No. 2017 IL App (1st) 123563 People
v. Spivey Filed 5-17-17 (TJJ)
Following a bench trial, defendant Donald Spivey was found guilty of two counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) and two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced defendant to four years’ imprisonment, followed by two years of mandatory supervised release (MSR), for his conviction on count two for UUWF. Initially on appeal, we vacated defendant’s UUWF conviction under count two “because ‘the State did not prove an essential element of the offense where it alleged in the charging instrument and proved at trial a predicate offense that has been declared unconstitutional and void ab initio.’ ” People v. Spivey, 2015 IL App (1st) 123563-U, ¶¶ 21, 25
(quoting People v. McFadden, 2014 IL App (1st) 102939, ¶ 43, aff’d and rev’d in part, 2016 IL 117424). On September 28, 2016, the supreme court denied the State’s petition for leave to appeal but entered a supervisory order directing us to vacate our judgment and to reconsider the matter in light of People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, to determine if a different result is warranted. People v. Spivey, No. 119492 (Ill. Sept. 28, 2016). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a different result is warranted.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150146 People
v. Brown Filed 5-17-17 (TJJ)
Following a bench trial, defendant Dewayne Brown was convicted of the offense of armed habitual criminal. He was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment and was assessed various fines, fees, and costs. Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that (1) he was not proved guilty of the offense of armed habitual criminal beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the armed habitual criminal statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2012)) is facially unconstitutional because it has the potential to criminalize wholly innocent conduct; and (3) the fines, fees, and costs order must be corrected to apply his presentence incarceration credit toward several fines. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm defendant’s conviction. We do, however, correct the fines, fees, and costs
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152951 In
re Application of the County Treasurer Filed
After the circuit court entered an order directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed to Alliance Partners, Ltd., two occupants of the property subject to the deed filed a petition to intervene, alleging that they received no notice of the proceedings for a tax deed and asking the court to vacate the order for a tax deed. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition to intervene without holding an evidentiary hearing and the court erred by dismissing the petition to vacate the order for a tax deed without an evidentiary hearing. We reverse and remand for further proceedings in accord with this order.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 170486 Guerrero
v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the Village of
Franklin Park Filed 5-16-17 (TJJ)
The Municipal Officer Electoral Board of Franklin Park (Board), its members and objector Robert J. Godlewski (collectively, respondents) appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County reversing the Board's final decision, which determined that petitioners, candidates for various offices in the Village of Franklin Park, were ineligible to appear on the ballot for the April 4, 2017 municipal election. The circuit court ruled that certain defects common to petitioners' respective statements of economic interests did not invalidate their candidacies and directed that petitioners' names appear on the ballot. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 150390 People
v. Mayo Filed 5-16-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Eduardo Mayo, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County finding him “not not guilty” of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(d) (West 2012)) and battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2012)). Because the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding as to either offense, we reverse.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 151203 People
v. Pena Filed 5-16-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Isidro Pena, appeals the trial court’s order that denied his “Motion for Return of Property.” Defendant sought to vacate the administrative forfeiture of certain property, arguing that he did not receive notice of the forfeiture. The court held that the State’s notice was sufficient and denied the motion. Defendant contends that the State’s effort to notify him of the proceedings did not meet constitutional standards. We vacate and remand.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 140514 People
v. Brown Filed 5-16-17 (TJJ)
The defendant argues that his conviction of second degree murder must be vacated because a finding of not guilty verdict of first degree murder precluded a finding that he was guilty of second degree murder. The State argues that the jury mistakenly filled out extra verdict forms. Also, the State argues that the defendant forfeited this issue on appeal because he failed to make a timely objection or include the issue in his posttrial motion and did not argue plain error.
No. 2017 IL App (1st)
King Filed 5-15-2017 (ATH)
No. 2017 IL App (1st)
King Filed 5-15-2017 (ATH)
Following a bench trial, defendant Lavona King was found guilty of home invasion, residential burglary, aggravated battery, and aggravated unlawful restraint. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry pursuant to People v. Krankel into her claims that trial counsel “ignored” one witness and failed to impeach another. Defendant further contends that certain convictions must be vacated pursuant to the one-act, one-crime rule.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143684-B Taylor v. Dart Filed 5-15-2017 (ATH)
Answers to the following certified questions: “Is a Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board member that was appointed on June 2, 2011 to serve a term which expired on March 19, 2012, a lawfully appointed member of the Merit Board when he presided over Percy Taylor’s Merit Board Hearing on February 27, 2013? If the Merit Board member was not lawfully appointed to the Merit Board, does the decision of October 30, 2013 remain valid or is it rendered void?”
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 160110 Worley v. Fender Filed 5-15-2017 (ATH)
Plaintiff argues on appeal the alleged selection of lower step-down underinsured motorist limits ($500,000 for directors, partners, officers, or owners of Davis & Sons or a family member who qualified as an insured, and $40,000 for any other person who qualified as an insured) is void because
the limits are based solely on status.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 113085 People
Cowart Filed 5-12-2017 (ATH)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 113085 People
Cowart Filed 5-12-2017 (ATH)
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under a theory of accountability. Following a simultaneous bench trial, defendant was also convicted of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC). On appeal, this court reversed both the first-degree murder conviction and the AHC conviction. Our supreme court then issued a supervisory order directing us to reconsider that judgment in light of its decision in People v. McFadden. We now affirm the defendant's AHC conviction, reverse the defendant's first-degree murder conviction, and remand for resentencing.
No. 2017 IL App (1st)
130203-B People v. Richardson Filed 5-12-2017 (ATH)
No. 2017 IL App (1st)
130203-B People v. Richardson Filed 5-12-2017 (ATH)
Following a bench trial the defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). On appeal, the defendant argues that: his prior conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), premised on a statutory provision held unconstitutional by our supreme court, could not serve as a predicate felony to support his UUWF conviction; the State's indictment for the charge of UUWF "failed to state a cause of action" because the defendant's predicate AUUW felony was based on an unconstitutional statute; and the arresting police officer's pat-down search of the defendant was unconstitutional. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 141251 People v. Hardimon Filed 5-12-2017 (ATH)
The defendant appeals from his convictions for first degree murder and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF). On appeal, the defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and his UPWF conviction must be reversed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160641 Epstein v. Bochko Filed 5-11-12017 (ATH)
Two caregivers of the decedent obtained power of attorney and opened a joint bank account with the decedent, Anna Polachanin (Anna), as the primary account holder at Selfreliance Ukrainian American Federal Credit Union (Selfreliance). Over the next few months, the two caregivers deposited much of Anna’s life savings into this joint account from her other bank accounts. The money was then wired from the joint account at Selfreliance to bank accounts in Ukraine. In October 2008, a licensed psychiatrist evaluated Anna and concluded that she had dementia and that her dementia had been present for several years. The public guardian petitioned the Cook County circuit court for a citation to recover assets from the two caregivers, Selfreliance, and others. Shortly thereafter, Anna died, and the Cook County public administrator (petitioner) was appointed to supervise her estate and continued to pursue the petition. The court granted Selfreliance’s motion for summary judgment finding that there was no evidence respondent knew or should have known of Anna’s mental incapacity at the time she opened the joint bank account.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161071 American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Krop Filed 5-11-2017 (ATH)
Plaintiff American Family Mutual Insurance Company brought a complaint for declaratory judgment against Walter Krop and Lisa Krop (collectively, the Krops) seeking a declaration that the Krops were not entitled to coverage or protection under its home insurance policy procured in 2012. The Krops then brought a counterclaim against American Family and a third-party complaint against American Family’s agent, Andy Vargas. Both American Family and Vargas moved to dismiss the counterclaim and third-party complaint pursuant to 2-615 and 2-619. The trial court granted the motion with respect to 2-619 and made no rulings as to 2-615.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162101 In re Nicholas C. Filed 5-11-2017 (ATH)
Mother/respondent-appellant appeals from the Cook County circuit court’s order in the instant cause finding her to be unfit under section 50/1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act and ordering the termination of her parental rights over Nicholas C. and Nathan W., her minor children.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 170404 Dean v. Smith Filed 5-11-2017 (ATH)
Petitioner Deyon L. Dean, a candidate for Riverdale village president in the April 4, 2017, election, appeals from an order of the circuit court, confirming a decision of the Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the Village of Riverdale (Board), which sustained objections to his nomination papers. Dean contends that the Board erroneously concluded that section 10-3 of the Code, in conjunction with section 10-4 of the Code, requires an independent candidate to indicate his or her independent status on nominating petitions. In light of the impending election date, we issued an order on March 30, 2017, reversing the circuit court, directing that Dean’s name be included on the ballot, and indicating that an opinion would follow.
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 120079-B People v. Thompson Filed 05-10-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (3rd) 140881 People v. McKee Filed 05-09-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 170091 In re Marriage of O'Hare Filed 05-09-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150643 Haag v. The Board of Education of Streator Elementary School District 44 Filed 05-09-17 (MGB)
The plaintiffs, educational support personnel (ESP) employed by the Board of Education of Streator Elementary School District 44 (Board), brought a declaratory judgment action against the Board, seeking reinstatement to full-time positions along with corresponding payment of back-pay and benefits. The plaintiffs maintained that the Board’s action in issuing each plaintiff an honorable discharge from full-time employment and offering to re-hire each as a part-time employee violated their rights under section 10-23.5 of the School Code (Code). 105 ILCS 5/10 23.5 (West 2012). Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court of La Salle County granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed. The plaintiffs’ reading of section 10-23.5 would put ESPs on an equal footing with certified teachers when it comes to expectations of continued employment and protections from employment termination or reduction of hours. This concept has been specifically rejected by our courts. Spear, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 120 (“Teachers subject to tenure, a status known as ‘contractual continued service,’ are in a readily distinguishable class of school employees and are provided special statutory procedural safeguards *** which we believe do not apply to [ESPs].”); Buckellew, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 512 (contractual continued service protections do not apply to those employees covered by section 10-23.5 of the Code). Relevant case law clearly establishes a legislative intent under the Code to distinguish between certified teachers and ESPs and to provide greater protections from lay-offs or reduction of hours to teachers. The plaintiffs’ position is contrary to that precedent. The plaintiffs next argue that the Board violated section 10-23.5 of the Code by not recalling them to full-time positions, and instead hiring additional part-time employees so as to obviate the need for the recalling of full-time employees. We disagree. The statutory recall rights provided to ESPs under section 10-23.5 are limited to employees “removed or dismissed” from a specific category of position and requires a school district to recall effected employees to “that category or any other category of position, so far as they are qualified to hold such positions.” 105 ILCS 5/10-23.5 (West 2012). The plaintiffs’ argument, therefore, fails in two regards. First, recall rights under section 10-23.5 of the Code are triggered when employees are “removed or dismissed,” not when their hours of employment have been reduced. See Buckellew, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 509. Second, the plaintiffs point to no authority, either in the School Code or 8 elsewhere, to support their proposition that a school board cannot reduce the hours of employment of employees other than certified teachers.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 141379 People v. Rodriguez Filed 05-08-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 130882 People v. White Filed 05-08-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153167 Village of Alsip v. Portincaso Filed 5-5-17 (AMT)
This is an appeal from the final judgment entered by the circuit court of Cook County, which reversed the Board of Trustees of the Alsip Police Pension Fund’s award of a line-of-duty disability pension to plaintiff James Portincaso. On appeal, the parties raise several issues for review; however, we only address the dispositive issues of (1) whether the Board of Trustees of the Alsip Police Pension Fund (Pension Board) abused its discretion in denying the Village of Alsip’s (Village’s) petition to intervene, and (2) whether the decision in the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) litigation precluded the redetermination of whether James Portincaso was injured on December 11, 2010. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160530 Sommese v. American Bank & Trust Co., N.A. Filed 5-5-17 (AMT)
Plaintiff appeals the order of the circuit court dismissing his claim against defendant, American Bank & Trust Company, N.A., to recover statutory damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to the Act. Plaintiff contends his damages claim should not have been barred because it was filed after the effective date of the 2011 amendments to the Act and, therefore, did not require retroactive application thereof. Plaintiff additionally contends the circuit court erred in rejecting his claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 151226 Snow
v. Power Construction Company, LLC Filed
Plaintiff John T. Snow filed a negligence action against defendants Power Construction Company, LLC (PCC), Power Engineering and Contracting Corporation (PCEC) (collectively Power), and Thorne Associates, Inc. (Thorne), after he was injured when several sheets of drywall fell on him while at a construction site. Plaintiff was employed by third-party defendant, Professionals Associated Construction Layout & Survey Co., Ltd. (Professionals), as a surveyor and was on the site in his professional capacity. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of PCC, PCEC, and Thorne. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) granting summary judgment because there was a material question of fact regarding the stacking of the drywall and the responsibility for safety of persons on the jobsite, (2) ruling that reliance on an alleged custom and practice could make an injury unforeseeable as a matter of law; (3) striking portions of the affidavits of plaintiff and Richard Hislop tendered in response to the motions for summary judgment, and (4) quashing the notice of deposition for John Karp, president of PCC. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160382 Wesly
v. The National Hemophilia Foundation Filed
On September 18, 2015, the plaintiff, Osvaldo H. Wesly, M.D., filed a defamation action against Craig M. Kessler, M.D., and Georgetown University, together with various other defendants, including the National Hemophilia Foundation, Michael Tarantino, M.D., Kollet Koulianos, the Bleeding and Clotting Disorders Institute, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Bob Robinson, Bleeding Disorders Alliance Illinois, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Danielle Baxter, Great Lakes Hemophilia Foundation, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, and Kathryn Reese-Kossow. On December 8, 2015, Georgetown University filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 2-301 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2014)). On June 9, 2016, the trial court issued an order denying Georgetown University’s motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Georgetown University appeals this ruling. Reversed.
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 140300 People
v. Fickes Filed 5-4-17 (TJJ)
The defendant, Michael Fickes, appeals his conviction, following a trial by jury in the circuit court of Fayette County, for the offense of aggravated participation in methamphetamine manufacturing. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reduce the defendant’s aggravated participation in methamphetamine manufacturing conviction to simple participation in methamphetamine manufacturing, and remand for a new sentencing hearing on that conviction.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160256 People
v. James Filed 5-31-7 (TJJ)
Defendant, Thomas R. James, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for issuance of a certificate of good conduct under section 5-5.5-30 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5.5-30 (West Supp. 2015)). We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 160482 In
re Lu. S. Filed 5-3-17 (TJJ)
D.S. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because we lack jurisdiction to review this cause, we must dismiss her appeal.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 141117 People
v. Morris Filed 3-28-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Pharoah Morris, who was 16 years old at the time of the offense, was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm following a jury trial. He was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 100 years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) he received a de facto life sentence without meaningful consideration of mitigating circumstances, (2) the applicable sentencing statutes that mandate firearm enhancements are facially unconstitutional under the Federal and Illinois Constitutions, and under the Illinois Constitution as applied to him, (3) section 5-130(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-130(1) (West Supp. 2015)), which automatically transfers 16-year-olds charged with murder and attempted murder to adult court, therefore subjecting them to mandatory adult sentencing, violates the Federal and Illinois Constitutions and due process, and (4) he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing under the newly enacted section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a), (b) (West Supp. 2015)), which requires trial courts to consider certain factors before sentencing and gives trial courts discretion to impose firearm enhancements for individuals under 18. For the reasons that follow, we remand for resentencing.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143000 CE
Design Ltd v. Healthcraft Products, Inc. Filed
Plaintiff CE Design Ltd. (CE Design), individually and on behalf of the certified class, appeals from an order of the circuit court in a collection case denying CE Design’s motion for turnover and its citation to discover assets. CE Design argues the court erred in recognizing the judgment of a Canadian court finding it had jurisdiction over CE Design and that ING Insurance Company of Ontario (ING) had no duty to defend or indemnify against a judgment held by CE Design against its insured, HealthCraft Products, Inc. (HealthCraft). ING obtained a judgment against CE Design in the Canadian proceeding for fees and costs. The circuit court denied enforcement of the Canadian judgment against CE Design finding it unenforceable because it did not comport with Illinois and United States standards of due process. ING cross-appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of CE Design’s motion for turnover and citation to discover assets against ING and we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of ING’s citation to discover assets against CE Design.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150054 People
v. Irwin Filed 5-2-17 (TJJ)
On March 4, 2012, around 7:30 p.m., police officers in Maywood responded to a radio call of “shots fired.” On their way to the location specified in the call, the officers saw a vehicle traveling at high speed run through a red light and head past them in the opposite direction. The officers pursued the car with lights and siren activated, but the car did not stop until blocked by another responding police vehicle. After all four occupants exited the car, one of the officers discovered a handgun on the floor in the front passenger seat where defendant Kristopher Irwin had been sitting. Irwin was tried and convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) based on his failure to possess a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card. Irwin was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Irwin raises several issues on appeal relating to the admission of evidence during his trial. Finding no error warranting a new trial, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150500 People
v. Veal Filed 5-2-17 (TJJ)
Following a 2014 bench trial, defendant Israel Veal1 was convicted of several counts arising out of his possession of a handgun, all of which merged into his armed habitual criminal conviction, for which he was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. Veal’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence of the gun. Finding no error, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161231 People
v. Smith Filed 5-2-17 (TJJ)
When police searched Jerome Smith’s home, they found marijuana and counterfeit currency. Smith admitted that he used equipment police found in his home to make the counterfeit currency. The State accused Smith of marijuana possession, and he pled guilty to the charge. More than a year later, prosecutors persuaded a grand jury to indict Smith for manufacturing counterfeit currency, where the grand jury based the new charge on evidence the State obtained in connection with the search that led to the charge of marijuana possession. The circuit court granted Smith’s motion to dismiss the counterfeiting charge, as the circuit court found that the compulsory joinder statute required the State to charge Smith with counterfeiting when it prosecuted Smith for marijuana possession. We find that under the reasoning of People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, the new charge violates the compulsory joinder statute. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160706 Jankovich
v. The Illinois State Police Filed 4-27-17
Plaintiff Michael Jankovich appeals from the rejection of his application for a concealed-carry license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act (Act) (430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2014)) by defendants the Illinois State Police (ISP) and the Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board (Board) (collectively, defendants). The Chicago police department and Cook County sheriff’s office filed objections to plaintiff’s application, which the Board affirmed. Plaintiff then filed a petition for review of the Board’s decision in the circuit court of Cook County, which the circuit court denied.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161609 Mordkovich
v. Tishman Speyer Properties Filed 4-28-17
Douglas B. Warlick & Associates (Warlick) appeals from an order of the circuit court dismissing its motion to intervene and for an adjudication of its alleged lien on the sums paid in settlement of this personal injury action. Based upon the following analysis, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160554 In
re Parentage of J.W. Filed 4-28-17 (TJJ)
During the proceedings in this parentage action, originally filed under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act of 1984) (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 2008)), attorney Jerry Kinnan filed three motions for “Interim Attorney Fees” on behalf of his client, petitioner Carol M., seeking fees from respondent Larry W. The trial court dismissed Carol’s third motion for interim attorney fees on the grounds that she was actually seeking contribution for final attorney fees and that Carol and Kinnan did not have a written engagement agreement. Carol appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her third motion for interim attorney fees. Carol argues that the trial court erred by (1) failing to expeditiously schedule a hearing on her first two motions for interim attorney fees, and (2) determining that a written engagement agreement was required. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160656 Bowling
Greene Sports Center, Inc. v. G.A.G. LLC Filed
The instant controversy is a dispute between a senior lender and a junior lender. The senior lender, Gold Coast Bank, loaned over $3.4 million to the defendants, G.A.G. LLC, James P. Gochis, and Peter Gochis. The junior lender, Bowling Green Sports Center Inc. (Bowling Green), loaned $405,000 to the defendants. Gold Coast Bank and Bowling Green executed an intercreditor agreement that provided that Bowling Green would not sue to recover any money from the defendants until the defendants had repaid Gold Coast Bank in full. The intercreditor agreement also provided that Gold Coast Bank agreed not to increase its loan to the defendants without first receiving Bowling Green’s consent. Despite that provision, Gold Coast Bank subsequently increased its loan to the defendants by $51,000, without Bowling Green’s knowledge or consent. After the defendants failed to timely repay Bowling Green, Bowling Green filed a breach-of-contract claim against the defendants. Gold Coast Bank intervened in the proceedings and sought to have Bowling Green’s complaint dismissed on the basis of the intercreditor agreement. The circuit court of Du Page County found that, although Gold Coast Bank had breached the intercreditor agreement, the agreement still required that Bowling Green’s complaint be dismissed. Bowling Green appeals from that order. For the reasons that follow, we affirm as modified.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 140715 People
v. Byrd Filed 4-27-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Franklin T. Byrd, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of 86 years on his convictions of intentional first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2008)) and armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2008)). He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to seat a potential juror as a remedy for a violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and in imposing the sentence. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to seat the juror or in imposing the sentence, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160323 In
re Marriage of Faletti Filed 4-27-17 (TJJ)
The respondents, Thomas Kasher, guardian of the estate of Virginia Faletti, and Teresa Convery, guardian of the person of Virginia Faletti, appeal from the circuit court’s denial of their motion to vacate the bifurcated judgment of dissolution of marriage. The respondents argue the circuit court abused its discretion when it entered the bifurcated judgment of dissolution of marriage without jurisdiction, consent, or notice. Reversed and remanded.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153201 In
re Commitment of Rendon Filed 4-27-17 (TJJ)
This appeal is brought by the fourth person ever committed as a sexually violent person (“SVP”) under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2014)) in Cook County. Respondent, Enrique Rendon, voluntarily stipulated to being an SVP and was civilly committed in 2002, then underwent sex offender treatment designed to reduce his risk of recidivism. After being recommended for release in 2010, respondent entered conditional release, where he remained in the community while scrupulously supervised by Department of Human Services (the Department) mental health professionals. The State then successfully moved to revoke his conditional release in 2012, claiming that he was a danger to the safety of others in the community and that he had violated several conditions of his release, including his alleged failure to honestly answer questions about his sexual behavior and fantasies in polygraph examinations. This court reversed that judgment, and once the mandate issued, respondent was returned to conditional release, over the State’s specific objection. In re Commitment of Rendon, 2014 IL App (1st) 123090, ¶ 41. This particular appeal stems from the trial court’s determination, following review of respondent’s 2015 annual mental health report, that there was no probable cause to find respondent had made sufficient progress in treatment such that he was no longer an SVP. This probable cause decision came despite some noted progress in treatment and even though he obtained the lowest possible score in standard testing designed to gauge the risk of sexual offender recidivism. The trial court therefore denied respondent a full evidentiary hearing in the matter. Had respondent succeeded in obtaining a full hearing, it would have been his first chance to argue whether he had reached such a low risk of recidivism as to warrant discharge. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to conduct such an evidentiary hearing.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153405 City
of Chicago v. Expedia, Inc Filed 4-27-17 (TJJ)
This appeal arises from the Cook County circuit court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the city of Chicago (the City) and against certain online travel companies (OTCs), namely Expedia, Inc., and its subsidiaries, Hotels.com, L.P., and Hotwire, Inc. (defendants).1 Specifically, the court granted the City judgment on its claim that defendants had failed to collect, and remit to the City, the correct amount of the Chicago Hotel Accommodations Tax (CHAT) (Chicago Municipal Code § 3-24-010 et seq. (1990)). Defendants now appeal. Reversed and remanded.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 142737 People
v. Austin Filed 4-25-17 (TJJ)
Defendant Marcus Austin was convicted by a jury of armed robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking, and aggravated assault. He argues on appeal that (i) after a Batson challenge, the trial court improperly collapsed the three-step procedure; (ii) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on exclusions to the definition of “firearm”; (iii) the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly commented on Austin’s silence at the time of his arrest; and (iv) the evidence to sustain his conviction for armed robbery was insufficient. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152772 People
v. Rudell Filed 4-25-17 (TJJ)
Sara Rudell challenges her conviction for child endangerment after leaving her six-month-old baby alone in a car. On appeal, she argues (i) the insufficiency of the evidence undermines her conviction, (ii) her trial counsel should have been allowed to move to suppress her statements to police after trial testimony had begun, (iii) the trial court should have granted her a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and (iv) cumulative error requires reversal. We reject each of these claims and affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150502 Gapinski
v. Gujrati Filed 4-24-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff Rebecca Gapinski, individually and as the administrator of the Estate of Daniel Gapinski, deceased, sought to recover for medical malpractice she alleged was committed by defendant Meena Gujrati, M.D., an employee of defendant Central Illinois Pathology, S.C. (CIP), and resulted in Daniel’s death from renal cell cancer. The jury found in favor of Rebecca, and the trial court entered a judgment against Gujrati and CIP in the amount of $1,727,409.50, jointly and severally. Gujrati and CIP appealed. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150547 Whipple
v. The Village of North Utica Filed 4-25-17
Plaintiffs, 13 owners and possessors of land in La Salle County, filed a three-count complaint against defendants, the Village of North Utica and Aramoni LLC, seeking to invalidate several village ordinances that allowed Aramoni to operate a silica sand mine in Waltham Township and requesting an injunction based on prospective nuisance. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and plaintiffs’ appeal. We reverse the dismissal of counts I and III and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162068 Krozel
v. The Illinois Court of Claims Filed 4-24-17
Plaintiff, Lainie Krozel, appeals the order of the circuit court granting defendants' motion to dismiss her complaint for writ of certiorari, which sought review of the Court of Claims' dismissal of her indemnity claim. On appeal, plaintiff contends her complaint should be reinstated because (1) the Court of Claims erroneously applied the two-year general statute of limitations contained in section 22(h) of the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/22 (West 2014)) instead of the five-year statute of limitations in section 22(a) for claims arising out of a contract; and (2) her due process rights were violated where the Court of Claims did not consider her complaint on the merits. For the following reasons, we affirm.-
No. 2017 IL App (1st)
161147 Board of Education of the
City of Chicago v. Illinois State Board of Education
Filed 4-21-17 (AMT)
No. 2017 IL App (1st)
161147 Board of Education of the
City of Chicago v. Illinois State Board of Education
Filed 4-21-17 (AMT)
The defendant appeals from an order of the circuit court denying her motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Board), on the Board's complaint for declaratory judgment, which asked the circuit court to declare that a hearing officer's stay of the defendant's dismissal hearing was void because good cause to stay the hearing did not exist. Hall is a tenured teacher employed by the Board. The Board approved dismissal charges of Hall after she failed to complete a remediation plan which was ordered after her teaching performance was deemed unsatisfactory. Over the Board’s objection, the hearing officer granted the defendant’s motion to stay the dismissal hearing pending a final arbitration decision regarding her grievance from July 2012 challenging the remediation plan. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 140926 Yanello v. Park Family Dental Filed 4-20-17 (AMT)
The plaintiff sued the defendants, Dr. Jae S. Roh and Park Family Dental, for professional negligence after certain dental implants surgically placed by Dr. Roh failed. Following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of the defendants on all counts. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s judgment arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the defense to show the jury an actual human skull and a model skull and to use the skulls to establish that Dr. Roh did not violate the standard of care. The plaintiff claims the defendant failed to lay the proper foundation for the skulls and failed to disclose skulls prior to trial pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 213.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160154 People v. Motzko Filed 4-20-17 (AMT)
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, as well as a petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress. The State filed motions to reconsider, which the trial court denied. The State then appealed the trial court’s order, granting defendant’s motion to suppress. Thereafter, the court granted defendant’s petition to rescind. The state appeals arguing the court erred in granting the motion to suppress, erred in denying its motion to reconsider, and lacked jurisdiction to grant the defendant’s petition to rescind.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160024WC Simpson v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n Filed 4-20-17 (AMT)
The claimant, Curtis Simpson, appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County, which confirmed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) to deny him benefits under the Act which he sought against his employer, the City of Peoria (City). The claimant, a firefighter with the City, alleged a work-related permanent injury to his heart by virtue of a heart attack. The arbitrator issued a decision awarding the claimant benefits. The Commission found that the City had successfully rebutted the presumption that the claimant's cardiovascular disease was causally related to his employment as a firefighter. The Commission further found that the claimant failed to meet his burden because at the time of his heart attack, he was at home, had just physically exerted himself, and was not performing any activity connected to his duties as a firefighter or Assistant Fire Chief. The circuit court confirmed the decision of the Commission. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150170 People v. Crenshaw Filed 04-19-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150124 People v. Lewis Filed 04-19-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150020 People v. Palmer Filed 04-19-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161159 BMO Harris Bank National Association v. LaRosa Filed 04-17-17 (MGB)
Defendants appeal an order of the circuit court that struck and dismissed their petition for relief pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendants had sought to vacate the personal deficiency judgment that was entered against them as part of a foreclosure. On appeal, defendants contend that their section 2-1401 petition was not barred by section 15-1509(c) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law. We Affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 142726 People v. Terrell Filed 4-14-2017 (AMT)
Defendant appeals following his bench trial where he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment. The defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish he constructively possessed the drugs and weapons recovered.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161780 Perry v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation Filed 4-14-2017 (AMT)
Plaintiffs-appellants, Christopher J. Perry and Perry & Associates, LLC (collectively referred to as plaintiffs), filed an action in the circuit court under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) against defendant-appellee, the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, seeking the disclosure of a complaint filed with defendant against Mr. Perry’s structural engineer’s license, as well as reasonable attorney fees, and a finding for civil penalties on the basis that defendant had acted in bad faith by failing to disclose the complaint. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted plaintiffs’ motion in part and denied it in part. The court ruled that the complaint was not disclosable, but it ordered the release of certain exhibits attached to the complaint. Both parties moved for reconsideration. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed plaintiffs’ action, ruling that a new statute under the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois precluded the release of either the complaint or its exhibits to plaintiffs.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161027WC Millennium Knickerbocker Hotel v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n Filed 4-14-2017 (AMT)
Claimant, Rudy Guzman, Jr., sought benefits pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) for an injury he allegedly sustained while working for respondent, Millennium Knickerbocker Hotel. The parties executed a lump-sum settlement contract, which provided, in part, that respondent had paid all of claimant’s medical bills. Almost 2½ years after the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) approved the settlement contract, claimant filed a “Motion to Enforce Contract and Penalties.” The claimant alleged that some of his medical bills remain unpaid and requested respondent pay the outstanding medical bills as well as penalties and attorney fees for respondent’s failure to pay the outstanding charges. The Commission entered an order granting claimant’s motion and directing respondent to pay claimant medical expenses as well as the requested penalties and attorney fees. The circuit court of Cook County confirmed the Commission’s order. Respondent then initiated the present appeal.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160286 Parmar v. Madigan Filed 4-13-2017 (AMT)
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment concerning an amendment to the Illinois Estate and Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Act (Estate Tax Act) Parmar’s estate was not subject to Illinois estate tax at the time of her death. Public Act 96-1496 became effective on January 13, 2011, reviving the Illinois estate tax by amending section 2(b) of the Estate Tax Act. By its terms, the amended section applied retroactively to the estates of persons dying after December 31, 2010. This included Parmar’s estate.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160799 In re Marriage of Haleas Filed 4-13-2017 (AMT)
Petitioner, Peter J. Haleas, filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to respondent, Fanee Haleas. Ultimately, the parties agreed to resolve their property and maintenance issues through binding arbitration. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award and entered a final judgment for dissolution of the marriage, incorporating the award. Respondent appeals, arguing that the arbitrator erred in finding that certain business interests were petitioner’s nonmarital property and in determining the amount and duration of maintenance. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 140530 People v. Fletcher Filed 4-13-2017 (AMT)
Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of armed robbery and sentenced defendant to 21 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues (1) his conviction should be vacated because the record does not show that he knowingly and understandingly waived his right to a jury trial, and (2) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery with a firearm. Reversed and remanded.
No. 2017 IL App (4th)
Dal D. Filed 4-13-2017 (AMT)
The state filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent mother as to her two sons, Dal. D. and Day. D. Following a fitness hearing, the trial court found respondent unfit. After a best-interest hearing, the court terminated respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appeals, arguing that (1) the factual basis to which she stipulated at her fitness hearing was insufficient to prove she was an unfit parent, (2) the court made no findings of fact to support its determination she was unfit, (3) her admission of unfitness was not knowing and voluntary, and (4) the court’s finding that Dal. D.’s and Day. D.’s best interest required termination of her parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160010WC Johnston
Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n Filed 4-13-2017 (AMT)
Claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Act seeking benefits from The East Dundee Fire Protection District (employer). He alleged he suffered injuries to his person “while shoveling snow in [the] fire department parking lot.” Following a hearing, the arbitrator denied benefits under the Act, finding the employer had successfully rebutted the presumption under section 6(f) of the Act that claimant’s heart or vascular disease or condition arose out of his employment as a firefighter and further, that claimant did not suffer accidental injuries which arose out of his employment nor was his current condition of ill-being causally related to the alleged accident. On review, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision. On judicial review, the circuit court of Kane County confirmed the Commission’s decision.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 142092 People
v. Murphy Filed 3-14-17 (TJJ)
Following a bench trial, defendant, Darnell Murphy, was found guilty of burglary. He was sentenced, because of his criminal background, to a Class X sentence of eight years in prison. On appeal, Murphy contends that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the State failed to establish that he did not have permission to be inside the building or that he intended to commit a theft. He also contests the imposition of certain fines and fees. We affirm and correct the fines and fees order.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152852 Jones
v. Brown-Marino Filed 4-10-17 (TJJ)
Following an election, plaintiff’s party lost majority control of the board of trustees. The new majority party began to take actions adverse to plaintiff’s interests, and plaintiff is trying to stop them. The board of trustees passed an ordinance allowing trustees to hire outside counsel to assist with drafting legislation and other legislative services. Plaintiff filed this case seeking a declaration that the ordinance was legally invalid. Plaintiff also moved the court to disqualify the law firm that defendants had hired to provide legislative services. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to disqualify counsel and subsequently dismissed the case. The trial court committed no error, and we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153095 Board
of Trusteees of the Harvey Police Pension Fund v. City
of Harvey Filed 4-10-17 (TJJ)
The City of Harvey appeals from a circuit court order enforcing the terms of a settlement agreement entered into between the City of Harvey and the Board of Trustees of the Harvey Police Pension Fund. In 2006, the Board of Trustees of the Harvey Police Pension Fund filed suit against the City of Harvey for various violations of the Illinois Pension Code. In February 2008, the parties entered into a settlement agreement by which the City of Harvey agreed to pay the Harvey Police Pension Fund $551,079.83 in back property taxes the City of Harvey had collected but failed to remit. The City of Harvey also agreed, commencing with the 2006-2007 fiscal year, to annually levy a tax upon all taxable property as required in section 3-125 of the Illinois Pension Code. The parties agreed that the circuit court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement until the back property taxes were repaid. On appeal, the City of Harvey challenges the circuit court’s authority to enforce the back property tax provision, which resulted in the majority of the money damages entered against it. It also challenges how the circuit court calculated those damages. Finally, it challenges the award of attorney fees in favor of the Harvey Police Pension Fund. For the reasons set forth more fully below, we reject the City’s arguments and affirm the judgment of the circuit court entered in favor of the Board of Trustees of the Harvey Police Pension Fund.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160305 Deutsche
Bank National Trust Company v. Payton Filed
When Carla and Marvin Watkins, the defendants, did not pay their mortgages, they became concerned that Citimortgage, Inc. (Citimortgage), and Countrywide Home Loans (Countrywide) would commence foreclosure proceedings against them. On November 11, 2005, a warranty deed containing the Watkinses’ signatures conveyed the subject property to Gary Leigh Payton and Tammy Marie Payton. We find that once Long Beach, Deutsche Bank’s assignor, paid off the Watkinses’ mortgages with Citimortgage and Countrywide, Long Beach was subrogated, by operation of law, and Long Beach stepped into the shoes of Citimortgage and Countrywide. Therefore, Long Beach acquired Citimortgage's and Countrywide’s priority interest in the subject property. We also find that the circuit court correctly granted Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment, predicated on the doctrine of equitable subrogation, in order to avoid an unjust result and to prevent the Watkinses from being unjustly enriched when they invoked their forged deed defense. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not err when it granted Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment predicated on the doctrine of equitable subrogation.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161764 Weaver
v. The Board of Education of the City of Chicago
Filed 4-11-17 (TJJ)
We do not believe Weaver’s case presents extraordinary or compelling circumstances, but even assuming that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable, Weaver’s claim nevertheless fails. There is no evidence that the Board unambiguously promised that a dismissal hearing would be held in the absence of a formal request by Weaver within the appropriate time frame, nor is there evidence that the Board could have reasonably foreseen Weaver’s reliance on that alleged promise. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160240 People
v. Ferral-Mujica Filed 3-24-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Armando Ferral-Mujica, appeals from an order of the circuit court of McHenry County denying his motions to withdraw his guilty plea and reconsider his sentence. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions, where he pleaded guilty in reliance on his counsel’s representation that the trial court expressly stated during an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012) conference that it would sentence defendant to a prison term between 8 and 12 years. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160414 Moore
v. The State of Illinois Filed 4-11-17 (TJJ)
In October 2011, Elda Buckley, now deceased, purchased an insurance policy that contained a rider payable to Christine P. Moore, the executrix of Buckley’s estate, upon Buckley’s death. The same day, Buckley applied for Medicaid benefits under the Illinois Public Aid Code (Code) (305 ILCS 5/1-1 to 15-11 (West 2010)), which contains a provision prohibiting the transfer of certain assets for less than fair market value. Following a hearing, defendant, the State of Illinois, acting through the Department of Human Services (Human Services) and its secretary, Michelle R.B. Saddler, and the Department of Healthcare and Family Services and its director, Julie Hamos (collectively, Departments), found Buckley’s insurance policy was purchased for less than fair market value and therefore constituted a nonallowable transfer of assets subject to penalty. In April 2015, the circuit court affirmed the Departments’ findings. The Public Administrator appeals, asserting the Departments erred in finding the purchase of the insurance policy was a nonallowable transfer subject to penalty under the Code. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160855 In
re Ronald J. Filed 4-11-17 (TJJ)
After adjudicating respondent, Ronald J., to be a delinquent minor and making him a ward of the court, the trial court committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (Department). Respondent appeals on two grounds: (1) the court erred by finding commitment to be in his best interest and in the best interest of the public, and (2) the court failed to review statutorily required evidence before ordering his commitment. We agree with the second argument and thus do not reach the first argument.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150765 Enbridge
Energy v. Fry Filed 4-6-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership (Enbridge), filed a condemnation suit to obtain easement rights over certain farmland in Kankakee County so that it could build and operate a new underground pipeline. The landowner defendants opposed the suit for condemnation and filed a traverse and motion to dismiss (traverse motion), which the trial court denied. A jury trial was later held on the condemnation complaint, and a directed verdict was entered for Enbridge as to the amount of just compensation it was required to pay to the landowners. The landowners appeal, raising numerous issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160184 The County of Boone v. Plote Construction, Inc. Filed 4-6-2017 (ATH)
Defendants, Plote Construction, Inc., Belvidere Materials, LLC, and Chicago Land Title and Trust Company, appeal an order of the circuit court of Boone County holding them in indirect civil contempt for violating an injunctive order entered in favor of plaintiff, the County of Boone. Defendants argue that the injunctive order expired prior to the conduct that was the basis for the contempt finding and, alternatively, that plaintiff failed to prove that defendants’ conduct violated the terms of the injunction. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160119 People v. Topor Filed 4-6-2017 (ATH)
appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Boone
County granting defendant’s motion to quash his arrest and
suppress evidence. Because an identified citizen informant
reported, via 911, the smell of burnt cannabis coming from
defendant’s vehicle, the police had reasonable suspicion
to stop defendant’s vehicle. In appeal, the defendant
maintains that the citizen informant was unreliable as he
did not indicate how he knew of smell of burnt cannabis. Thus, we reverse
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160410 People v. Peck Filed
A jury found defendant guilty of (1) possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (ecstasy) and (2) possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver premised on drugs found in a search of defendant’s residence. In February 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 20 years and 10 years, respectively. Defendant filed a motion for new trial asserting, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress his statements. The Trial Court found during Krankel hearing that counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and denied the motion. We conclude that trial counsel could not reasonably have determined that defendant reinitiated the conversation with Hockaday. After viewing the interrogation video, counsel should have concluded that defendant invoked his right to counsel and Hockaday, by not stopping his interrogation, violated defendant’s constitutional rights. Counsel’s failure to file this motion was not the result of a tactical decision, but of a fundamental misjudgment. The record demonstrates that defendant’s confession had an immense impact on the outcome of his case, and its admission negatively impacted defendant’s ability to provide alternative theories and request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses. Additionally, defendant’s confession was the State’s strongest piece of evidence to establish his intent to deliver. As mentioned by the State in its closing argument, the jury did not have to speculate as - 13 to defendant’s intent, as he said exactly what he intended to do with the drugs. Accordingly, we conclude defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 140578 People v. Shakirov Filed 04-05-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160162 Benzakry v. Patel Filed
Plaintiff Emil Benzakry, through his company Emil & Son, LLC, entered into a purchase agreement with defendants Paresh and Kalpita Patel, through their company KAP Family Investments, LLC, to purchase a gas station in Rock Falls, Illinois. The gas station closed, and Benzakry sued for damages. A judgment was entered in favor of Benzakry. Defendants appealed, arguing (1) a claim for veil piercing cannot be tried before a jury, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the introduction of bank statements without proper foundation, (3) plaintiffs cannot prove fraud because Paresh did not proximately cause Benzakry’s damages, (4) plaintiffs cannot prove fraud because Benzakry did not justifiably rely on Paresh’s alleged misrepresentations, and (5) the corporate veil judgment against Kalpita was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Benzakry cross-appealed, arguing (1) the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was error because plaintiffs are allowed to sue under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act or Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2006)) and (2) the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion to amend a complaint to conform the pleadings to the proofs was error because there was evidence of a principal-agent relationship. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. . The business record exception requires evidence related to the document’s creation. There is no evidence in the record of the instant case that shows the bank statements were made in the regular course of business. Specifically, there is no evidence, through testimony or affidavit, of the bank statement’s creation. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record, through testimony or affidavit, that shows it was regular practice for Paresh to keep KAP’s bank statements. Therefore, plaintiffs did not meet the business records exception requirements. Plaintiffs established proximate cause sufficiently to constitute fraud. Benzakry testified that his purpose for purchasing the gas station was to pursue a triple net lease, which allows a purchaser to collect rent from a tenant. Paresh made representations regarding the tenant’s reliability and trustworthiness when he made statements to Benzakry regarding his relationship with the tenant in an e-mail. Plaintiffs established justifiable reliance sufficiently to constitute fraud. Benzakry testified that his purpose for purchasing the gas station was to pursue a triple net lease, which allowed a purchaser to collect rent from a tenant. Paresh made representations regarding the tenant’s financial reliability and trustworthiness when he made statements regarding his relationship with the tenant to Benzakry in an e-mail. Appellate Court found trial court erred in granting directed finding in favor of seller on Consumer Fraud Counts, entered judgment on those counts in favor of buyer, and remand for determination of attorney's fees.
No. 2017 IL App (3d)
150165 People v. Wilson Filed
Defendant, Daejohn Wilson, appeals from his convictions for aggravated battery (X) and unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant argues that (1) his sentence is excessive and (2) he is subject to an unauthorized crimestopper’s fine. Defendant argues his sentence is excessive because the court failed to adequately consider in mitigation his youth, mental health issues, and potential for rehabilitation. Because defendant points to no evidence refuting the court’s consideration of these factors and the sentences were within the statutory ranges, we conclude defendant’s sentences were not the result of an abuse of discretion. We find defendant did not raise the Crimestoppers fine issue in the circuit court, and therefore, it is forfeited. PMoreover, the crimestopper’s fine was imposed by the circuit court who had jurisdiction to impose fines, and therefore, it is merely voidable and not void. While we find plain error occurred in the imposition of a fine that could only be assessed on a sentence of probation, we find no reversible error in that the issue is moot where credit properly awarded at $5.00 per day of incarceration more than satisfied the improperly imposed fine. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150164 In
re Amanda H. Filed 4-4-17 (TJJ)
The respondent, Amanda H., appeals orders of the circuit court of Kankakee County, committing her involuntarily to a hospital for inpatient medical treatment and ordering the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. Although those orders have expired, the respondent claims that the issues raised by this appeal fall within various exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Reversed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 110311-B People
v. Fields Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Anthony Fields was convicted of armed robbery and being an armed habitual criminal. The trial court imposed a 21-year sentence for armed robbery, which included a 15-year enhancement for the use of a firearm and a concurrent 10-year sentence on the conviction of being an AHC. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of either charge, (2) the 15-year enhancement of his sentence for armed robbery is unconstitutional, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. On February 11, 2014, we issued an opinion modified upon denial of rehearing, affirming his armed robbery conviction but reversing the AHC conviction. People v. Fields, 2014 IL App (1st) 110311. In September 2016, our supreme court issued a supervisory order directing us to reconsider that judgment in light of its decision in People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424. We now affirm defendant’s conviction for AHC as well as armed robbery.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 142019 People
v. Horton Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
Chicago police officers, in their mission to “serve and protect,” must remove from the city’s streets illegal guns, which claim hundreds of lives each year and imperil the public’s safety and security. Presumably acting on that laudable desire, an officer had a hunch, based on seeing “a metallic object” in Markell Horton’s waistband, that Horton might have a handgun and pursued him. Eventually, police found a handgun hidden under a mattress in a bedroom where they found Horton, and he was charged with possession. But changes in Illinois law (in part mandated by United States Supreme Court rulings protecting the right to keep and bear arms). We hold that the trial court improperly denied Horton’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Reversed.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 140841 People
v. Williams Filed 4-3-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Kimberly J. Williams, appeals from her two convictions for aggravated battery. Defendant argues (1) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s use of force was not justified, (2) defendant was deprived of her due process right to a fair trial, and (3) one of defendant’s convictions must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150055 Walker
v. Monreal Filed 4-3-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, David Walker, an inmate in the
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), filed a
complaint for mandamus relief against Adam Monreal,
Chairman of the Prisoner Review Board. In his complaint,
Walker requested that the trial court compel Monreal to
conduct a new revocation hearing regarding the revocation
of his mandatory supervised release (MSR). The trial court
granted Monreal’s motion to dismiss the mandamus complaint
with prejudice. Walker appealed. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150156 People
v. Bogan Filed 4-3-17 (TJJ)
The defendant, Antonio M. Bogan, appeals from his conviction for being an armed habitual criminal. He argues that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to prove that he possessed a firearm. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150918 People
v. Hall Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
Following a trial, a jury determined that defendant, Adam Hall, was a sexually violent person as defined by the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2012)), and he was subsequently committed to the custody and care of the Department of Human Services. On appeal, defendant contends that he was denied his right to a fair trial and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was a sexually violent person. In a motion to dismiss that was taken with the case, the State asserts that this court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal. We agree with the State for reasons discussed below.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152993 International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. The Illinois Labor Relations
Board Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
Petitioner, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 700 (Union), appeals from a decision and order of the Illinois Labor Relations Board, Local Panel, that upheld two general orders issued by respondents, the County of Cook and the Sheriff of Cook County. In relevant part, the first general order—known as the Gang Order—prohibits employees from associating with anyone the employee knew or should have known is or was in a gang and requires employees to complete a disclosure form about gang affiliations. The second general order— known as the Rules of Conduct Order—provides in part that the rules for on- and off-duty conduct extend to social media and networking sites. On appeal, the Union contends that the Gang Order was a subject of mandatory bargaining and the social media policy in the Rules of Conduct Order is overbroad under section 10(a)(1) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS 315/10(a)(1) (West 2012)). We reverse the Board’s decision as to the Gang Order and affirm the Board’s decision as to the Rules of Conduct Order.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153228 Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Elston Avenue Properties, LLC
Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
This appeal follows drawn-out negotiations and proceedings precipitated by eminent domain. Commonwealth Edison needed to dig on private property to run underground wires. The parties reached an agreement on compensation and on the specifications for digging and restoring the property. ComEd did not specifically follow the agreed-upon specifications for refilling the dig sites, resulting in nonconforming work. Nonetheless, ComEd asked the court to approve its performance and rule that its obligations had been satisfied. After the parties presented evidence, the trial court issued an order of satisfaction from which the property owner now appeals. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160870 North
Spaulding Condominium Assoc v. Cavanaugh Filed
Plaintiff North Spaulding Condominium Association (North Spaulding) initiated a forcible entry and detainer action against the defendant unit owners Michael and Tiffany Cavanaugh (collectively, the Cavanaughs) for unpaid assessments, seeking possession of the unit and a money judgment. In North Spaulding Condominium Ass’n v. Cavanaugh, 2017 IL App (1st) 153387-U (North Spaulding I), we affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Cavanaughs’ counterclaim against North Spaulding and the Cavanaughs’ third-party complaint against Westward Management (Westward). While North Spaulding I was on appeal, the forcible case proceeded to a bench trial. After the close of the condominium association’s case in chief, the Cavanaughs moved for judgment in their favor pursuant to section 2-1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2014)). The trial court denied the motion. The Cavanaughs rested without presenting any witnesses or introducing any evidence. The trial court entered judgment in favor of North Spaulding. The Cavanaughs filed a combined motion for a new trial and to reconsider the denial of their motion for judgment in their favor, which the trial court denied. The trial court then granted North Spaulding’s petition for attorney fees. The Cavanaughs timely appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161259-B In
re A.S. Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
This matter is before us following remand to the circuit court of Cook County to conduct a further hearing pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to address respondent’s claim that the State improperly used peremptory challenges to strike prospective black jurors during jury selection in his delinquency proceedings. In our earlier opinion in this case, we found that the trial court had improperly collapsed the second and third stages of the Batson hearing and, further, had not elicited any race-neutral reason from the State for its use of a peremptory against one prospective black juror, and therefore, we remanded for a resumed hearing. In re A.S., 2016 IL App (1st) 161259, ¶¶ 40, 47. We retained jurisdiction to further consider respondent’s Batson challenge, if necessary. Following the hearing on remand, the trial court concluded that the State had proffered race-neutral reasons for exercising peremptory challenges against all four black members of the venire. Because we conclude that respondent sustained his burden to show, as to one juror, that the State’s proffered race-neutral reason was pretextual, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160449 People
v. Johnson Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
In April 2014, defendant, Granville S. Johnson, filed a petition for postconviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act with the assistance of private counsel. In June 2014, the trial court dismissed defendant’s petition at the first stage of postconviction proceedings. In July 2014, defendant’s counsel withdrew his representation, and defendant filed a timely pro se motion to reconsider, which he later supplemented. Defendant’s motion to reconsider and its supplement alleged postconviction counsel provided “ineffective” assistance by failing to raise certain previously requested claims in his postconviction petition. In May 2016, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider and found any new claims raised in his motion to reconsider and its supplement were forfeited as they were not raised in the original petition. Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) not considering whether postconviction counsel’s representation was “unreasonable” for failing to include the additional claims in his postconviction petition and (2) summarily dismissing his petition because at least one of the claims he would have raised states the gist of a meritorious claim. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 170055 People
v. Zimmerman Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2016), intervenors—the Pantagraph, WGLT FM, and the Illinois Press Association—appeal the McLean County circuit court’s January 3, 2017, order denying the intervenors’ request to open for public inspection the fourth and fifth motions in limine filed under seal by criminal defendant, Kirk P. Zimmerman. On appeal, the intervenors contend the circuit court erred by finding the presumption of public access to judicial documents did not apply to the documents at issue. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 140369 People
v. Boston Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial, defendant Sylvester Boston was convicted of first degree murder in connection with the fatal stabbing of Steven Moore, Sr. (Moore) and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the admission of preliminary hearing testimony of a key eyewitness violated the confrontation clause and the Illinois Rules of Evidence, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce defendant’s prior conviction for possession of contraband in a penal institution, (3) the State’s improper comments on defendant’s postarrest silence warrant a new trial, (4) defendant was denied his right to a properly instructed jury where the court failed to clarify Illinois law on self-defense in response to a jury note, (5) defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated where a juror expressly dissented during the polling of the jury, and (6) defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve certain issues for appellate review. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court in its entirety.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 142723 People
v. Lozano Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Gilbert Lozano was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, predicated on defendant not possessing a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification card. Defendant appeals his conviction, asserting the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where the State failed to present evidence that established he was a member of a “street gang” as provided by the statutory definition. For the reasons that follow, we agree and reverse defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150575 People
v. Hernandez Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
After a jury trial, defendant Sergio Hernandez was found guilty of the first-degree murder of Rocio Munoz and of personally discharging the firearm that caused her death. Defendant was sentenced to 30 years for the murder and 25 years as a result of a firearm enhancement, for a total sentence of 55 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). Defendant now appeals the trial court's decision, arguing: (1) that the trial court erred in finding attenuation; (2) that his counsel at the attenuation hearing had a conflict of interest, since the appellate court permitted defendant on remand to address his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his statement as involuntary, and the same trial counsel continued to represent defendant on remand (Hernandez, 2013 IL App (1st) 103447-U, ¶ 56 (permitting the parties " 'an opportunity to develop a factual record' "); and (3) that this counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress defendant's statement as involuntary. For the following reasons, we reverse defendant's conviction, suppress the statement he made at the police station and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 151318 Cuevas
v. Berrios Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
Illinois law allows property owners to claim a partial exemption, commonly known as the “homestead exemption,” from real estate taxes for their primary residence. Plaintiff Daniel Cuevas claimed homestead exemptions on 11 different properties which he owned in Cook County. Only one of those properties was his principal residence. The county assessor, defendant Joseph Berrios, convened an administrative hearing to determine the relevant facts regarding Cuevas’s exemptions and the amount he might owe due to any improper exemptions. The Department of Erroneous Homestead Exemption Administrative Hearings (DEHE) determined that Cuevas improperly took exemptions on 10 of the 11 properties and that he owed $91,984.85 for back taxes, penalties, and interest for tax years 2007 to 2012. Cuevas filed two lawsuits challenging this action. In case No. 15 CH 2321 (the class action case), the circuit court upheld the legality of the administrative hearing process and the underlying statute against a host of challenges asserted by Cuevas. Cuevas also filed an administrative review case, No. 15 CH 169. In that case, the circuit court reversed the DEHE’s determination that Cuevas was responsible for back taxes for the 2007 tax year. We affirm the circuit court’s judgments in both cases.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152090 People
v. Trice Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
After a bench trial, defendant Sammy Trice was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance and sentenced to six years with the Illinois Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant claims: (1) that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the controlled substance, although it was the subject of a stipulation between the parties; and (2) that both the fines and fees order and the mittimus should be corrected. The State agrees that the fines and fees order must be corrected to reflect a total amount owed of $954 and that the mittimus must be corrected to reflect a single count of delivery of a controlled substance, rather than manufacture and delivery as currently indicated. Thus, these corrections are so ordered. However, for the following reasons, we do not find persuasive defendant's chain-of-custody arguments, and we affirm his conviction.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152114 Robinson
v. Point One Toyota Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
More than 20 years of litigation and three appeals later, this case returns to us to review the circuit court’s award of attorney fees and costs to plaintiff Latanya Kemp (Ms. Kemp) on her claim under the federal Consumer Leasing Act of 1976 (15 U.S.C. §1667(a) (1994) (CLA)). The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in its determination of the amount of reimbursable attorney fees and costs it awarded to Ms. Kemp. Ms. Kemp challenges the award on several grounds. For clarity sake we address Ms. Kemp’s arguments as follows: (1) whether the circuit court applied the wrong methodology in calculating the amount of reimbursable attorney fees; (2) whether the circuit court erred when it; (a) reduced the amount of costs requested by Ms. Kemp, (b) denied her request for attorney fees incurred for the fee petition proceeding, and (c) arbitrarily reduced her attorney fees request; and (3) whether the circuit court erred when it failed to award fees for the appellate proceedings. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153409 Archon
Construction Company Inc. v. U.S. Shelter, LLC
Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
This appeal involves the trial court’s decision on a quantum meruit claim made by plaintiff, Archon Construction Company, Inc. (Archon) against defendants, U.S. Shelter, L.L.C., U.S. Shelter Group, Inc., and Oak Ridge of Elgin, L.L.C. (collectively, U.S. Shelter). Archon appeals the trial court’s decision denying its claim. U.S. Shelter cross-appeals the trial court’s decision denying its counterclaim for breach of contract against Archon. As we explain below, the contract required a sanitary sewer system that was subject to the final approval of the city. This matter actually involves a contractual dispute between the parties for the extra work and costs involved in obtaining that final approval. But, because an express contract existed between Archon and U.S. Shelter, Archon cannot recover under the quasi-contractual quantum meruit theory. We also conclude that the circuit court’s decision finding in favor of Archon on U.S. Shelter’s counterclaim was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153576 Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCondichie Filed 3-31-17
Defendant Volneat McCondichie appeals from the circuit court’s order, granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. on its claim for forcible entry and detainer. On appeal, defendant maintains that summary judgment should not have been granted where she was entitled to a relocation assistance fee pursuant to section 5-14-050 of the Protecting Tenants in Foreclosed Rental Property Ordinance (Ordinance) (Chicago Municipal Code § 5-14-050 (added June 5, 2013)). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161036 The
Groves of Palatine Condominium Association v. Walsh
Construction Company Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
The instant appeal arises from the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff Walsh Construction Company’s third-party complaint against defendant K & K Iron Works, LLC (the LLC) on the basis that the LLC was not a mere continuation of the company that had subcontracted for certain construction work with plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the LLC was a mere continuation of K & K Iron Works, Inc. (the corporation), and, accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the third-party complaint on that basis. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161480 The
Employees' Retirement System of The State of Hawaii v.
Clarion Partners, LLC Filed 3-31-17
Plaintiff Stephen Jackson filed this qui tam lawsuit under Hawaii’s false claims statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 661-21 et seq. (2014) (Hawaii False Claims Act), against defendants Clarion Partners, LLC, and ING Clarion Realty Services, LLC. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Clarion defendants. Jackson appeals that decision. The Clarion defendants have filed a cross-appeal claiming that the court erred by denying their request for certain costs which they contend were recoverable under Hawaii law. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161709 Owens
v. VHS Acqusition Subsidiary Number 3 Filed
Dr. Raziuddin filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming that he was not the physician who treated plaintiff and that Dr. Seema Elahi was actually the treating physician. Plaintiff then amended his complaint, adding Dr. Elahi as a defendant. Dr. Elahi then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the amended complaint related back to the initial filing of the complaint, but certified the question for review pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). We allowed Dr. Elahi’s petition for leave to appeal and now answer the trial court’s certified question in the affirmative. However, while we are able to answer the question of law presented in the certified question, the record of the case at bar is not sufficiently developed for us to determine the application of that law to the factual circumstances present in the instant case. Accordingly, our analysis provides a roadmap that may be used to answer this important question in the court below, as well as in the future, and the case is remanded back to the trial court.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162367 Twyman
v. The Illinois Department of Employment Security
Filed 3-31-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff Wayde Twyman appeals the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint because plaintiff failed to file it within 35 days after service of a decision by the Board of Review of the Illinois Department of Employment Security (Board). In his complaint, plaintiff had sought review of a final decision by the Board denying him unemployment benefits. For the following reasons, we affirm the dismissal.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152054 Kopnick v. JL Woode Management Company, LLC Filed 3-30-2017 (ATH)
Charlene Kopnick sued her former landlord, claiming a violation of section 5-12-170 of Chicago’s Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (RTLO), a violation of section 2 of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) and common law unjust enrichment with regard to her 2014 lease. The trial court granted the landlord’s motion to dismiss the action with prejudice. On appeal, Kopnick argues her allegations were factually sufficient and that, at minimum, she should have been allowed to amend. This is a case of first impression regarding section 5-12-170 of the RLTO. In count I, Kopnick alleged the landlord “did not give” her a summary copy of the RLTO. In Count II, she alleged the daily fee charged by her landlord for each of the eight days she had not provided timely notice of her intent to renew or move out were in violation of the RTLO as well as unfair, unscrupulous, and contrary to public policy thereby violating the Consumer Fraud Act. In count III, she alleged that her landlord’s “collection of notice fees and the enforcement of their notice fee policy is an unjust retention of a benefit obtained by coercion.”
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 140326 People v. Montano Filed 3-30-2017 (ATH)
In July 1990,
Guadalupe Montano, the wife of defendant, Aurelio Montano,
went missing, and her body was never found. The State’s
theory was that defendant, motivated by jealousy,
strangled Guadalupe with a rope, wrapped her in a rug,
buried her at a horse farm with the help of his brother,
told other family members about the killing, and moved the
body before the police could find it. In 2014, a jury
found defendant guilty of first-degree murder, and the
trial court imposed a sentence of natural life
appeal, defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial
because the court erred in allowing evidence that three
detector dogs alerted to the scent of remains on the rug
which was found buried in an outdoor area of the horse
argues the evidence did not meet the reliability standard
set forth in Frye
v. United States.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150676 Peterson Vet, Inc. v. The Department of Employment Security Filed 3-30-17 (ATH)
Peterson Vet, Inc., filed a complaint in the trial court
for administrative review of a decision of the
Department of Employment Security Board of Review
(Board) that granted unemployment
insurance benefits to one of Peterson Vet’s former
employees, defendant Kara Timmerman. Defendant had
worked for Peterson Vet as a veterinary technician and
was discharged after it was learned she falsely
represented on her application that she was a
Certified Veterinary Technician. Her license
had actually lapsed.
After being discharged, the defendant filed an
application for unemployment benefits. A Department
claims adjudicator determined that Timmerman was
ineligible for unemployment benefits based upon
misconduct. Defendant appealed this ruling. A department
referee later affirmed the decision of the claims
adjudicator after a hearing. Defendant than appealed
to the Board who later revered the referee’s decision. Upon review,
the trial court reversed the Board’s decision and
denied Timmerman’s claim for benefits. Timmerman
appeals. Trial court affirmed.