Board's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, reversed the Board's order and reinstated Jackson with back pay and benefits. Affirmed.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 151762 Kreczko
v. Triangle Package Machinery Co. Filed 5-3-16
After receiving several customer complaints about his job performance and unprofessional behavior, Triangle Package Machinery Company fired Andrew Kreczko. Four months later, Triangle hired a younger, Hispanic employee to fill Kreczko's position. Kreczko, 51, sued Triangle alleging age, disability, and racial discrimination. The trial court dismissed the racial discrimination claim, and later granted Triangle's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims, finding (i) Kreczko failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination because it was shown that Kreczko fell short in meeting his legitimate performance expectations, and (ii) Triangle's reason for firing Kreczko was not a pretext for unlawful discrimination. We affirm. The record shows Triangle terminated Kreczko for unsatisfactory job performance and this reason was not pretextual. Further, the trial court correctly let the entire affidavit stand as being made on personal knowledge except for a single paragraph, which was stricken.
No. 2016 IL App (3d) 140990 In
re Marriage of Labuz Filed 5-3-16 (TJJ)
The circuit court of Peoria County entered a final judgment for dissolution of marriage which dissolved the parties’ marriage and ordered respondent Jeffrey Labuz (Jeffrey) to pay maintenance and child support. A postnuptial agreement signed by the parties was incorporated into the judgment. Jeffrey did not contest the entry of the judgment at the time it was entered. However, approximately five months later, Jeffrey filed a motion to vacate the judgment for dissolution of marriage pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that the parties’ postnuptial agreement was unconscionable. Jeffrey subsequently filed an amended motion to vacate the judgment which raised essentially the same arguments. Karen filed a motion for summary judgment. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on Jeffrey’s motion, the circuit court denied the motion. Jeffrey filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 150643 In
re Parentage of G.E. Filed 5-2-16 (TJJ)
Respondent, Nicole O., appeals the judgments of the trial court declining to stay contempt proceedings brought against her by petitioner, Michael N., and holding her in civil contempt of court. We hold that the record is inadequate for our review, as the bystander’s report submitted by respondent is not in compliance with the procedures set forth in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (eff. Dec. 13, 2005) for the preparation and certification of a bystander’s report. Therefore, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 150677 Hancock
v. Village of Itasca Filed 5-2-16 (TJJ)
On June 27, 2013, plaintiff, David E. Hancock, a former police officer employed by the Village of Itasca (Village), filed a two-count complaint in the circuit court of Du Page County against the Village. In count I, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that, because he suffered a catastrophic injury, the Village was obligated, pursuant to section 10(a) of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, to pay the entire premium for his coverage under the Village’s health-insurance plan. In count II, plaintiff sought an order of mandamus compelling the Village to pay the premium. The trial court entered summary judgment for the Village on the basis that plaintiff suffered his injury before the effective date of the Act. We affirm because, regardless of whether the Act would otherwise apply, plaintiff’s action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
No. 2016 IL App (2d) 160115 Wiesner
v. Brennan Filed 5-2-16 (TJJ)
Jennifer Shilakis Wiesner (Candidate) filed nomination papers to be a candidate of the Democratic Party for nomination to the office of resident circuit court judge for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Du Page County, in the March 15, 2016, general primary election. After Joan C. Brennan (Objector) filed objections to the nomination papers, the Du Page County Election Commission (Commission) found Candidate to be ineligible to be on the ballot pursuant to section 7-10 of the Illinois Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2014)). On judicial review, the trial court set aside the Commission’s decision and ordered that Candidate’s name be placed on the ballot. On March 3, 2016, this court entered a written order affirming the judgment of the trial court and reversing the Commission’s order, stating that the Commission’s “decision to remove the Candidate from the March 15 primary ballot was reversible error.” Our written order also stated that a “full disposition will be filed in due course.” This is that disposition.