No. 2017 IL App (1st) 131097 People
v. Buckhanan Filed 2-7-16 (TJJ)
We reverse the disqualification of Buckhanan’s counsel and remand for a new trial. Nothing in the State’s theory of disqualification, either as originally articulated or as revised after the hearing, warranted depriving Buckhanan of his chosen counsel. And although the State’s evidence was more than sufficient to sustain Buckhanan’s conviction, the error in disqualifying his attorney, standing alone, mandates reversal of the circuit court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 132884 People
v. Faulkner Filed 2-10-17 (TJJ)
Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County found defendant Dorian Faulkner guilty of one count of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) and two counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon (UUWF), and sentenced him to six years of imprisonment. On direct appeal, he argues that: (1) his AHC conviction should be reversed because it was predicated on a prior conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) that was based on a statute found to be unconstitutional and void by People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116; and (2) his AHC and UUWF convictions should be reversed because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition recovered by the police. On August 31, 2015, we issued an opinion affirming the UUWF convictions but reversing the AHC conviction. People v. Faulkner, 2015 IL App (1st) 132884. In September 2016, our supreme court issued a supervisory order directing us to reconsider that judgment in light of its decision in People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424. We now affirm the convictions for both AHC as well as UUWF.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143150 People
v. Bingham Filed 2-10-17 (TJJ)
Following a bench trial in September 2014, the trial court convicted defendant, Jerome Bingham, of theft, which was elevated to a Class 4 felony due to a previous retail theft conviction, and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. Defendant had a prior conviction in 1983 for attempted criminal sexual assault for which he had not been required to register as a sex offender because the conviction occurred prior to enactment of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2012)), in 1986. Under section 3(c)(2.1) of the Act (730 ILCS 150/3(c)(2.1) (West 2012)), as amended in 2011, defendant’s 2014 felony theft conviction in this case required him to register as a sex offender for the 1983 attempted criminal sexual assault. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him; (2) the Act violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions; (3) his theft conviction was improperly elevated from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony, and the trial court improperly imposed an enhanced three-year sentence for the Class 4 felony conviction; and (4) the trial court erroneously imposed a DNA analysis fee and failed to apply the $5 per day credit for presentence incarceration to several charges that qualify as fines. We affirm defendant’s conviction, three-year sentence, and the requirement that he register as a sex offender. We vacate his DNA analysis fee, credit him with $65 as against his fines, and direct the clerk of the circuit court to modify the fines and fees order accordingly.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152730 Nationstar
Mortgage LLC v. Missirlian Filed 2-10-17 (TJJ)
In a mortgage foreclosure action, a mortgage assignee’s lack of a license to conduct the business of residential mortgage lending was not a basis to invalidate the assignment, and thus, the trial court erred when it concluded the assignee lacked standing to pursue foreclosure, denied confirmation of the foreclosure sale, and dismissed the foreclosure action.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160098 In
re Marriage of Wendy L. D. Filed 2-10-17 (TJJ)
Petitioner-Appellant Wendy L. D., n/k/a Wendy L. S. (Wendy), appeals from the December 31, 2015 order awarding custody of the parties’ children to respondent-appellee George T. D. (George). For the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the circuit court of Cook County.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162381 In
re Manual M. Filed 2-10-17 (TJJ)
The respondent, Manuel M., appeals from the trial court's judgment adjudicating him a delinquent minor by reason of his commission of two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and the resulting sentence of 18 months' probation and 30 days' commitment to the Juvenile Temporary Detention Center with the order of commitment stayed. For the reasons which follow, we reverse the respondent’s delinquency adjudication and sentence and remand the matter for a new trial.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160042 Lindsey
v. Butterfield Health Care II, Inc. Filed
In this consolidated appeal, the defendant Butterfield Health Care II, Inc., doing business as Meadowbrook Manor of Naperville (Meadowbrook), claims that certain of its documents are privileged and that the circuit court of Du Page County should not have ordered it to produce them during discovery in a lawsuit filed against it by plaintiff, Jannie Lindsey, as the guardian of Laura Lindsey. Meadowbrook insists that the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2101 et seq. (West 2014)) and the Long-Term Care Peer Review and Quality Assessment and Assurance Protection Act (the Quality Assurance Act) (745 ILCS 55/1 et seq. (West 2014)) protect it against having to disclose those documents. We agree with the trial court that the documents at issue should be produced.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 140627 People
v. Pepitone Filed 2-9-17 (TJJ)
The defendant, Marc A. Pepitone, was convicted of being a child sex offender in a public park (720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b) (West 2012)) and was sentenced to 24 months of conditional discharge, 100 hours of public service, and $400 in fines and costs. On appeal, Pepitone argues that (1) section 11-9.4-1(b) is unconstitutional on its face because it bears no reasonable relationship to protecting the public and (2) section 11-9.4-1(b) violates the ex post facto clause because his prior conviction occurred before section 11-9.4-1(b) took effect. We hold that section 11-9.4-1(b) is facially unconstitutional and therefore reverse the circuit court’s judgment.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160775 American
Access Casualty Company v. Alcauter Filed
Defendant Kimberly Krebs, the other driver involved in the car accident with Alcauter, filed a motion for sanctions against AACC and Newman, arguing that she had informed Newman of Alcauter’s arrest and detention prior to trial and that AACC proceeded to trial anyway. The trial court granted Krebs’s request for sanctions. AACC appeals, arguing that Newman reasonably relied on the representations of counsel assigned to represent Alcauter at the arbitration that Alcauter had been contacted about the arbitration. While conceding that the facts did not support its declaratory-judgment action, AACC argues that it should not be faulted simply for advocating a losing cause. We affirm the imposition of sanctions. The record shows that, well before the scheduled trial date, Newman was informed of the possibility that Alcauter had been incarcerated. Yet Newman did no serious investigation of that possibility and failed to forthrightly bring Alcauter’s arrest to the attention of the trial court. Instead, AACC and Newman elected to proceed to trial, knowing that its declaratory-judgment claim lacked factual support.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161144 Smith v. American Heartland Insurance Company Filed 2-6-17 (MGB)
Plaintiff sustained injuries while a passenger in a vehicle owned by Pearson which was struck by a hit and run driver. Pearson's insurance coverage was split between Defendant (liability and uninsured) and another (collision). Pearson had not yet been provided with policies at the time of collision, but had a card naming each insurer but not specifying which coverage each provided. UIM policy required notice within 120 days for hit and run incidents. Plaintiff's attorney, using information provided by Pearson, notified collision carrier of claim, but not Defendant. Defendant, once notified and after taking several months to investigate claim, denied coverage based upon lack of timely notice. Based on the above, the 120-day notice provision Heartland seeks to enforce against Smith is a dilution or diminution of the uninsured motorist statute and is therefore against public policy as applied to her. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of judgment in favor of Smith, and her claim for uninsured motorist benefits should proceed to arbitration.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161499 The Forest Preserve District of Cook County, Illinois v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council Filed 2-7-17 (MGB)
Union represents a bargaining unit of sergeants employed
by the District. The Union filed two grievances
regarding the placement of newly promoted patrol
officers on the sergeant’s salary schedule. The Union
argued that newly promoted sergeants should be placed on
the sergeant’s salary schedule based on their years of
service with the District. The District maintained the
Personnel Rules governed. Those rules provide that a
newly promoted sergeant’s salary is comparable to a two
step increase on the patrol officer’s salary schedule,
regardless of his or her tenure with the District. The
Arbitrator sustained the Union's grievances. The
Trial Court reversed the Arbitator's Decision, finding
for the Disctrict. Establishing that an arbitrator has
failed to interpret the collective bargaining agreement
and has, instead, imposed his or her own personal view
of right and wrong on the labor dispute presents a huge
challenge. . Nevertheless, we agree with the circuit
court that the District has cleared this hurdle.
Arbitrator Cox’s rationale for deviating from the
Personnel Rules was the District’s “long established
practice” of paying newly promoted sergeants based on
their years of service. But, as the circuit court noted,
Arbitrator Cox provides no examples of this historical
practice. Neither does the Union. Moreover, even if the
Union could provide evidence of the District’s practice
of deviating from the Personnel Rules, a long-standing
policy outside of the CBA does not draw its essence from
the CBA. Thus, the circuit court correctly vacated the
award of the Arbitrator.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160536 Doe v. Carlson Filed 2-7-17 (MGB)
This case arises from Cherie Carlson’s alleged sexual
abuse of Jane Doe, beginning when Doe was 16 years old.
Alleged abuse occurred when Doe was 16 t0 20 years
old, ending in 1999. Doe filed suit against Carlson, among
others, on November 15, 2013. Carlson moved to dismiss the
suit on the grounds that the statute of limitations had
expired in 2001, two years after Doe knew or should have
known both that the abuse occurred and that her injury was
caused by the abuse. The trial court agreed and
grantedthe Motion to Dismiss. Ordinarily, the issue of
when the statute of limitations begins to run under the
discovery rule is one of fact, but when the answer is
clear from the pleadings, we may decide this issue as a
matter of law. Doe does not allege her memories of the
abuse were repressed. Further, while she denied awareness
of the fact that the contact between her and Carlson was
criminal, she admitted that she knew the contact was
“wrong” and “inappropriate” at the time it was occurring.
Doe elaborated that she did not believe her encounters
with Carlson amounted to a consensual dating or sexual
relationship. It is well-settled that under the discovery
rule a plaintiff need not appreciate the criminality of
the conduct at issue to be charged with knowledge that her
injury was wrongfully caused. Finally,s, Doe, at the
age of 20, informed a third party that Carlson had been
“sexually inappropriate” with her. Indeed, Doe had
considered reporting Carlson’s conduct earlier, but
decided against it after remembering that another girl
whom Carlson mentored made similar allegations that
Carlson “inappropriately touch[ed]” her, only to end up
leaving the church with her family. Doe also recalled that
her youth group leader at the time ordered the members not
to discuss those allegations. Taken together, and contrary
to her argument on appeal, Doe’s testimony establishes
that she knew of Carlson’s abuse at the time it
occurred. Turning then to the issue of when Doe knew
that her injuries were caused by the sexual abuse (the
second prong of section 13-202.2(b)), pursuant to Clay,
knowledge of injury is presumed where the victim was aware
of the sexual abuse as it was occurring . And even
assuming arguendo that this presumption of knowledge of
injury is inapplicable, Doe’s testimony nevertheless
reveals that she had actual knowledge of the cause of at
least a portion of her injuries when they occurred.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150690 Loncarevic and Associates, Inc. v. Stanley Foam Corporation Filed 2-7-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153010 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Maka Filed 2-3-17 (ATH)
This matter arises out of a mortgage foreclosure on a property owned by defendant. Defendant raised the issue before the circuit court that his mortgage was void because the original lender, Alliance Mortgage Company d.b.a. BNY Mortgage (Alliance) was not licensed at the time the loan was originated pursuant to the Residential Mortgage License Act of 1987. On appeal, defendant maintains that because Alliance was not licensed in Illinois when the mortgage was originated his mortgage is void as against public policy and consequently the judgment of foreclosure was improperly granted.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153516 Blackstone Condominium Association v. Speights-Carnegie Filed 2-3-17 (ATH)
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging a failure to pay condominium assessments. Plaintiff sought damages, plus attorney fees and costs under a breach of contract theory. After bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiff and entered a judgement. Subsequent to the trial, the court denied a petition for attorney’s fees finding that the underlying action was for breach of contract, but that plaintiff had failed to produce a written instrument or condominium declaration providing for attorney fees in the event of a breach by defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Trial court affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143299 Perry
& Associates, LLC v. The Illinois Department of
Employment Security Filed 2-2-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff Perry & Associates, LLC appeals from the circuit court’s order affirming the administrative decision of defendants, the Illinois Department of Employment Security (Department) and the Director of Employment Security (Director), holding that the raise in plaintiff’s rate for contributions to the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund (Fund) for calendar year 2013 was proper. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the Department cannot retroactively change the contribution rate for an employer midyear because (1) this change violates the terms of section 1509 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (820 ILCS 405/1509 (West 2012)),(2) the unilateral ability to increase the rate at any time on any year violates public policy, (3) the retroactive application of the rate and imposition is improper, (4) the Department caused delays in proceedings by failing to provide a fair hearing such that it is inequitable to assess interest, and (5) the refusal to address the benefits to the claimaint as a defense to the rate was improper.
No.2017 IL App (1st) 153015 County
of Cook v. Illinois Labor Relations Board
Filed 2-1-17 (TJJ)
Respondent-appellee International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 700 (Union), the representative of three bargaining units of Cook County correctional officers, deputy sheriffs, and fugitive investigators, filed a charge with the Illinois Labor Relations Board (Board), alleging that petitioners-appellants, County of Cook and the Sheriff of Cook County (“Sheriff” or “the Employer”), committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally changing their secondary employment policy and refusing to bargain over it when they issued a general order establishing new policies and procedures governing their employees’ ability to work a second job. The Employer appeals, contending the Board’s decision must be reversed because the new secondary employment policy is not subject to bargaining, as it is within the Employer’s inherent managerial authority; the new secondary employment policy does not change hours, wages or conditions of employment; and the new secondary employment policy does not impose new discipline on employees. The employer also contends the complaint should be dismissed because the Union was not denied the opportunity to bargain over the issue of secondary employment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 141281 People
v. Oelerich Filed 2-1-17 (TJJ)
After a jury trial, defendant, Mark D. Oelerich, was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated driving under the influence of cannabis. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 24 years’ imprisonment for first-degree murder and 14 years for aggravated DUI. On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction of murder should be reduced to reckless homicide because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the mens rea for murder. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 122640 People
v. Anderson Filed 2-1-17 (TJJ)
Defendant Robert Anderson was convicted of four counts of first degree murder related to the shooting deaths of Moises Reynoso and Robert Lilligren. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to life in prison. Defendant now appeals and raises eight issues: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony; (3) the trial court erred by precluding defense counsel from questioning Officer Jeong Park as to whether he would describe defendant as “black”; (4) the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of defendant’s prior acquittal for an unrelated charge; (5) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion in limine for expert testimony on eyewitness identification; (6) the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for new trial in light of allegedly newly discovered evidence; (7) the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument were prejudicial and denied defendant a fair trial; and (8) the trial court erred in denying his request for a new trial based on his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160466 Jaworski
v. Skassa Filed 2-1-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Violetta Jaworski, appeals from the dismissal of her claim to quiet title to a garage in her condominium complex. She contends that her claim should not have been dismissed on res judicata grounds, as the prior action, initiated by defendant Danuta Skassa (defendant), did not result in a final judgment or decide the issue of ownership of the garage. Because defendant believes that plaintiff has filed this appeal for improper purposes, defendant asks this court to impose sanctions against plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, we affirm, but we deny defendant’s request to impose sanctions.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 140893 People
v. Soto Filed 1-31-17 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial, defendant Raul Soto was convicted of first-degree murder for the deadly beating of his roommate and sentenced to 27 years’ imprisonment. During the murder investigation, Soto voluntarily accompanied police to the police station and cooperated with the investigation. After spending two nights at the police station, Soto made The trial court agreed with Soto that his first two incriminating statements were inadmissible mainly because, although the police had probable cause to arrest Soto for the murder, they failed to give him Miranda warnings before eliciting an incriminating statement and the taint from that statement rendered inadmissible his second statement given minutes after his first. But the trial court found that Soto’s third incriminating statement, given more than 24 hours later, was admissible based on the curative measures taken after the unwarned interrogation. The trial court also found that Soto voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, despite his asserted cognitive defects and low intelligence level. On appeal, Soto challenges the admissibility of his third incriminating statement. Finding no error in the trial court's rulings, we affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 141660 People
v. Gonzalez Filed 12-27-16 (TJJ)
Petitioner Tony Gonzalez appeals from the trial court’s second-stage dismissal of his amended petition for postconviction relief brought pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010)). Gonzalez asks this court to reverse the dismissal of his amended postconviction petition asserting claims of actual innocence and a Brady violation and requesting remand for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 130190-B People
v. Edwards Filed 1-31-17 (TJJ)
Following a stipulated bench trial, the Will County circuit court found defendant, Matthew Edwards, guilty of first degree murder and attempted murder. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming his confession to police was involuntary based on the fact that he was 17 years old at the time, had a fifth grade reading level, suffered from various mental disorders, and that the investigating officers did not allow him to speak to his mother or another concerned adult despite his request to do so. The trial court denied the motion.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 140566 The
Bank of New York Mellon v. Laskowski Filed
Plaintiff, the Bank of New York Mellon (Bank), in its capacity as the trustee for the certificate holders of a certain alternative loan trust, brought an action against defendant, Pacific Realty Group, LLC (Pacific) and others to foreclose upon a mortgage held on certain real property in Bolingbrook, Will County, Illinois. Well into the proceedings, after the subject property had already been sold at a sheriff’s sale, Pacific filed its appearance in the case. On that same court date, the trial court entered a dismissal for want of prosecution (DWP) against the Bank for failing to appear. The DWP was later vacated. About 90 days after Pacific had filed its appearance, it filed a motion to quash service of process. The trial court denied Pacific’s motion and later confirmed the sale of the property and the proposed distribution of the proceeds. Pacific appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motion to quash service of process. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 140907 People
v. Brown Filed 1-31-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Christopher Brown, appeals the denial of his request to correct the mittimus to reflect additional presentence custody credit. We vacate and remand with directions.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143403 People
v. Jones Filed 1-30-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Michael Jones, was convicted after a bench trial of aggravated domestic battery, and the trial court sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment and four years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the State did not prove him guilty of aggravated domestic battery beyond a reasonable doubt where severe deformities in his hands and arms, along with his lack of strength and range of motion, rendered him incapable of stabbing the victim in her chest; (2) he is entitled to a new trial where the record shows that the trial court prejudged his case and rejected his defense before defendant’s expert witness had testified; and (3) he was denied his right to present a full defense when the trial court refused to admit mental health records of the victim. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162306 In
re Tyianna J. Filed 1-30-17 (TJJ)
This is an appeal from the circuit court’s orders adjudicating the minor Davion N. a ward of the court and terminating the parental rights of Davion’s natural mother, respondent Traci F. In this case the juvenile court took the somewhat unusual step of terminating Traci’s parental rights as to Davion at the dispositional hearing. On appeal, Traci makes the following arguments in favor of reversal: (1) the circuit court’s finding that Davion was abused and neglected was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the court abused its discretion by permitting expedited termination at the dispositional hearing; (3) Traci’s procedural due process rights were violated because no hearing was held to determine if the statutory criteria for expedited termination roceedings were met; (4) Traci’s procedural due process rights were violated because the court terminated her parental rights prior to conducting an adjudicatory hearing to determine if Davion was abused or neglected; (5) the court’s finding that Traci was unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (6) the court’s finding that termination of Traci’s parental rights and the appointment of a guardian with the ability to consent to adoption was in Davion’s best interest was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160141 Kupper
v. Powers Filed 1-30-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Robert L. Powers, appeals the dismissal of his third amended countercomplaint and the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his fraudulent misrepresentation claim because the alleged false statements made by plaintiffs, Robert H. Kupper II, Kevin I. Kupper, Alan Kupper, and David G. Kupper, as beneficiaries of the Heritage Bank of Central Illinois, as trustee under the provisions of a trust agreement dated January 27, 2006, known as trust No. 20-101, were false statements of material fact. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his negligent misrepresentation claim because plaintiffs owed a public duty to convey accurate information about the zoning of the premises. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice his claim that plaintiffs violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2014)), which was pled in his first amended countercomplaint. Additionally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment because (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 133703 In re Parentage of A.H. Filed 1-20-17 (ATH)
In this action against
the biological father, the mother filed a petition to
recognize and enroll a judgement from a court in
Thailand that adjudicated the defendant to be the father
of triplets conceived by gamete intrafallopian transfer
(GIFT) and ordered support obligations on him. The court
concluded that the circuit court properly extended
comity to the foreign judgment because it was not
contrary to Illinois public policy and the father failed
to establish that the judgment was obtained by fraud or
that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to
present a defense in the foreign proceeding.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161944 In re Jeanette L. Filed 1-27-17 (ATH)
Following a hearing, the
trial court adjudicated minor-respondent, Jeanette L.,
to be an abused and neglected minor, and made her a ward
of the court. The trial court subsequently found
Jeanette L.’s biological parents, respondents Georgina
L.1 and Clarence M., unfit
parents and terminated their parental rights. Georgina
L. appeals, contending that the trial court’s findings
should be reversed because the State failed to provide
her with reasonable accommodations under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
We affirm judgment of circuit court.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160028 Country Preferred Insurance Company v. Groen Filed 1-27-17 (ATH)
Plaintiff filed an
amended motion for summary judgment asserting defendant
could not maintain an uninsured motorist claim, since
she had already received workers’ compensation benefits
in excess of the uninsured motorist policy’s limits.
Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment,
asserting that the setoff provision (1) violated the
Workers Compensation Act and was unenforceable and (2)
excluded medical payments made by her employer directly
to her medical providers. In its written order, the
court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s
motion finding that the setoff provision was
enforceable, unambiguous, and not against public policy.
IL App (1st) 150180 Stiffle
v. Marz Filed
The plaintiffs, Kimberly and Scott Stiffle, appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County granting the defendant’s, Baker Epstein Marz’s, motion for sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and dismissed the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the circuit court erred when it found they violated Rule 137 and that dismissal of their second amended complaint with prejudice was too severe a sanction. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and vacate in part the order of the circuit court.
No. 2017 IL App (2d)
140941 People v. Spivey
Filed 1-25-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (2d)
150731 People v. Hernandez Filed 01-25-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (3d)
150101 In re Marriage of Goesel Filed 01-24-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153095 Board
of Trustees of the Harvey Police Pension Fund v. City of
Harvey Filed 1-23-17 (TJJ)
The City of Harvey appeals from a circuit court order enforcing the terms of a settlement agreement entered into between the City of Harvey and the Board of Trustees of the Harvey Police Pension Fund. In 2006, the Board of Trustees of the Harvey Police Pension Fund filed suit against the City of Harvey for various violations of the Illinois Pension Code. In February 2008, the parties entered into a settlement agreement by which the City of Harvey agreed to pay the Harvey Police Pension Fund $551,079.83 in back property taxes the City of Harvey had collected but failed to remit. The City of Harvey also agreed, commencing with the 2006-2007 fiscal year, to annually levy a tax upon all taxable property as required in section 3-125 of the Illinois Pension Code. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 140165 People
v. Malone Filed 1-23-17 (TJJ)
The defendant, William A. Malone, appeals from the dismissal of his postconviction petition, arguing that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to amend the postconviction petition or withdraw as counsel. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160277 In re N.G. Filed 1-19-17
No. 2017 IL 119945 The
Hertz Corporation v. The City of Chicago Filed
Defendant, the city of Chicago (City), imposes a tax on the use of personal property within its borders. The tax applies to the lease of personal property within the City and to the use of property in the City that is rented or leased outside the City. In 2011, the City’s director of the department of revenue (now the City comptroller) issued Ruling 11, which provided guidance to suburban vehicle rental agencies located within three miles of Chicago’s borders, including plaintiffs, as to the collection of the tax. Personal Property Lease Transaction Tax Second Amended Ruling 11 (eff. May 1, 2011) (Ruling 11). Ruling 11 stated that beginning July 1, 2011, in the event of an audit, the City department of revenue (Department) would hold the suburban rental agencies responsible for paying the tax unless there was written proof that the lessee was exempt from paying the tax based upon the use of the leased vehicle outside the City. In the absence of such proof, Ruling 11 provided, the Department would assume that a customer who is a Chicago resident would use the leased vehicle primarily in the City and that a customer who is not a Chicago resident would use the vehicle primarily outside the City.
No. 2017 IL 120310 People
v. Johnson Filed 1-19-17 (TJJ)
Defendant Allen R. Johnson appeals from the dismissal of his postconviction petition as untimely. This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015)), and we now consider the timeliness of defendant’s petition within the meaning of section 122-1(c) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2008)). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
No. 2017 IL 120343 The
Board of Education of Springfield School District No.
186 v. The Attorney General of Illinois Filed
On administrative review, the circuit court of Sangamon County reversed the Attorney General’s binding opinion finding violations of the Open Meetings Act (Act) (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2012)). The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 2015 IL App (4th) 140941. This court granted the Attorney General’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). The Illinois Association of School Boards, Illinois Association of School Administrators, and Illinois Association of School Business Officials filed an amicus curiae brief pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010), as did the Illinois Municipal League. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
No. 2017 IL 120643 The
Village of Bartonville v. Lopez Filed 1-19-17
At issue in this case is whether defendants, Salvador Lopez and Policemen’s Benevolent Labor Committee, Inc., are precluded from seeking grievance arbitration of Lopez’s termination from his employment with plaintiff Village of Bartonville’s police department. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on its complaint for declaratory judgment and to stay arbitration. The appellate court, with one justice specially concurring and one justice dissenting, reversed the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to order the parties to proceed to arbitration. 2016 IL App (3d) 150341. This court allowed plaintiff’s subsequent petition for leave to appeal.
No. 2017 IL App (1st)
151738 Gassman v. The Clerk of the Circuit
Court of Cook County
Filed 1-17-17 (MGB)
Section 27.2a(g)(2) of the Clerks of Courts Act (Act) imposes a fee for filing a petition to vacate or modify “any final judgment or order of court.” 705 ILCS 105/27.2a(g)(2) (West 2012). Pursuant to this section, in separate underlying cases, plaintiffs were each charged a $90 fee for filing a petition to vacate a dismissal for want of prosecution. Plaintiffs paid under protest and then filed the present lawsuit, seeking mandamus relief and arguing that the fees were not authorized by the statute because a dismissal for want of prosecution is not a final order of court. The Clerk sought dismissal under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014)), arguing that the word “final” in section 27.2a(g)(2) applies only to judgments, not to orders of court. The trial court dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the Clerk’s interpretation of the statute is incorrect. We agree with plaintiffs and reverse. Although this is presumably a fictitious name, there is no indication in the record that “A.N. Anymous” obtained leave of court to file a complaint under a fictitious name, as required by Illinois law. 735 ILCS 5/2-401(e) (West 2014) (parties may only appear under fictitious names “[u]pon application and for good cause shown”). Accordingly, on remand, we direct plaintiffs to file an amended complaint omitting any fictitious names.
No.2017 IL App (1st) 143632
People v. West
Filed 1-17-17 (MGB)
Following a bench trial, defendant Esau West was convicted of (1) armed habitual criminal (AHC), (2) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), and (3) unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon. The trial court imposed a six-year imprisonment term for each conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, West claims that (1) his jury waiver was invalid because the trial court failed to adequately admonish him, (2) the AHC statute is facially unconstitutional, and (3) his AUUW conviction must be vacated because it was based on the same physical act—possession of a loaded firearm—as his AHC conviction. The trial court adequately admonished West that by signing the waiver form and tendering it to the court, he would be waiving a jury trial and that the court, and not a jury, would hear the evidence. Consequently, the trial court adequately the trial court adequately conveyed to West that his case would not be heard by a jury. The fact that the trial court did not inquire into whether West’s waiver was the product of any promise or threat is an insufficient basis to undermine his otherwise valid waiver. Significantly, at no point did West object to his case proceeding to a bench trial despite his presence in court; instead, he affirmatively indicated that he understood he was waiving his right to have a jury hear the evidence in his case. A facial unconstitutionality challenge to the AHC statute on grounds identical to those raised by West has been previously considered and rejected by two different panels of this court in People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (1st) 133663, and People v. Fulton, 2016 IL App (1st) 141765. We find no basis to invalidate the substantial authority upholding the constitutionality of the AHC statute and adopt the soundly reasoned decisions in Johnson and Fulton. Accordingly, we reject West’s claim that the ACH statute is facially unconstitutional as a violation of due process. The State acknowledges that West’s convictions for AHC and AUUW are both based on West’s possession of the same loaded 9-millimeter handgun and concedes that his less serious conviction of AUUW must be vacated. We agree with the parties that West’s convictions for AHC and AUUW violate the one-act, one-crime rule because they arose out of the same physical act—possession of the same loaded firearm. Because West’s AUUW conviction is a Class 2 felony ( and his AHC conviction is a Class x felony, we vacate the less serious offense of AUUW and direct the clerk of the circuit court to correct West’s mittimus by vacating the AUUW conviction.
No. 2016 IL App (3d)
160070 Lynn v.
Filed 1-12-17 (MGB)
Respondent appealed grant of Plenary Order asserting that he was not allowed to present evidence. No report of proceedings of the plenary hearing was filed and the common law record did not indicate the manner in which the hearing was conducted. Respondent was granted parenting time by separate Order incorporated in the Plenary Order after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The Majority found the allegations of the Petition supported the entry of the Order.
No. 2016 IL App (4th)
Filed 1-12-17 (MGB)
Defendant sentenced to 4 1/2 years after being convicted of Domestic Battery following jury trial in which victim recanted, her recorded statement was entered into evidence, and testimony of former spouse of the defendant concerning an alleged battery occurring in 2010 was admitted. Considering victim's statements to police, along with the testimony of former wife, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of domestic battery. In this case, the other crime and the charged offense were similar enough to support admitting the other-crimes evidence. During both alleged offenses, defendant positioned himself on top of his victim and struck her on the face. In addition, both offenses were a reaction by defendant to the prospect of another romantic partner being involved with the victims, who had both been romantic partners with defendant. Both attacks occurred in the home of the victim. Defendant can not claim error in Instruction regarding evdence of other crimes where he affirmatively acquiesced to the limiting instruction. Note: The Court provides a proposed modification of IPI 3.14 to use in such cases, referencing a prior unpublished 1st District Decision.
No. 2016 IL App (3d)
140770 People v. Gordon
Filed 1-13-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 142085 People v. Viramontes Filed 1-09-17 (ATH)
On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction for attempted murder, the admission of jail house phone recordings, and the trial court’s refusal to tender all of co-defendant Marcy Cruz’s mental health records. After a review of the facts and relevant case law, we conclude the facts of this case are such that a jury could find the defendant intended to kill both victims when he violently struck each of them in the head with a baseball bat. We further find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting jail house phone tapes, because the State had laid a sufficient foundation. Finally, we conclude that defendant’s failure to include mental health records on appeal results in the forfeiture of this issue.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160019 People v. Evans Filed 1-09-17 (ATH)
Defendant pled guilty to home invasion and was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. Defendant has tried to challenge that sentence as excessive through a postsentencing motion numerous times, but each time this court has remanded the matter on appeal either because defense counsel failed to strictly comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) or on jurisdictional grounds. On this appeal, defendant once again argues that his attorney failed to strictly comply with Rule 604(d). We agree and must remand the matter for strict compliance with that rule.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 160778 R&J
Construction Supply Co. v. Adamusik Filed
On October 1, 2008, plaintiff, R&J Construction Supply Company, Inc., filed a complaint against Gregory Adamusik, d/b/a United Masonry & Tuckpointing, alleging breach of contract. Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Adamusik in the amount of $9395.84 plus costs. At plaintiff’s request, the circuit court revived the judgment on June 23, 2015. On June 26, 2015, plaintiff issued a third-party citation to discover assets (CDA) to appellee, Edmar Corporation, in order to recoup any funds owed to Adamusik/United Masonry from Edmar. On August 25, 2015, following Edmar’s failure to answer or appear again, the trial court confirmed the conditional judgment and entered a final judgment against Edmar in the amount of the Adamusik judgment of $9395.84 plus costs and interest. On November 23, 2015, Edmar filed a petition to vacate the judgment entered against it pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)) arguing that plaintiff failed to establish a basis to issue its initial third-party citation to Edmar and that Edmar had no relationship with plaintiff or Adamusik. Edmar argued that the citation was not properly filed and any judgment based on the improperly filed citation should be vacated. After a hearing, the trial court granted the section 2-1401 petition, vacated the conditional and final judgments, and dismissed the citation against Edmar. Plaintiff now appeals.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 162381 In
re Manuel M. Filed 1-5-17 (TJJ)
The respondent, Manuel M., appeals from the trial court's judgment adjudicating him a delinquent minor by reason of his commission of two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a) (West 2014)) and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF) (720 ILCS 5/24-3.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 2015)) and the resulting sentence of 18 months' probation and 30 days' commitment to the Juvenile Temporary Detention Center with the order of commitment stayed. For the reasons which follow, we reverse the respondent’s delinquency adjudication and sentence and remand the matter for a new trial.
No. 2016 IL App (3d) 150809 In
re Application of the County Collector Filed
Petitioner Steve Sodeman bought a property owned by Mary Gatewood at a tax sale and filed for a tax deed. The trial court denied his petition because Sodeman failed to serve the property owner and taxpayer. He subsequently sought a sale in error, which the trial court also denied, finding that Sodeman did not make a bona fide attempt to comply with the statutory notice requirements. We affirm.
No. 2016 IL App (3d) 160420 In
re Marriage of Schomburg Filed 12-14-16 (TJJ)
This appeal arises from posttrial proceedings stemming from the dissolution of the marriage between the respondent, Duane Osland, and his first ex-wife, the petitioner, Julie Schomburg. Duane appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for reimbursement of monies garnished from his severance and bonus checks, which had been paid to Julie for child support and child support arrearages. On appeal, Duane argues that he not only has an obligation to pay child support to Julie, but he also has an obligation to pay his child support for his daughter from his second marriage with Tunde Osland, his second ex-wife. Tunde is not a party in this case. Duane requests this court to (1) reapportion the 50% lien amounts that were placed on his bonus and severance checks and redistribute the money equally between his two current child support orders and (2) vacate the child support order from his other divorce case (case number 14-D-03) ordering him to pay $3452.42 from his severance check to his second ex-wife, Tunde. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Duane’s petition, in which he requested the reallocation of the garnished amounts that he had styled as a petition to modify child support.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 1600005WC Murff
v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n Filed
The claimant, Anthony Murff, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County which confirmed a decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission), denying his petition pursuant to section 19(h) of the Workers Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West 2014)) by reason of his failure to present evidence demonstrating a change in his physical or mental condition. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
No. 2016 IL 118613 People
v. Price Filed 12-30-16 (TJJ)
Defendant, Damen Price, filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that his natural life sentence for first degree murder was void. The trial court dismissed the petition. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded for resentencing. 2014 IL App (1st) 130037-U, ¶ 31. In light of our decision in People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, in which we abolished the so-called “void sentence rule,” we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing defendant’s petition.
No. 2016 IL 119659 People
v. Smith Filed 12-30-16 (TJJ)
Defendant, Matthew Smith, was charged by indictment with aggravated battery of a corrections officer, a Class 2 felony. Following a jury trial in the Livingston County circuit court, defendant was found guilty. Defendant was sentenced as a Class X offender to six years in the Department of Corrections. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction but vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, holding that defendant was not eligible for Class X sentencing. 2015 IL App (4th) 130453-U. This court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015).
No. 2016 IL 119889 Bremer
v. The City of Rockford Filed 12-30-16 (TJJ)
In Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392 (2003), this court held that the phrase “catastrophic injury” in section 10(a) of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act is synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability pension under section 4-110 of the Illinois Pension Code. The primary issue in this case is whether the phrase “catastrophic injury” in section 10(a) is also synonymous with an injury resulting in an occupational disease disability pension under section 4-110.1 of the Pension Code. Based on our decision in Krohe and subsequent cases defining “catastrophic injury,” we hold that the legislature did not intend for that phrase to be synonymous with a disease resulting in the award of an occupational disease disability pension.
No. 2016 IL 121563 Johnson
v. Ames Filed 12-30-16 (TJJ)
This cause is before us on the appellate court’s certificate of importance pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 316 (eff. Dec. 6, 2006), addressing whether a referendum seeking to impose term limits on the elected office of village president in the village of Broadview was invalid because it was vague and ambiguous. The village election board concluded that the proposition was vague and ambiguous because it did not clearly state whether the term limits were prospective or retroactive. On judicial review, the trial court reversed and reinstated the referendum on the November 8, 2016, general election ballot, finding the language was not vague or ambiguous. The appellate court affirmed. Because of the time constraints present in this election case, we granted the appellant’s emergency motion for expedited consideration of the certificate of importance and affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, with our opinion to follow. We now issue our opinion on the question presented in the appellate court’s certificate of importance.
No. 2016 IL 118882 People
v. McDonald Filed 12-15-16 (TJJ)
Defendant, Stanley McDonald, was convicted in the circuit court of Cook County of the first degree murder of his boyfriend, Lawrence Gladney. The incident took place in May 2004 during a physical altercation between defendant and Gladney, who lived together in an apartment on West 111th Street in Chicago. Defendant was initially tried in 2007 and was convicted of first degree murder. That conviction was overturned on appeal due to an erroneous jury instruction and the cause remanded for a new trial. People v. McDonald, 401 Ill. App. 3d 54 (2010). In February 2012, defendant was tried for first degree murder a second time and convicted. The trial court instructed the jury on second degree murder, unreasonable belief in self-defense, but declined to give instructions on second degree murder due to serious provocation or involuntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced defendant to 27 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the tendered instructions. 2014 IL App (1st) 121009-U. This court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315.
No. 2016 IL 120041 Schweihs
v. Chase Home Finance, LLC Filed 12-15-16
This tort case arose out of foreclosure proceedings involving plaintiff Melinda Schweihs’s home. Plaintiff sued defendants Chase Home Finance, LLC (Chase), Safeguard Properties, Inc. (Safeguard), Todd Gonsalez, and Edilfonso Centeno for numerous torts, including emotional distress, as a result of Gonsalez and Centeno entering her home. Her emotional distress claims, which are at issue here, were dismissed by the circuit court, and the appellate court affirmed. 2015 IL App (1st) 140683. This court allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
No. 2016 IL 120232 In
re M.I. Filed 12-15-16 (TJJ)
The State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of J.B. for failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for his daughter M.I.’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2014)) and for failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of M.I. (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2014)). The juvenile court granted the State’s petition. The appellate court, in a split decision, reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court’s conclusions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The dissenting justice would have affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015), to determine (1) whether the appellate court improperly grafted a willfulness requirement onto subsections (b) and (m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m) (West 2014)), (2) whether the juvenile court erred by not expressly stating that it did not consider evidence outside the nine-month period in ruling on subsection (m), (3) whether the juvenile court’s ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (4) whether the State is limited to asserting subsection (p) when petitioning to terminate an intellectually disabled parent’s rights.
No. 2016 IL App (1st) 153539 Peters v. R.
Carlson & Sons, Inc. Filed 1-4-17 (MGB)
No. 2016 IL App (5th) 150244 People v. Biagi Filed 1-5-17 (MGB)
No. 2016 IL App (3rd) 160138WC
Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n
Filed 1-4-17 (MGB)