IL 114899 In
re Lance H.
Filed 10-17-14 (RJC)
This Randolph County case concerns the procedure
for how, at a hearing on a petition for involuntary admission
to a mental health facility, a circuit court must deal with
the subject individual’s oral request in his testimony for
The 53-year-old respondent in this case has spent much of his adult life either incarcerated or institutionalized, having been admitted to mental health facilities fifteen times since the 2008 conclusion of his sentence for parole violations. In that year, he was involuntarily admitted to Chester Mental Health Center. On April 28, 2011, a petition for his involuntary admission was filed in the circuit court, certified by a psychiatrist at the center and supported, at the subsequent hearing, by the testimony of a center social worker. The respondent, who was represented by counsel, testified on his own behalf, expressing his desire for voluntary, rather than involuntary, admission. No oral or written motion as to this was filed by his attorney. The circuit court committed him involuntarily to the center and he appealed.
In 2012, after the term of commitment at issue here had ended and its issues might be considered moot, the appellate court reversed, finding the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine to be applicable. The supreme court did not disagree that a mootness exception was applicable in the appeal which followed. However, the appellate court had reversed the circuit court’s involuntary commitment order, holding that the circuit court should have considered and ruled on the respondent’s request for voluntary admission. On this point, the Illinois Supreme Court did not agree with the appellate court and reversed it.
IL 115102 People
Filed 10-17-14 (RJC)
In 2008, this defendant was 15 years old and
residing at the John Costigan Center in Schaumburg, a
residential treatment facility for adolescents, which was run
by Streamwood Health Systems. A ward of the State, he was
arrested on a Sunday evening in the lobby of the facility,
charged with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual
assault of a social worker, and transferred from juvenile
court to criminal court pursuant to the Illinois automatic
transfer statute. He was found fit for trial and, after a Cook
County jury convicted him, he was sentenced to 36 years in
prison based on 12 consecutive terms for each count. The
appellate court, however, had ordered a new trial, and the
The victim was a woman who was a 25-year-old staff member at the facility and who had just given the defendant a ride to it from a weekend family visit. She alleged that he forced her to drive off the main road to a location where he sexually assaulted her. She sustained bruises and there was evidence of damage to the vehicle which indicated a struggle, but no DNA evidence was found providing a link to the defendant.
At his trial in the circuit court, the defendant was unsuccessful on his motion to suppress his police station confession, and the Rape Shield statute was applied to overcome his efforts to have the victim’s sexual history admitted into evidence.
The appellate court took the opposite view on both of these issues and ordered a new trial, opining that the confession should have been suppressed and that the victim’s sexual history should have been admitted. Statute requires that, when a minor is arrested, a “reasonable attempt” must be made to notify the parent or legally responsible person. The defendant argued that this statute was not complied with and that this called for suppression of his inculpatory statement.
A Schaumburg police officer who was the youth officer assigned to the defendant’s case testified at the suppression hearing that both the defendant’s caseworker from the Department of Children and Family Services and the director of the residential facility were that night notified by telephone of the defendant’s arrest, but that the caseworker did not return the phone call for two days. He also testified that the director gave permission that night to speak with the defendant and search the vehicle. At the suppression hearing, the director was unable to recall giving permission, but never denied giving it. The youth officer testified that he read Miranda rights to the defendant, and that he was present at the questioning, but that the interrogation was conducted by another officer. The defendant did not claim at the suppression hearing that he was threatened, mistreated or coerced by the police, that he failed to understand the interrogation process, that he asked to speak to another adult, or that he told the officers that he was a special education student with trouble reading and writing. The circuit court, however, had viewed the defendant as “astute.” It found that the youth officer had done his duty and that the confession was voluntary.
IL 115805 Lake
County Grading Co. v. Village of Antioch Filed
This is a public construction bond case. In the
Village of Antioch in Lake County, two residential
subdivisions were built by a developer, Neumann Homes, Inc.,
which is not a party to this appeal and which declared
bankruptcy in 2007. Neumann had entered into an agreement with
defendant Village to provide certain public improvements and,
for this purpose, subcontracted with plaintiff Lake County
Grading, Inc., to furnish labor and materials. Plaintiff did
so, but was not fully paid by Neumann. Subcontractors
have no right to a mechanics’ lien against public bodies in
Illinois. Therefore, the Public Construction Bond Act was
enacted by the legislature to protect such subcontractors by
requiring surety bonds for public construction that guarantee
payment for labor and materials furnished over certain
amounts, which were involved here. The bonds provided by
Neumann to the Village did not contain specific provisions for
such payment. Neumann defaulted on its contractual
obligations to the Village and, although plaintiff Lake County
Grading was not fully paid, plaintiff could not seek to
recover under the bonds themselves because its claims for
payment were filed too late, beyond the 180-day limitations
period called for in the Bond Act. Plaintiff claimed in this
suit that it was a third-party beneficiary of the contracts
between Neumann and the Village and that the Village, in not
including a specific provision referring to payment of
subcontractors, had breached its contractual obligations by
not complying with the Bond Act. Therefore, plaintiff
theorized, the Village was liable to compensate it for the
unpaid claims. The circuit court of Lake County awarded
summary judgment to the plaintiff and the appellate court
IL 116203 Hayashi
v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional
Filed 10-17-14 (RJC)
These consolidated appeals involving revocation
of health care licenses come from Cook County. The plaintiffs
in these cases are one chiropractor and two physicians. Their
licenses to practice were revoked under a statute which became
effective on August 20, 2011, and which calls for permanent
revocation of health care licenses for certain criminal
convictions involving patients or for being required to
register as a sex offender. All of the plaintiffs qualified
for revocation under this statute, but their convictions had
been entered before its effective date. Contending that the
2011 enactment was improperly retroactive, the plaintiffs
challenged its application to them on a number of theories and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the circuit
court which, however, dismissed the actions. The appellate
court consolidated the appeals and affirmed the dismissals.
No. 2014 IL App (2d) 131082 People
v. Hernandez Filed 10-20-14 (TJJ)
Following a stipulated bench trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder after he and his brother, Edwin Hernandez, set fire to a home, killing a 12-year-old boy and seriously injuring the boy’s family members (including the boy’s mother, who was apparently paralyzed after she jumped from a second-story window to escape the fire). The crime was gang-related, and the intended target of the crime was not home. During the investigation, defendant, in a videotaped statement, confessed to the crime. The court denied his motion to suppress the confession. Because the denial of his motion to suppress could not be appealed if he entered a guilty plea, defendant proceeded with a stipulated bench trial to preserve his appellate rights regarding the confession’s admissibility. After finding defendant guilty and denying defendant’s posttrial motion (which attacked the suppression ruling), the court sentenced defendant to 84 years’ imprisonment, followed by years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Defendant appealed, arguing that the confession should have been suppressed (and challenging his eligibility for extended-term sentencing and a public defender fee), and this court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. People v. Hernandez, 2012 IL App (2d) 110817-U. On June 4, 2013, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to section 122- 1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, arguing: (1) that the application of MSR was unconstitutional; and (2) that he was denied effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The petition is signed by defendant and notarized. One notarized affidavit, from Edwin, is attached to the petition. In his affidavit, Edwin attests that, on the night of the crime, defendant was asleep and did not leave his house. Further, Edwin attests that he wanted to testify at defendant’s trial, that he told this to defendant and defendant informed his attorney, but that defendant told him that his attorney did not respond to the information and no one contacted Edwin about testifying. Finally, in a handwritten note included with his petition, defendant writes that he was waiting for an affidavit from Nidia Hernandez (his sister), but that, due to mail delays, he had not yet received it. On September 19, 2013, in a lengthy written decision, the court denied the postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant appeals. Because defendant’s allegations are directly contradicted by the record and he cannot establish prejudice, we affirm.
No. 2014 IL App (1st) 122868 People
v. Hall Filed 10-20-14 (TJJ)
Defendant Thomas Hall appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. On appeal, defendant contends that he was subject to an improper double enhancement at sentencing because a prior conviction was used both as an element of the instant offense and to find him eligible for a Class X sentence. Defendant acknowledges that he did not include this issue in his pro se postconviction petition, but argues that his sentence is void, thus, this issue may be raised at any time. We agree with defendant, and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
No. 2014 IL App (5th) 130582 American
Service Insurance v. Miller Filed 10-17-14 (TJJ)
Defendant David Miller appeals the orders of the circuit court of St. Clair County that awarded Miller sanctions. The plaintiff, American Service Insurance, cross-appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2014 IL App (1st) 112615 Garland
v. Sybaris Club International, Inc. Filed 10-16-14
The instant cause arises from the death of Scott Garland. Garland's surviving spouse, plaintiff Jennifer Garland, filed a complaint against numerous persons and entities following Garland's death. By her complaint, plaintiff sought recovery for Garland's death on a number of grounds. As to the Levinson defendants, plaintiff alleged that Levinson had been negligent in entrusting the aircraft to Turek, whom, she alleged, was not qualified to fly that particular kind of airplane. As to Knudson, plaintiff alleged negligent entrustment of the aircraft as well as negligent supervision, alleging that Knudson, who was onboard the doomed flight, failed to properly supervise Turek during the flight itself. As to HK, owner of the aircraft, plaintiff alleged it was vicariously liable for its agents, Levinson and Knudson. Plaintiff also sued Sybaris, a group of hotels whose president and founder was Knudson, who conducted the doomed flight in the course of Sybaris business and was, allegedly, a de facto owner of the aircraft. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her ninth amended complaint pursuant to section 2- 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the named parties herein. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
No. 2014 IL App (1st) 120586 People
v. Pena Filed 10-15-14 (TJJ)
After a bench trial, defendant Daniel Pena appeals his conviction for aggravated battery of a peace officer, contending that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the officer's testimony was not credible and was disputed by a videotape of the incident. Pena also contends that he was denied his constitutional right to self-representation, and that the trial court failed to conduct a proper inquiry into his pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court sentenced Pena to six years' imprisonment as a Class X offender based on his criminal history. We affirm.
No. 2014 IL App (3d) 120773 People
v. Pollock Filed 10-15-14 (TJJ)
A Henry County jury convicted defendant, Tabitha Pollock, of aggravated battery and felony murder of her 3½-year-old daughter. This court affirmed. People v. Pollock, 309 Ill. App. 3d 400 (1999). A divided panel of our supreme court found “insufficient evidence to support the inference that, prior to [the daughter’s] death, [defendant] knew [her paramour] was abusing her children.” People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 220 (2002). As such, the court reversed Pollock’s conviction without remand. Id. at 224. Following the reversal, Pollock filed a petition for a certificate of innocence pursuant to section 2-702 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. The matter proceeded to a hearing, after which the circuit court denied Pollock’s petition. She appeals. We affirm.
No. 2014 IL App (1st) 121740 People
v. Alvidrez Filed 10-15-14 (TJJ)
Defendant Jose Alvidrez was tried and found guilty by a jury of the first degree murder of his 18-month-old son, Joshua Alvidrez, who died as a result of a severe head injury suffered at home while under defendant's care. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment and now appeals contending the trial court erred when it precluded his expert from testifying about the amount of force required to cause Joshua's brain injuries. Defendant also contends that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during its closing and rebuttal arguments by disparaging his character and that of his expert, thereby prejudicing the jury. Lastly, Defendant contends that he is entitled to additional days of presentence credit and that the trial court improperly levied various fines, fees and costs against him. We affirm.
IL App (1st) 131036 Nelson
v. Country Mutual Insurance Company Filed
a bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of
defendant-appellee Country Mutual Insurance Company (Country
Mutual) and against plaintiff-appellant Forest Lee Nelson
(Nelson).1 Nelson appeals, attacking not this final judgment
but, rather, a prior order We note for the record that the
party designations in this cause are somewhat confused,
perhaps due to the fact that the cause began in the chancery
division of the trial court and later was entered by the
trial court vacating an arbitration award, granting summary
judgment in favor of Country Mutual and allowing trial in
the first place. He contends that the underinsured
endorsement provision to the insurance policy at issue did
not provide the option for a trial to take place, and that
the provision, which was the basis for the arbitration
award's rejection, was ambiguous. He asks that we reverse
the judgment of the trial court, that we reinstate the
arbitration award, and that we remand the cause for
determination of the proper setoffs to the award. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
IL App (1st) 142771 Mabwa
v. Mendoza Filed 10-08-14 (LJD)
On July 22, 2014, plaintiffs filed a petition with the Office of the City Clerk of the City of Chicago which requested that the voters of the 18th precinct in the 27th ward be able to vote in the upcoming November 4, 2014, election on the question of whether: "the sale at retail of alcoholic liquor be prohibited in this 18th precinct of the 27th ward of the City of Chicago (as such precinct existed as of the last general election)?" Defendant Susana A. Mendoza, the Clerk of the City of Chicago, did not certify the petition as valid, and plaintiffs then sought a writ of mandamus from the trial ourt to order the clerk to certify the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.
IL App (1st) 133964 Pirrello
v. Maryville Academy, Inc.Filed 10-08-14 (LJD)
Plaintiff, Brandy Pirrello, appeals from partial summary judgment entered in favor of defendant, Maryville Academy, Inc., finding that Pirrello was not entitled to recover medical expenses incurred prior to her eighteenth birthday under a section of the Rights of Married Persons Act commonly referred to as the Family Expense Act (750 ILCS 65/15(a)(1) (West 2008)). The trial court found that the claim under the Act did not relate back to the filing of Pirrello's original complaint on July 16, 2009, and was thus barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The court further denied Pirrello leave to file a third amended complaint adding her father as a party. We agree that the claim under the Act is time-barred and affirm.
IL App (3rd) 120905 People
v. Holman Filed 10-08-14 (LJD)
a jury trial, defendant, Exulam Holman, was convicted of
aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1),
12-3.3(a) (West 2010)) and was sentenced to 14 years in
prison. Defendant appeals, challenging both his conviction
and his sentence. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
IL App 4th) 120887 People
v. Brown Filed 10-08-14 (LJD)
Defendant, Michael B. Brown, appeals the trial court's first-stage dismissal of his postconviction petition, arguing the court erred in finding the petition frivolous and patently without merit where he raised the gist of a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We reverse and remand for second-stage proceedings.
IL App (1st) 113534 People
v. Hood Filed 10-08-14 (LJD)
IL App (2nd) 130327 People
v. Yaworski Filed 10-06-14 (LJD)
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of De Kalb County, defendant, Glenn A. Yaworski, was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of section 11-501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2004)) and driving while his icense was revoked (DWLR) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2004)). Defendant received a Class 2 felony sentence of 3½ years’ imprisonment for DUI pursuant to section 11-501(c-1)(3) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(c-1)(3) (West 2004)). The trial court vacated the DWLR conviction. In an arlier appeal, we affirmed defendant’s DUI conviction and his sentence for that offense. Thereafter, on February 29, 2012, defendant, while on mandatory supervised release (MSR), filed a pro se petition under the Post- Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012)), challenging the enhancement of the offense of DUI to a Class 2 felony. The trial court appointed the office of the De Kalb County public defender to represent defendant in the postconviction proceedings. Assistant Public Defender Charles Criswell appeared on defendant’s behalf. Criswell had represented defendant at trial. The State successfully moved to dismiss defendant’s petition and this appeal followed. Defendant argues that, because the petition claimed that he had not received the effective assistance of counsel at trial, Criswell labored under a conflict of interest in the ostconviction proceedings. We agree, and we therefore vacate and remand for further proceedings.
IL App (5th) 130325 People
v. Helm Filed 10-06-14 (LJD)
The State filed a complaint under section 15 of the Illinois Animal Control Act (Act) (510 ILCS 5/15 (West 2012)) and sought an order declaring Roscoe, a dog owned by the defendant, William P. Helm, to be a vicious dog within the meaning of section 2.19b of the Act (510 ILCS 5/2.19b West 2012)). After a bench trial, the circuit court declared Roscoe to be a vicious dog and ordered that he be humanely euthanized. The court also ordered the defendant to pay a $100 public safety fine. On appeal, the defendant contends that the circuit court erred in declaring Roscoe to be a icious dog where the evidence established that his conduct was justified under section 15(a)(3) of the Act (510 ILCS 5/15(a)(3) (West 2012)), because he was protecting a member of his household. We affirm.
IL App (1st) 140342 Andrews
v. Gonzalez Filed 10-03-14 (LJD)
Plaintiff, William T. Andrews, filed suit against defendant, Dagoberto Gonzalez (Dagoberto), to recover an outstanding judgment awarded in a personal injury lawsuit against G & G Cement Contractors (G&G), a partnership of which Dagoberto was the sole surviving partner. The circuit court ranted Dagoberto's motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4) (West 2012)), finding that plaintiff's claim was barred by res judicata because Dagoberto was a named defendant in the prior underlying action and was found ot liable for negligence. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his claim against Dagoberto because various provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) (Act) (805 ILCS 206/100 et seq. (West 2012)) and sections 2-410 and 2-411 of the Code (735 ILCS /2-410, 2-411 (West 2012)) demonstrate that res judicata does not bar a judgment creditor of a partnership from enforcing an outstanding judgment against a partner who was named individually in the underlying lawsuit. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remand the cause for further proceedings.
IL App (5th) 130244 Illini
Environmental, Inc. v. The Environmental Protection Agency
Filed 10-03-14 (LJD)
llini Environmental, Inc. (Illini), appeals from the trial court's May 6, 2013, order denying its motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Illini argues that dismissal of an enforcement action filed by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency) against Illini was res judicata on certain issues of fact in Illini's declaratory judgment action. Illini claims that the EPA accepted its proffered "Compliance Commitment Agreement" and therefore cannot pursue enforcement on one of the two violation notices. Illini also argues that the trial court erred in finding that Illini was responsible for determining whether waste was hazardous. Illini further argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Illini violated Illinois law in listing itself as a generator of waste that it transported from another company to an Illinois landfill. Finally, Illini argues that the trial court was incorrect in concluding that the Illinois EPA complied with applicable law when it posted information on its website about Illini's violations. We affirm.
IL App 116362 Goldfine
v. Barack, Ferrazzano, Kirschbaum & PerlmanFiled
This legal malpractice action comes from Cook County. The plaintiffs are Morton and Adrienne Goldfine. In the years 1987 through 1990, they worked with broker Michael Steinberg, of the Peoria office of investment firm Shearson Lehman Brothers, to purchase $4.5 million worth of stock in First Capital Holdings. That stock became worthless in 1991 after First Capital’s bankruptcy. Plaintiff had a number of claims against Steinberg and Shearson arising from their stock purchases. Their claims for common law fraud and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act were ultimately settled in 2007 for $3.2 million in what is referred to here as the “underlying” lawsuit. However, their claim for violation of the Illinois Securities Law of 1953 was held to be time-barred for failure of plaintiffs’ attorneys to timely file the required notice called for by that securities statute. Those attorneys are the firm of Barack, Ferrazzano, Kirschbaum & Perlman, the defendants here, who are accused of malpractice in the plaintiffs’ loss of their statutory claim. That is the case which is at issue here.
IL App (3rd) 120978 People
v. Perez Filed 10-01-14 (LJD)
Respondent, Valerie Perez, was in traffic court waiting to appear on a speeding ticket. When the court took a recess, respondent exited the courtroom and was overheard by a bailiff saying, “I waited all fucking morning and now she takes a break.” After the bailiff relayed the comment to the court, the trial judge returned to the bench and instructed the State to prepare and file a petition for contempt. The court denied the defense request for a short continuance to prepare for trial and presided over a hearing on the same date as the alleged misconduct. After finding respondent guilty of indirect criminal contempt, the court sentenced respondent to serve eight days in custody. Respondent appeals. We reverse.