Illinois Supreme and
Appellate Court Case Summaries
By Laurence J.
Dunford (LJD), Robert Clifford( RJC)
and Timothy J.
Joyce(TJJ)
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No. 2012 IL App (1st) 102939 People
v. McFadden Filed 11-30-12 (TJJ)
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the
trial judge found defendant Onaffia McFadden guilty of three
armed robberies while armed with a firearm and two counts of
unlawful possession or use of a weapon by a felon (720
ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2008)). The trial judge sentenced
McFadden to 29 years in prison on each of the armed robbery
convictions, including a 15-year enhancement for carrying a
firearm pursuant to section 18-2(b) of the Criminal Code. The
trial judge also sentenced McFadden to 10 years in prison
on each of the convictions for UUW by a felon. All of the
sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. On appeal,
McFadden contends that: (1) the 15-year statutory enhancement of
his armed robbery sentences is unconstitutional; (2) his
sentence is otherwise excessive; (3) one of his convictions for
UUW by a felon violates the "one-act, one-crime" rule; and (4)
the mittimus must be corrected to remove an erroneous conviction
for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). For the
following reasons, we agree with McFadden's first, third and
fourth claims, vacate the armed robbery sentences, vacate one of
his convictions for UUW by a felon, correct the mittimus, and
remand the case for resentencing.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 103568 People
v. Morfin Filed 11-30-12 (TJJ)
Defendant Nicholas Morfin appeals from an order of the circuit
court dismissing his second or successive petition for relief
from judgment challenging his mandatory sentence of natural life
imprisonment for two counts of first degree murder on the
basis that he was a minor at the time of his offenses.
Defendant contends that a mandatory life sentence for an
offender under 18 years old violates the Illinois constitutional
requirement of proportionate penalties and the federal
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments. In particular, he contends that his claim is
meritorious under the United States Supreme Court decision in
Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The State
responds that defendant's constitutional challenges to his
sentence are barred as res judicata and are not meritorious, and
particularly contends that Miller does not apply herein as it is
a new rule of law that cannot be applied retroactively on
collateral review. For the reasons stated below, we agree with
defendant, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing
consistent with Miller.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 110619 Kreutzer
v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n Filed 11-30-12 (TJJ)
This case comes before this court for the second time. In the
prior proceeding, Kreutzer v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 404 Ill.
App. 3d 791, 815 (2010) (Kreutzer I), we reversed the order of
the Illinois Commerce Commission granting respondent
Commonwealth Edison Co. a certificate of public convenience and
necessity for the construction of an electrical power line along
Kreutzer Road, on which is situated the property of petitioners,
Frances Kreutzer, Marie Caranci, William Byrne, and Linda Byrne.
On remand, ComEd modified the dimensions of the easement it was
seeking and the Commission determined that this change cured the
evidentiary deficiency on which the reversal in Kreutzer I was
based. The Commission rejected petitioners’ attempt to
introduce additional evidence on whether the Kreutzer Road route
was superior to the other candidate routes, an issue that the
Commission had determined in the first proceeding. The
Commission reasoned that our reversal and remand in
Kreutzer I was narrow and did not reopen the issue that
petitioners attempted to reargue. The Commission reconfirmed the
Kreutzer Road route with the modification that ComEd had made.
Petitioners appeal, and we affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 110209 Department
of Central Management Services v. Illinois Labor Relations
Board Filed 11-30-12 (TJJ)
On September 9, 2008, the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (union), filed with the
Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel (Board), a
majority-interest petition to represent three regional
supervisors employed by the Illinois Department of Public
Health (Department) in the job title or classification of senior
public administrator, option 8H. On September 7, 2010, after an
administrative hearing conducted on February 2, 2010, the
administrative law judge (ALJ), Sylvia Rios, issued a
recommended decision and order granting the petition. On January
28, 2011, the Board decided the ALJ was correct and ordered the
Board's Executive Director, John Brosnan, to certify the union
as the exclusive representative of the three petitioned-for
regional supervisors. On February 3, 2011, Brosnan issued
a certification of representation, stating that the three senior
public administrators, option 8H, were within the existing
bargaining unit designated as RC-63. The Department
appeals on the ground that the petitioned-for individuals were
supervisory employees within the meaning of section 3(r) of the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. We find no clear error in
the Board's decision that the individuals at issue were
"employees" with the right to bargain collectively. Therefore,
we affirm the Board's decision.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 120031 Cundiff
v. Patel Filed 11-30-12 (TJJ)
In March 2009, plaintiff, Bradley Cundiff, sued defendant,
Gunvant Patel, for negligence. In July 2010, defendant filed a
motion in limine barring evidence relating to conversations
between plaintiff and defendant's liability insurance provider.
The trial court granted the motion. In September 2011, a
jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $3,054.
Plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court erred by granting
defendant's motion in limine barring evidence of a conversation
between plaintiff and defendant's liability insurance
provider. We reverse.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 120525 Wittendorf
v. Worthington Filed 11-30-12 (TJJ)
Petitioner, Geannette Wittendorf, and respondent, Kenneth
Worthington, are the biological parents of L.W, born September
19, 2010. The parties were never married. On April 20, 2012, the
trial court awarded Geannette residential custody of L.W.
and Kenneth unsupervised visitation. The court also
modified Geannette’s order of protection against Kenneth to
allow for personal, mail, and telephonic contact to the extent
that it is strictly necessary to effectuate the terms of the
visitation order. On April 20, 2012, Geannette filed a
motion for rehearing. On May 18, 2012, after a hearing on the
motion, the court affirmed its decision as to visitation and
modification of the order of protection. Geannette appeals, and
we reverse and remand as to visitation and affirm the
court’s modification of the order of protection.
No. 2012 IL App 101631 People
v. Cleveland Filed 11-30-12 (TJJ)
The trial court dismissed defendant Albert Cleveland's petition
at the second stage of postconviction proceedings. In 1996, the
defendant was convicted of murder and attempted murder. In 1998,
the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on
a per se conflict of interest and counsel's failure to call the
mother of his children as an alibi witness. Over the course of
10 years, appointed counsel supplemented the defendant's initial
petition with additional affidavits from other potential
exculpatory witnesses and added another claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel alleging he was precluded from testifying
by his defense counsel. We conclude the defendant has made a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation based on
counsel's failure to interview several alibi witnesses. We
affirm the dismissal of the defendant's final claim based on
counsel's alleged refusal to allow him to testify because the
defendant did not assert his desire to testify before the
trial court. We remand for a third-stage evidentiary hearing on
the claims that his counsel was subject to a per se conflict of
interest and that defense counsel failed to call known
exculpatory witnesses.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 103590 People
v. Garcia Filed 11-30-12 (TJJ)
After a jury trial, defendant Baldomero Garcia was convicted of
two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault and sentenced to
two eight-year consecutive sentences in the Illinois Department
of Corrections for his conduct toward L.P. (the victim),
the five-year-old daughter of defendant’s live-in
girlfriend. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the State did not
prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court
erred by admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements into
evidence, (3) the trial court erred by permitting the
State’s expert to testify to a medical opinion for which there
was no foundation, and (4) defendant’s due process rights were
violated when he did not receive a fitness hearing and no
independent judicial determination of defendant’s fitness
was made. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 111780 Hawthorne
Race Course, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Board Filed
11-30-12 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Hawthorne Race Course, Inc. (Hawthorne), appeals the
circuit court's ruling upholding the decision of defendant, the
Illinois Racing Board (Board), in interpreting the Illinois
Horse Racing Act of 1975 (Racing Act) (230 ILCS 5/54.75
(West 2010)). Plaintiff contends the Board erred in
concluding that the percentage of the Horse Racing Equity Trust
Fund (Fund) payable to each eligible licensee under the 2008
version of the Racing Act should be the same as that previously
distributed under the 2006 version of the statute. Based
on the following, we affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 112842 People
v. Burge Filed 11-30-12 (TJJ)
The Illinois Attorney General appeals from an order of the
circuit court dismissing her complaint against
defendants-appellees the Retirement Board of the Policemen's
Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, its board of
trustees (Pension Board), and Jon Burge, a retired Chicago
police officer. In the complaint, the Attorney General, acting
on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois, sought
declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to enjoin the Pension
Board from making ongoing pension payments to Burge in
light of his felony convictions. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse and remand the matter to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 113577 Duffy
v. Orlan Brook Condominium Owners' Association Filed
11-30-12 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Norma Duffy, appeals the circuit court’s order
granting the dismissal of her fourth amended complaint in favor
of defendants, Orlan Brook Condominium Owners’ Association
(condo association) and unknown members of the Orlan Brook
Condominium Owners’ Association, individually (board members).
Plaintiff contends her fourth amended complaint adequately pled
causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive
fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and, in the
alternative, negligent infliction of emotional distress. Based
on the following, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
for further proceedings.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 121183 A.M.
Realty Western L.L.C. v. MSMC Realty, L.L.C. Filed
11-30-12 (TJJ)
Plaintiff A.M. Realty Western L.L.C. (AM Realty) sued a former
tenant, defendant MSMC Realty, L.L.C. (MSMC), to collect monthly
payments that the former tenant had agreed to pay, in addition
to rent, for certain building improvements. Defendant
moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff no longer had
standing to collect under the prior lease because plaintiff had
since sold the building. On November 17, 2011, the trial court
granted defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint with
prejudice. For the following reasons, we reverse.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 110018 People
v. O'Laughlin Filed 11-29-12 (TJJ)
Defendant, Robert E.D. O'Laughlin, argues the Macon County
circuit clerk improperly imposed various fines against him as a
result of his convictions for aggravated driving under the
influence of alcohol, driving while license revoked or
suspended, and aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude an
officer. The State concedes the circuit clerk erred in imposing
certain fines. However, the State asks this court to remand the
case to the trial court for it to impose certain mandatory
fines. We affirm defendant’s conviction, vacate the fines
improperly imposed by the circuit clerk, and remand this case
with directions for the trial court to impose certain fines as
directed and others if deemed appropriate.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 110668 People
v. Millsap Filed 11-29-12 (TJJ)
On October 8, 2010, defendant, Adam J. Millsap, was charged in a
three-count information with aggravated battery. After a bench
trial, he was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery and
sentenced to serve concurrent terms of four years in the
Illinois Department of Corrections. The trial court also ordered
defendant to pay various assessments including a Violent Crime
Victims Assistance Fund (VCVA) assessment and a Children's
Advocacy Center (CAC) assessment. On appeal, defendant
argues that (1) under the one-act, one-crime rule, one of his
convictions for aggravated battery must be vacated; (2) the $40
CAC assessment should be reduced; and (3) the $25 VCVA
assessment should be reduced to $4. We affirm as modified and
remand with directions.
No. 2012
IL App (1st) 112655 Promisco
v. Dart Filed
11-28-12 (RJC)
No. 2012
IL App (3d) 120475 In
re Estate of H.B.
Filed 11-28-12 (RJC)
No. 2012
IL App (4th) 110720 People
v. Canizalez-Cardena
Filed 11-28-12 (RJC)
No. 2012
IL App (5th) 120271 In
re S.L.
Filed 11-28-12 (RJC)
On January 18, 2011, the State filed a petition for
termination of the parental rights of Bruce V. and Julia F.,
the parents of S.L., a minor child. The father did not
participate in the proceedings below and has not filed a brief
in this court. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court entered an order finding that the State had not proved
the first two grounds but had proved Julia to be unfit under
the final two grounds alleged in the amended petition. Julia
appeals from the order of the circuit court of Marion County
finding her to be an unfit parent under sections 1(D)(m)(iii)
and 1(D)(p) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii),
(D)(p) (West 2010)). We reverse and
remand.
No. 2012
IL App (1st) 111145 People
v. Williams
Filed 11-27-12
(RJC)
Defendant appeals the dismissal of two of his successive
petitions (third and fourth petitions) for relief under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2010)). In his third petition, which the circuit court
reviewed as a second-stage proceeding under the Act, defendant
made a claim of actual innocence, and claimed that the State
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that he was arrested without
probable cause. The circuit court granted the State's motion
to Nos. 1-11-1145 and 1-11-2251 (Consolidated) dismiss his
third petition. In his motion for leave to file his fourth
petition, defendant alleged that his mandatory life sentence
is unconstitutional. The circuit court denied him leave to
file his fourth petition. At issue is whether defendant has
made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights have
been violated such that he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his claims in his third petition; and whether
defendant has satisfied the cause-and-prejudice requirements
codified under section 122-1(f) of the Act such that the
circuit court erred in denying his motion for leave to file
his fourth petition challenging his sentence.
No. 2012
IL App (4th) 110403 People
v. Lee Filed 11-27-12 (RJC)
This appeal comes to us on the motion of the office of the
State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to withdraw as counsel on
appeal on the ground no meritorious issues can be raised in
this case.
No. 2012
IL App (4th) 110519 People
v. Nichols
Filed 11-27-12 (RJC)
In March 2011, a jury found defendant, Demetrius Nichols,
guilty of aggravated battery. In June 2011, the trial court
sentenced defendant to seven years in prison, to be served
consecutively to sentences defendant was already serving.
Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred by not
ordering a fitness hearing on its own motion in response to
allegedly incoherent and delusional statements defendant made
and his treatment during these proceedings for schizophrenia
and (2) the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated
battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Affirmed.
No. 2012 IL 111534 People
v.
Leach Filed 11-29-12 (LJD)
Defendant Curtis Leach was convicted after a bench trial in
the circuit court of Cook County of the first degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2002)) of his wife, Latyonia
Cook-Leach, and sentenced to 28 years’ imprisonment. His
conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. People v.
Leach, 391 Ill. App. 3d 161 (2009). Upon defendant’s initial
appeal to this court, we vacated the appellate court’s
judgment and remanded the cause to that court for
consideration in light of People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 135
(2010). People v. Leach, 237 Ill. 2d 575 (2010)
supervisory order). After reconsideration, the appellate court
again affirmed defendant’s conviction. 405 Ill. App. 3d 297.
We then allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal under
Supreme Court Rule 315 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26,
2010)). We are asked to determine whether admission of the
opinion testimony of a pathologist other than the pathologist
who performed the autopsy on the victim and of the autopsy
report itself violated the rule of Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004).
No. 2012 IL 112214 People
v.
Tate Filed 11-29-12 (LJD)
Petitioner, Douglas Tate, filed a postconviction
petition in the circuit court of Cook County. The appellate
court affirmed the circuit court’s summary dismissal. No.
1-09-2379 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We
granted leave to appeal, and now reverse the judgment of
the appellate court and remand to the circuit court for
further proceedings.
No. 2012 IL 112337 In
re Detention of Stanbridge Filed 11-29-12 (LJD)
In these consolidated appeals, we are asked to clarify the
quantum and scope of evidence needed to establish probable
cause in a postcommitment discharge or conditional release
proceeding pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment
Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2008)). In both cases,
the trial court found a lack of probable cause and dismissed
the individual petitions for discharge or conditional release.
In Stanbridge, the appellate court reversed, finding that the
trial court improperly weighed contradictory evidence of the
parties’ respective experts. Stanbridge, 08 Ill. App. 3d
553. In Lieberman, the appellate court affirmed, over a
dissent, finding that the expert did not present sufficient
evidence on the relevant statutory elements to warrant a
further hearing and did not comply with the statutory
requirements for conditional discharge. Lieberman, 011
IL App (1st) 090796. We allowed petitions for leave to
appeal in both cases (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)
and consolidated the appeals for review. For the following
reasons, we reverse the appellate court judgment in Stanbridge
and affirm the appellate court judgment in Lieberman.
No. 2012 IL 112817 People
v.
Hughes Filed 11-29-12 (LJD)
Defendant, Jackie Hughes, pleaded guilty to one count of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16 (West
2006)) and was sentenced to 14 years in prison. Defendant
appealed from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea,
contending that the circuit court of Lake County lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a plea to a
previously nol-prossed charge, and that his plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily made because the court and counsel
failed to advise him of the possibility that the State would
file a petition for involuntary commitment under the
sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et
seq. (West 2006)). The appellate court affirmed. 2011 IL App
(2d) 090992. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment
of the appellate court.
No. 2012 IL 113107 Center
Partners,
Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC. Filed 11-29-12
(LJD)
Defendants appeal from a circuit court of Cook County order
that granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel the production of
certain documents containing privileged attorney-client
communications. Defendants refused to comply with the
court’s order to compel production of documents and were found
in contempt. Defendants appealed pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 304(b)(5) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The appellate court
affirmed the granting of the motion to compel. 2011 IL App
(1st) 110381. For the following reasons, we reverse the
judgments of the appellate and circuit courts and remand the
cause to the circuit court.
No. 2012 IL 113116 People
v.
Giraud Filed 11-29-12 (LJD)
Defendant was convicted in the circuit court of Cook County of
multiple counts, including one count of aggravated criminal
sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(3) (West 2006)). The
victim was his teenage daughter. The aggravating factor found
by the jury was that “during *** the commission of the
offense,” he “acted in such a manner as to threaten or
endanger the life of the victim” (id.), because on at least
one occasion, he had forcible intercourse with her without
wearing a condom, knowing that he was HIV positive. The
appellate court reduced this conviction to criminal sexual
assault (720 ILCS 5/12-13 (West 2006)), on the basis that the
victim was neither threatened nor her life endangered during
the assault. 2011 IL App (1st) 091261, ¶ 30. We allowed the
State’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
No. 2012 IL 113414 Carr
et
al. v. Koch Filed 11-29-12 (LJD)
Citizens unhappy with the way in which public school education
is funded in Illinois brought this declaratory judgment action
against the State Superintendent of Education, the Illinois
State Board of Education, and the Governor. The 2010 complaint
alleged that a funding system is in place which requires
taxpayers in school districts with low property values (such
as theirs) to pay property taxes to fund local public schools
at a higher rate than similarly situated taxpayers in school
districts with higher property values. The complaint alleged
that this amounts to a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The circuit court
of Sangamon County dismissed the action, and the appellate
court affirmed
No. 2012 IL 113569 Toftoy
v.
Rosenwinkel Filed 11-29-12 (LJD)
At issue in this case is whether the Farm Nuisance Suit Act
(740 ILCS 70/1 et seq. (West 2006)) bars the plaintiffs’
nuisance lawsuit against a neighboring cattle farm where the
plaintiffs acquired their property after the cattle farm had
been in operation for more than a year. The appellate
court eld that the suit was not barred. 2011 IL App (2d)
100565. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment
of the appellate court.
No. 2012 IL 113706 Rodriquez
v.
The Department of Financial and Professional Regulation
Filed 11-29-12 (LJD)
Plaintiff, Jack V. Rodriquez, filed a petition with the
circuit court of Cook County seeking reimbursement of
litigation expenses pursuant to section 10-55(c) of the
Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/10-55 (West
2008)). The petition followed a proceeding where
Rodriquez successfully invalidated an administrative
rule of the Department of Financial and Professional
Regulations (Department). The circuit court granted the
Department’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that
Rodriquez’s claim for litigation expenses was barred by res
judicata. The appellate court reversed the circuit
court’s finding relating to litigation expenses and remanded
the cause to the circuit court for a calculation of reasonable
litigation expenses. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate the
circuit court’s original judgment.
No. 2012 IL 113875 In
re A.P. Filed 11-29-12 (LJD)
This appeal arises from a judgment of the circuit court of
Peoria County that found A.P. and J.P. to be neglected minors
under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
(Act) (705 ILCS 405/2- 3(1)(b) (West 2010)) due to an
environment injurious to their welfare. At the
subsequent is positional hearing, the circuit court
found that respondent-mother Lisa P. was a fit parent and
closed the minors’ cases. Respondent appealed, challenging the
finding of neglect and the circuit court’s admission of
records from the Pediatric Resource Center under section
2-18(4)(a) of the Act 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2010)).
The appellate court reversed, holding that the circuit court
erred in admitting the records and adjudicating the minors
neglected. 2012 IL App (3d) 110191. Before this court, the
State challenges the appellate court’s determination on both
issues. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of
the appellate court reversing the trial court’s determination
that the minors’ were neglected.
No. 2012 IL 114163 People
v.
Meersman Filed 11-29-12 (LJD)
The petitioner, Mark Senko, State’s Attorney of Rock Island
County, seeks a writ of mandamus (see Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VI, § 4(a)) to compel respondent, the Honorable F. Michael
Meersman, judge of the circuit court of Rock Island County, to
sentence defendant, Adrian Morrison, in accordance with
section 5-8-4(d)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code)
(730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(2) (West 2010)). Petitioner argues that
respondent improperly imposed concurrent sentences when
consecutive sentences are mandated by the statute. For the
following reasons, we award the writ.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 111145
People
v.
Williams Filed 11-27-12 (LJD)
We are called upon to determine whether the denial of
defendant Carl Williams' petition for an evidentiary hearing
to show actual innocence should be reversed. We are also
required to determine whether the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. __ , 132 S. Ct.
2455 (2012), prohibiting mandatory life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles should be retroactively applied. We
answer yes to both issues.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 110403
People
v.
Lee Filed 11-27-12 (LJD)
This appeal comes to us on the motion of the office of the
State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to withdraw as counsel on
appeal on the ground no meritorious issues can be raised in
this case. For the following reasons, we agree and affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 110519
People
v.
Nichols Filed 11-27-12 (LJD)
In March 2011, a jury found defendant, Demetrius Nichols,
guilty of aggravated battery. In June 2011, the trial court
sentenced defendant to seven years in prison, to be served
consecutively to sentences defendant was already
serving. Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court
erred by not ordering a fitness hearing on its own motion in
response to allegedly incoherent and delusional statements
defendant made and his treatment during these proceedings for
schizophrenia and (2) the State failed to prove him guilty of
aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree and
affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (2nd) 110082
People
v.
Czapla Filed 11-26-12 (LJD)
1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Boguslaw Czapla, was
convicted of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West
2010)) and mob action (720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(1) (West 2010)). The
trial court vacated the mob action conviction and sentenced
him to three years’ imprisonment for aggravated battery.
Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred by
admitting a tape recording of a 911 call that contained a
statement by defendant’s brother that defendant committed the
offense. We affirm.
No. 2012
IL App (3rd) 120068 Musicus
v.
First Equity Group Filed 11-26-12 (LJD)
Plaintiff, Raphael J. Musicus,
brought suit against First Equity Group, LLC (First Equity),
CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (CVS), and the City of Kewanee (City) for
damages and other relief relating to the City's grant of First
Equity's application for rezoning of certain real property and
a special use permit. Plaintiff's main allegation in the
complaint was that notice of the public hearing on the
application was deficient. All three defendants filed motions
to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)), alleging that notice
was proper. After a hearing, the trial court granted the
motions to dismiss of First Equity and the City (collectively
referred to as defendants) and denied the motion to dismiss of
CVS. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court's grant of
the City's motion to dismiss and reverse the trial court's
grant of First Equity's motion to dismiss.
No. 2012 IL App (3rd) 110478 In
re
Marriage of Haller Filed 11-26-12 (LJD)
On October 19, 2007, Suzie Haller filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage from Robert Haller. On March 17, 2011,
the parties appeared for trial but reached a settlement
agreement, which was read into the record. Both parties
testified that it was their desire that the court approve the
agreement and that they understood that the agreement was
binding. The trial court approved the agreement, entered
judgment in a docket entry, and ordered Suzie's attorney to
prepare a written judgment to be filed on a later date.
Subsequent to the hearing, but before a written judgment was
entered, Robert filed a motion to set aside the settlement
agreement. Suzie submitted a proposed written judgment and
filed a motion for entry of judgment. Following a hearing, the
trial court denied Robert's motion to set aside and granted
Suzie's motion for entry of judgment.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 102089 People
v.
Lewis Filed 11-21-12 (LJD)
Following a bench trial, defendant Orlando Lewis was found
guilty of the second degree murder of Robert Thompkins and
sentenced to eighteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal,
defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense when
Thompkins walked toward him after defendant displayed a gun.
Defendant further contends that his sentence was
excessive and that his mittimus should be reduced to reflect
1,032 days spent in presentencing custody. The State agrees
that his mittimus should be corrected to 1,033 days. As to all
other claims, the State disagrees.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 110966 People
v.
Hyland Filed 11-21-12 (LJD)
Following a jury trial, defendant Kraig Hyland was convicted
of one count of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and one
count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang
member. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of three
years on each count. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 112120 Hoffman
v.
Orland Firefighters' Pension Board Filed 11-21-12 (LJD)
The Orland Firefighter's Pension Board (the Board) terminated
the work-related disability pension of plaintiff Eric Hoffman,
a decision the circuit court reversed. The plaintiff was
awarded a disability pension by the Board in 2002 by a three
to two vote, following a 2001 injury he sustained while
performing his firefighter duties. In 2010, the Board held a
hearing to examine whether the plaintiff should continue to
receive his disability pension. The plaintiff's personal
physician testified that the plaintiff remained physically
incapable of performing the full duties of a firefighter. The
Board's doctor, based on his examination of the plaintiff and
his review of the available medical records dating back to the
plaintiff's original injury in 2001, testified that the
plaintiff had no objective manifestations of a physical
disability and that his only ailment was a subjective claim of
pain. The Board's doctor opined that the plaintiff was never
rendered disabled by his 2001 injury. The Board terminated the
plaintiff's pension. The circuit court reversed, ruling
that the only evidence supporting the termination was that the
plaintiff never sustained a disability, which rendered the
Board's decision against the manifest weight of the evidence
because no proof was presented that the plaintiff had
recovered from his disability. We agree with the circuit court
and affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 112174 CNA
International,
Inc. v. Baer Filed 11-21-12 (LJD)
In this consolidated appeal, plaintiffs, CNA International,
Inc. (CNA), and Gold Coast Development, LLC, appeal the trial
court's orders: (1) granting the motion of defendants Steven
H. Baer and Rally Capital Service, LLC, to dismiss counts I
through IV of plaintiffs' second amended complaint; (2)
discharging Baer as receiver; (3) granting defendant Cole
Taylor Bank's motion to dismiss counts V and VI of
plaintiffs' second amended complaint; and (4) denying
plaintiffs' request to file a third amended complaint. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 122555 Reyes
v.
Menard, Inc. Filed 11-21-12 (LJD)
Plaintiff Gloria Reyes appeals the trial court’s order
granting defendant’s motion to bar plaintiff’s rejection of an
arbitration award for defendant and the self-executing order
that entered a sanction automatically barring plaintiff from
testifying and presenting evidence if the order was not
complied with on a date certain. For the following
reasons, we reverse the barring of the arbitration award and
grant plaintiff's motion to reject the award.
No. 2012 IL App (2nd) 111303 Glasgow
v.
Associated Banc-Corp Filed 11-21-12 (LJD)
Plaintiff, Takeisha Glasgow, appeals the trial court’s
dismissal, pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2008)), of
plaintiff’s amended complaint against defendants, Associated
Banc-Corp and Associated Banc-Corp—Lindenhurst Branch.
We affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (3rd) 110904 City
of
East Peoria v. Palmer Filed 11-20-12 (LJD)
The defendant, Bradford Palmer, was charged with driving under
the influence (DUI) pursuant to section 11-501(a)(2) of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West
2010)). He filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary
suspension of his license, which the circuit court granted
after finding that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify
the traffic stop. Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed a
motion to quash his arrest. After a hearing, the court
granted the motion to quash.
No. 2012 IL App (3d) 110904 City
of
East Peoria v. Palmer Filed 11-20-12 (TJJ)
The defendant, Bradford Palmer, was charged with driving under
the influence (DUI) pursuant to section 11-501(a)(2) of the
Illinois Vehicle Code. He filed a petition to rescind the
statutory summary suspension of his license, which the
circuit court granted after finding that the arresting officer
lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity to justify the traffic stop. Shortly thereafter, the
defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest. After a
hearing, the court granted the motion to quash. On appeal, the
municipality of East Peoria argues that: (1) the court erred
when it found that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity to stop the
defendant's vehicle; (2) the arresting officer had probable
cause to arrest the defendant for DUI; and
(3) the court erred when it refused to admit into evidence an
audio recording of a call from Par-A-Dice casino security to
the East Peoria police. We affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 111478 Martinez
v.
River Park Place Filed 11-20-12 (TJJ)
Plaintiffs, Al A. Martinez and Greg Campos, appeal from an
order of the circuit court of Cook County finding that
plaintiffs' damages arising from defendant's breach of their
contracts to purchase two condominium units in a planned
development in Elgin, Illinois, were limited to a return
of plaintiffs' earnest money and nominal damages of $1 each.
The order was issued in response to defendant's motion to
reconsider the trial court's memorandum opinion, issued after
a bench trial, finding that defendant had breached the
contracts by terminating plaintiffs' purchase agreements when
they would not agree to an increase in the purchase price and
awarding damages to each plaintiff equal to the difference
between the increased price and the contract price for
their condominium units. Plaintiffs also appeal from the
trial court's finding that defendant did not violate the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act,
by increasing the purchase price of the condominium
units in order to coerce plaintiffs to either agree to the
price increase or terminate their purchase agreements. On
appeal, plaintiffs argue that: (1) the trial court erred in
finding that they failed to present evidence to support
an award of damages more than the return of their earnest
money; and (2) the trial court's finding that defendant did
not violate the Consumer Fraud Act was contrary to law and
against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm the trial court.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 120308 People,
ex
rel. Madigan v. United Construction of America
Filed 11-20-12 (TJJ)
This appeal presents two certified questions that deal with
the pleading requirements for an action by the Attorney
General under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act. The first question concerns the
pleading requirements for a claim under section 2 of the Act,
and the second concerns the pleading requirements for
obtaining injunctive and other relief under section 7. We do
not need to explain much about the background of this case in
order to answer the certified questions. Defendants are
all involved in some fashion with the mortgage and home repair
industries in Illinois. The complaint alleges that defendants
approach unsophisticated homeowners, usually elderly ones from
predominantly African-American communities, and offer to
provide home repair services and financing in order to pay for
those services. If the homeowners decline, defendants instead
offer to provide mortgage refinancing services. The problem
with this business model, the complaint alleges, is that
defendants then push the homeowners into high-risk and
unaffordable financing arrangements and steer the resulting
home-repair contracts to companies that, among other things,
fail to complete the work in a professional manner, if at all.
The complaint alleges that this is all accomplished
through a variety of deceptive and unfair business practices.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 110769 People
v.
Burton Filed 11-20-12 (TJJ)
Following a bench trial, defendant, Jerry Burton, was
convicted of being an armed habitual criminal, unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon, and unlawful use of a
weapon. The trial court denied defendant’s posttrial motion
for reconsideration of the finding of guilty and for a
new trial. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to
six years in prison followed by a three-year term of mandatory
supervised release. Defendant was assessed a $400 fine and
$310 in costs. Defendant timely appealed. The issues
are: (1) whether the State’s comment during closing arguments
that the testimony of its key witness was credible, because
the witness had given a prior consistent statement to the
police immediately after the incident, warrants a new trial
under the plain error doctrine; and (2) whether
defendant is entitled to monetary credit against his $400
fine, where he spent 86 days in presentencing custody. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment as modified to
reflect full credit awarded against defendant’s fine.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 110559 People
v.
Williams Filed 11-20-12 (TJJ)
Defendant, Anthony Williams, pleaded guilty to retail theft.
Following the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea,
defendant timely appealed. He argues that he should be allowed
to withdraw his plea, because the trial court, when
admonishing defendant concerning the sentencing range,
erroneously admonished him that he was eligible to elect
treatment under section 40-5 of the Alcoholism and Other Drug
Abuse and Dependency Act (the Act) (20 ILCS 301/40-5 (West
2010)), if given probation (commonly referred to as
Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime or “TASC” probation).
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 120391 Mahoney
v.
Gummerson Filed 11-20-12 (TJJ)
This matter comes before the court as a permissive
interlocutory appeal brought pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The questions certified
arose from a proceeding in which plaintiff, Carolyn Mahoney,
filed a civil action against defendants, her former
husband, Billy J. Cox, and his attorney, R. Marc Gummerson,
for allegedly engaging in a plot to kill Mahoney. Mahoney
served a subpoena on the Illinois Department of Corrections
(Department), seeking the disclosure of the identity and
statements of a confidential informant who assisted the
Department in its investigation of the alleged murder-for-hire
plot. After denying the Department’s motion to quash the
subpoena, the trial court certified three questions to this
court. We granted the Department’s application to review
two of the three certified questions: “1. Whether 735 ILCS
5/8-802.3 [(West 2010)] precludes disclosure of a CI’s
[confidential informant’s] identity in a civil action
involving allegations of a murder-for-hire plot but
where no criminal prosecution is being conducted. 2. If not,
whether the Department must affirmatively prove that the
interest in protecting the CI’s identity outweighs the seeking
party’s need for the identity, including that disclosure will
impose a risk to the safety of the CI, and that
disclosure will discourage other citizens from providing
information to law enforcement.”
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 112191 In
re
Commitment of Fields Filed 11-14-12 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
respondent Justin Fields was found to be a sexually violent
person (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment
Act. The trial court subsequently entered an order
committing respondent to a secure facility for institutional
care and treatment. On appeal, respondent argues that: (1) he
was denied a fair trial when the prosecution improperly
commented about his custodial status and nonparticipation in
treatment, as well as improperly
argued testimony from the State's expert witnesses as
substantive evidence, during its closing argument that shifted
the burden of proof and violated orders in limine; (2) the
trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based
upon the prosecution's allegedly improper remarks during
closing argument; (3) the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was an SVP under the Act; and (4) he
was denied his right to a dispositional hearing under the Act
before the commitment order was entered. While we reject
respondent's challenges to the prosecutor's remarks during
closing argument and the sufficiency of the evidence against
him, we remand the cause to the trial court to conduct a
dispositional hearing allowing respondent to present
testimony and evidence for its consideration in framing the
commitment order.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 110059 People
v.
Mutesha Filed 11-19-12 (TJJ)
Defendant, Ronex Mutesha, appeals his conviction of aggravated
battery to a peace officer. He contends that the trial court
erred when it denied his request to discharge his public
defender and represent himself for posttrial motions and
sentencing. The State contends that the denial was
proper because there was a bona fide doubt as to his fitness.
However, although defendant was fit when the court decided the
posttrial motions and sentenced him, his appeal of a prior
unfitness determination was still pending. We determine
that, under People v. Elsholtz, 136 Ill. App. 3d 209 (1985),
because that appeal was still pending, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to rule on the posttrial motions and sentence
defendant. Accordingly, its orders on those matters are void,
we vacate the denial of defendant’s posttrial motions and his
sentence, and we dismiss the appeal.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 111317 Newport
Township
Road District v. Pavelich Filed 11-19-12 (TJJ)
Defendants appeal the trial court’s order that the Newport
township board allocate funds from the road district’s budget
for payment of plaintiffs’ legal fees. On appeal, defendants
argue that: (1) the trial court erred by denying their motion
to dismiss; (2) the Newport Township highway
commissioner was not justified in retaining independent
counsel; (3) there is no authority for ordering a township
board to review a petition for attorney fees and to establish
a budget item to pay the fees; (4) plaintiffs were not
entitled to fees springing from a lawsuit filed in 2009; and
(5) the township board is vested with exclusive discretion in
annual budgetary matters involving the road district. We
affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (3d) 110385 People
v.
Max Filed 11-19-12 (TJJ)
After a jury trial, defendant, Billie S. Max, was convicted of
theft in excess of $10,000 and sentenced to a period of
probation and county-jail time and ordered to pay restitution.
Defendant appeals her conviction, arguing that: (1) the State
committed reversible error by improperly attempting to
define reasonable doubt for the jury in rebuttal closing
argument; (2) the trial court erred in denying defendant's
posttrial motion to appoint a special prosecutor; (3) her
trial counsel was ineffective; (4) she was not proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) she was denied a
fair trial because of the cumulative effect of various trial
errors. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 103834
Geisler
v.
Everest National Insurance Company Filed 11-16-12
(LJD)
Plaintiff Fred Geisler, M.D., filed this suit claiming that
defendants Everest National Insurance Company (Everest) and
Western Litigation, Inc. (Western) breached its duties under
the Everest insurance policy (Everest Policy) regarding two
medical malpractice lawsuits in which plaintiff was a named
defendant (Townsley Lawsuit and Lalicata Lawsuit). Defendants
responded claiming that plaintiff failed to state a claim for
breach of the Everest Policy regarding its defense of the
Townsley Lawsuit, and that the Everest Policy did not provide
plaintiff with coverage for the Lalicata lawsuit.
In this appeal, plaintiff seeks to reverse the circuit court’s
orders granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 110013
The
Department
of Central Management Services v. The Illinois Labor
Relations Board Filed 11-16-12 (LJD)
Petitioners, the Department of Central Management Services
(CMS), the Illinois Departments of Public Health (DPH) and
Natural Resources (DNR), and the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) bring this action for direct review of
a decision by the Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel
(Board), declaring the American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (Council 31), to be the
exclusive bargaining representative of a group of professional
engineers with the job title senior public service
administrator (option 8E), employed at DPH, DNR, and
EPA. Petitioners appeal, arguing the option 8Es were
supervisory employees within the meaning of section 3(r) of
the Act (5 ILCS 315/3(r) (West 2008)). We reverse.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 120069 Yellow
Book
Sales and Distribution Company, Inc. v. Feldman
Filed 11-15-12 (TJJ)
This is a collection case, arising from several contracts
entered into by the plaintiff, Yellow Book Sales and
Distribution Company, Inc. (Yellow Book), and the defendant,
David Feldman (Feldman). As president of Glassworks, Inc.
(Glassworks), Feldman negotiated and signed four
contacts for advertising services with Yellow Book. On each
occasion, Feldman signed the contracts with his name,
followed, by "President" or "Pres." When Glassworks went out
of business and failed to pay the remaining balance owed
on the four contracts, Yellow Book sued Feldman as the
purported guarantor. Following a bench trial, the court found
Feldman personally liable under the guarantee. The parties
then stipulated to the judgment amount ($13,178.01).
Feldman now appeals, contending that the trial
court's finding that he intended to be bound personally under
the guarantee was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 110718 Gaylor
v.
Campion, Curran, Rausch, Gummerson and Dunlop, P.C.
Filed 11-15-12 (TJJ)
Plaintiffs, Robert W. Gaylor (Robert), Joann A. Gaylor, Robert
E. Gaylor (Bobby), and Morna Gaylor, filed a two-count second
amended complaint against defendants, Campion, Curran, Rausch,
Gummerson & Dunlop, P.C. (the Campion firm), and Lee C.
Lockwood, an associate attorney of the Campion firm, alleging
legal malpractice and common-law fraud. The trial court
dismissed the fraud count, and the matter proceeded to trial
on plaintiffs’ one-count third amended complaint alleging
legal malpractice only. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of plaintiffs and awarded them damages of $182,625. Plaintiffs
appeal, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in dismissing
their fraud count and (2) that the jury’s determination of
damages was manifestly inadequate and ignored proven
elements of damages. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 1200060 People
v.
Hubbard Filed 10-17-12 (TJJ)
Defendant, Roy E. Hubbard, appeals from the dismissal of two
petitions under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure
in which he sought to vacate his 2006 conviction of aggravated
criminal sexual assault (bodily harm). That conviction
was entered under a plea agreement by which defendant received
a sentence of 47˝ years’ imprisonment. During a conference
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 before the court’s
acceptance of the agreement, the parties advised the court
of defendant’s prior conviction of predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child, but the parties did not formally
stipulate to the conviction’s existence and the court did not
take judicial notice of it. In his petitions, defendant
asserted that, under the recidivist
sentencing provision of section 12-14(d)(2) of the Criminal
Code of 1961, the existence of the earlier conviction meant
that the only statutorily authorized sentence was a life
sentence. He argued that, as a consequence, the sentence, the
plea agreement, and the conviction all were void. Affirmed.
No. 2012 IL App (3d) 110608 In
re
Marriage of Razzano Filed 11-14-12 (TJJ)
The petitioner, Brenda Lynn Razzano, now known as Brenda Lynn
Gorski, filed a motion to modify child support, alleging
changes in circumstances in the income of her ex-husband, Dana
Louis Razzano, and in the needs of the parties' two children,
Maria and Joseph. Brenda also filed, in the alternative,
a petition for educational support. The circuit court granted
Brenda's motion to modify child support, and Dana appealed. On
appeal, Dana argues that the court erred when it modified
child support pursuant to section 505(a) of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, rather than
under section 513(a)(2) of the Act. We affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (1st)
101786 In
re
Marriage of Digiovanni Filed
11-13-12 (RJC)
Petitioner Susan DiGiovanni appeals the order of the circuit
court denying her petition to extend maintenance and granting
respondent Nick DiGiovanni's petition to modify maintenance.
On appeal, Susan contends the trial court (1) erred in
characterizing her petition as a petition to modify support
instead of a petition to review support; (2) erroneously
applied the substantial change in circumstances standard to
her petition; (3) erred in granting Nick's petition to modify
maintenance and in determining the amount of maintenance; (4)
erred in making the decreased maintenance
retroactive to February 9, 2009; (5) erroneously applied the
penalty clause of the parties' marital settlement agreement
(MSA), finding Susan and her attorneys liable for respondent's
attorney fees; and (6) abused its discretion in awarding Nick
$78,500 in attorney fees. Affirmed.
No. 2012 IL App (2d)
110646 People
v.
Dryden Filed 11-13-12
(RJC)
Defendant, Stephen H. Dryden, pleaded guilty to aggravated
driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS
5/11-501(a)(2), (d) (West 2010)). The trial court sentenced
him to 20 years’ imprisonment. Defendant subsequently moved to
withdraw the plea and to reconsider the sentence. The trial
court denied the motion and defendant appeals. He contends
that he is entitled to a new hearing on his motion because his
attorney’s certificate did not comply with Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006) in that it did not state
that the attorney had consulted with defendant to ascertain
his contentions of error in the sentence. We vacate and
remand.
No. 2012 IL App (2d)
110396 People
v.
Thompson Filed
11-13-12 (RJC)
In May 2010, the State charged defendant, John M. Thompson,
with two counts of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1),
(a)(2) (West 2010)), one count of battery (720 ILCS
5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2010)), and one count of resisting a peace
officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1 (West 2010)), and defendant was
released on bond. Thereafter, the State charged defendant with
an unrelated felony and defendant was taken back into custody.
The State initially opted to try the felony case first for
speedy-trial purposes pursuant to section 103-5(a) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the speedy-trial statute) (725
ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2010)). Before bringing defendant to
trial in either action, however, the State changed its
election and brought defendant to trial in the current matter
first for the purposes of a speedy trial. A jury found
defendant guilty of resisting a peace officer, and the trial
court sentenced defendant to time served. Defendant now
appeals his conviction, contending that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did
not file a motion to dismiss the charges on the basis that the
State failed to bring him to trial within the speedy-trial
term. We affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (5th)
120110 Kosydor
v.
American Express Centurion Services Corporation
Filed 11-13-12 (RJC)
On November 12, 2010, Ron E. Kosydor
filed in the circuit court of Union County a complaint against
the defendants, American Express Centurion Services
Corporation and American Express Bank, F.S.B. (hereinafter
referred to collectively as American Express), and Baker,
Miller, Markoff & Krasny, LLC (hereinafter referred to as
the law firm). The complaint alleged that American Express and
its law firm had violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (the Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 to
12 (West 2008)) by engaging in debt collection activities
against the plaintiff which were malicious and fraudulent
because the defendants knew that the plaintiff did not owe
them any money. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to sections 2-619(a)(4) and
(a)(9) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735
ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4), (a)(9) (West 2010)). On December 19, 2011,
the circuit court of Union County entered an order dismissing
with prejudice the plaintiff's complaint. The court ruled that
the Act does not apply to attorneys. The court further ruled
that res judicata did apply to bar the action against American
Express.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 110337 Illinois
State
Bar Association Mutual Insurance Company v. Frank M.
Greenfield and Associates, P.C. Filed 11-09-12
(LJD)
This appeal is essentially a case of first impression and
concerns whether an admission of error in a legal malpractice
claim by a policyholder without his insurance company’s
approval gave the company the right to deny coverage and not
defend the attorney and his law firm. Attorney Frank M.
Greenfield admitted to making a mistake in drafting a client’s
will that affected the distribution of funds from a trust
established by his client. Greenfield had a professional
liability insurance policy through Illinois State Bar
Association Mutual Insurance Company (ISBA Mutual), but did
not inform ISBA Mutual prior to sending the letter to
the beneficiaries. ISBA Mutual claims that, by failing to
inform it of the letter prior to sending it, Greenfield
violated a provision of his insurance policy and,
consequently, ISBA Mutual had no duty to defend Greenfield in
the subsequent legal malpractice action.The trial court also
found that even if he had violated the policy, ISBA Mutual was
not prejudiced by the breach. ISBA Mutual appeals, and we
affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 110930 Tunca
v.
Painter Filed 11-09-12 (LJD)
Plaintiff, Dr. Josh Tunca, appeals from an order of the
circuit court of Cook County granting summary judgment in
favor of defendant, Dr. Thomas Painter, on count II of his
third amended complaint, which alleged that plaintiff's
statements to other doctors about plaintiff's performance
violated the confidentiality provisions of section 8-2101 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, commonly referred to as the
Medical Studies Act. Plaintiff contends that he has a
private right of action for defendant's violation of the Act
and that, contrary to the trial court's findings, defendant's
statements to other doctors about plaintiff's performance were
privileged under the Act.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 111529 Pekin
Insurance
Company v. Equilon Enterprises LLC Filed 11-09-12 (LJD)
In this declaratory action arising out of a personal injury
suit, the circuit court denied plaintiff Pekin Insurance Co.'s
motion for summary judgment on the question of duty to defend
and, instead, granted judgment as a matter of law to
defendants Equilon Enterprises, d/b/a Shell Oil Products US,
and Shell Oil Company (collectively Shell), as additional
insureds under the policy. Waldemar Zablocki filed suit for
injuries he sustained while lighting a cigarette behind a gas
station operated by Summit Shell (Summit), d/b/a Mary's
Station II, Inc. Based on the unclear endorsements, in
particular the endorsement that purported to limit coverage to
vicarious liability, Pekin has not demonstrated that the
allegations of the underlying complaint do not bring the case
potentially within the policy's coverage. We affirm the
circuit court's judgment that Pekin has a duty to defend
Shell.
No. 2012 IL App (2nd) 100736 People
v.
Wigman Filed 11-08-12 (LJD)
Following a bench trial, defendant, James J. Wigman, was
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and
improper lane usage. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), 709(a) (West
2006). Defendant appeals, alleging that his statutory right to
a speedy trial was violated. Defendant acknowledges that he
failed to preserve the issue but asks us to consider the issue
under the plain error doctrine or, alternatively, to find that
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to move for discharge. We find that there was no
error, because there was no lawful basis for raising a
speedy-trial objection.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 111040
Lynch
v.
The Department of Transportation Filed
11-08-12 (LJD)
In this consolidated appeal, plaintiffs, Robert D. Lynch and
Timothy L. Storm, seek review of the Sangamon County circuit
court's orders dismissing their claims under the Illinois
Human Rights Act (Rights Act) (775 ILCS 5/art. I (West 2010))
pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Both Lynch and
Storm sued the State of Illinois, in its capacity as their
respective employers, for violations of the Rights Act. Lynch
sued the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) for
unlawful retaliatory conduct. Storm sued the Illinois State
Police (State Police) for unlawful employment discrimination
on the basis of age, sex, and sexual orientation. In both
cases, the court concluded (1) the Rights Act does not contain
clear and unequivocal language waiving the State's
sovereign immunity; (2) the State's sovereign immunity is not
waived simply because the Rights Act includes the State in its
definition of "employer"; and (3) the State was not estopped
from asserting its sovereign immunity despite the letters it
sent informing plaintiffs they could "commence a civil action
in the appropriate state circuit court."
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 113129WC W.B.
Olson,
Inc. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission Filed
11-08-12 (LJD)
W. B. Olson, Inc. (Olson) appeals from an order of the
Circuit Court of Cook County which confirmed a decision of the
Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission),
awarding the claimant, Craig Kolin, benefits pursuant to the
Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West
2008)) for injuries to his right knee that he received while
in Olson's employ. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 120285 People
v.
Baum Filed 11-08-12 (LJD)
In February 2012, the trial court granted defendant Mason S.
Baum's motion to dismiss the State's criminal charges against
him, finding that, because defendant was younger than 17 years
old when the alleged crimes occurred, the State was required
to initiate charges against him in a juvenile delinquency
petition. The State appeals, arguing it should not have been
precluded from charging defendant in criminal, as opposed to
delinquency, proceedings. We disagree and affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (3rd) 110381
People
v.
Oaks Filed 11-07-12 (LJD)
In this appeal, defendant, Douglas E. Oaks, contests the
dismissal of his postconviction petition after a third-stage
evidentiary hearing. Defendant also challenges the trial
court's denial of his request for leave to file supplemental
postconviction claims during the third-stage evidentiary
hearing. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 110666
People
v.
Mineau Filed 11-06-12 (RJC)
Defendant, Martinez L. Mineau, was
charged with burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2008)) and
unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS
5/4-103(a) (West 2008)). Pursuant to an agreement with the
State, he pleaded guilty to the unlawful-possession charge and
the State dismissed the burglary charge. Defendant later moved
to withdraw the plea. Following a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion. Defendant appeals, contending that the
cause should be remanded for a new hearing where the attorney
who represented him at the hearing did not file a certificate
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1,
2006) and the certificate that co-counsel filed was
insufficient. We affirm.
No. 2012
IL App (4th) 120202 Carmody
v.
Thompson Filed 10-03-12 (RJC)
In September 2011, plaintiff, Kevin
Carmody, filed a complaint against defendant, Charles
Thompson, for defamation per se, false light, and tortious
interference with contractual relations following plaintiff's
termination from the University of Illinois (University). In
November 2011, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
section 2-619(a)(1) of the of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2010)), arguing
the cause should instead be heard in the Court of Claims
because defendant's actions were taken pursuant to his
University employment. In February 2012, the trial court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals,
arguing the trial court erred (1) in granting defendant's
motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, (2) denying his
request for leave to amend his complaint.
No. 2012
IL App (2d) 110856 People
v.
Olsson Filed 11-06-12 (RJC)
These consolidated
appeals arise from orders entered during the period when
defendant, Paul Olsson, was in the custody of the Department
of Human Services (Department) pursuant to section
104-25(g)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code)
(725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2) (West
2010)), which provides for the potentially long-term
commitment of a criminal defendant who has been found unfit to
stand trial and for whom treatment to attain fitness has been
unsuccessful. The period of commitment under this provision
may be as long as the maximum sentence for the charged
offense. Id. While the defendant is committed under section
104-25(g)(2), the trial court must periodically review his or
her condition and treatment needs. Defendant argues that the
trial court’s review proceedings were deficient because (1)
the facility to which he is committed failed to comply with
its statutory duty to report on his treatment and his
condition, and (2) the trial court failed to conduct a
meaningful hearing to determine whether he had been restored
to fitness. We agree with the first argument and therefore
vacate the orders and remand for further proceedings. We find
no error, however, relative to the question of defendant’s
fitness.
No. 2012
IL App (2d) 120156 Leja
v.
Community Unit School District 300 Filed
11-06-12
(RJC)
Plaintiff, Allison Leja,
appeals from the dismissal of her second amended complaint
against defendant, Community Unit School District 300.
Plaintiff, a student at a high school owned and operated by
defendant, allegedly was injured in her school’s gymnasium
when a volleyball net crank she was turning either “broke
loose” or “snapped back” and struck her in the face. Plaintiff
alleged in her two-count second amended complaint that
defendant was negligent (count I) or engaged in willful and
wanton conduct (count II). The trial court dismissed count I
pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2008)) after determining
that defendant was immune from liability for negligence under
section 3-106 of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West
2008)). The court then dismissed count II pursuant to section
2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2008)) after
determining that plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to
plead willful and wanton conduct under the Act. Both
dismissals were with prejudice. On appeal, plaintiff
challenges the dismissal of count II only. Plaintiff argues
that the warning label on the volleyball net crank was
sufficient to put defendant on notice that the crank posed a
risk of injury, and that instructing plaintiff to operate the
crank bearing the warning label evinced an utter indifference
to or conscious disregard for plaintiff’s safety. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2012
IL App (1st) 112974 Staes
and
Scallan, P.C. v. Orlich Filed
11-06-12 (RJC)
Staes & Scallan,
P.C., a law firm (plaintiff), filed a verified complaint for
breach of contract against defendants, and former clients, P.
Daniel Orlich and Jeffrey Gidney. Defendants each owned
a baseball team in the independent Northern League, a
professional baseball league (League). Plaintiff sought
payment of approximately $56,000 in fees and costs associated
with its defense of defendants in a lawsuit brought by the
League. Prior to trial, and after having a default judgment
and subsequent judgment order entered against him, Gidney
settled with plaintiff for $28,000. This amount represented
approximately half of the amount plaintiff claimed it was owed
from defendants. Following the bench trial against Orlich, the
circuit court found in plaintiff's favor on the issue of
liability only, taking the issue of damages under advisement.
After allowing Orlich and plaintiff to file written
submissions outlining their respective positions to charges
contained in plaintiff's outstanding invoices, the circuit
court entered judgment against Orlich in the amount of
$23,397.35, plus prejudgment interest. At issue here is
whether the circuit court's judgment order in the amount of
$23,392.35, plus prejudgment interest, is against the manifest
weight of the evidence. We hold that the circuit court's
judgment order is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
No. 2012 IL App (2d)
110856 People
v.
Olsson Filed 11-6-12 (TJJ)
These consolidated appeals arise from orders entered during
the period when defendant, Paul Olsson, was in the custody of
the Department of Human Services (Department) pursuant to
section 104-25(g)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2) (West 2010)), which
provides for the potentially long-term commitment of a
criminal defendant who has been found unfit to stand trial and
for whom treatment to attain fitness has been unsuccessful.
The period of commitment under this provision may be as
long as the maximum sentence for the charged offense. Id.
While the defendant is committed under section 104-25(g)(2),
the trial court must periodically review his or her condition
and treatment needs. Defendant argues that the trial
court’s review proceedings were deficient because (1) the
facility to which he is committed failed to comply with its
statutory duty to report on his treatment and his condition,
and (2) the trial court failed to conduct a meaningful
hearing to determine whether he had been restored to fitness.
We agree with the first argument and therefore vacate the
orders and remand for further proceedings. We find no error,
however, relative to the question of defendant’s fitness.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 120156 Leja
v.
Community Unit School District 300 Filed 11-6-12
(TJJ)
Plaintiff, Allison Leja, appeals from the dismissal of her
second amended complaint against defendant, Community Unit
School District 300. Plaintiff, a student at a high school
owned and operated by defendant, allegedly was injured in her
school’s gymnasium when a volleyball net crank she was
turning either “broke loose” or “snapped back” and struck her
in the face. Plaintiff alleged in her two-count second amended
complaint that defendant was negligent (count I) or engaged in
willful and wanton conduct (count II). The trial court
dismissed count I pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code
of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2008))
after determining that defendant was immune from liability for
negligence under section 3-106 of the Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
(Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 2008)). The court then
dismissed count II pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735
ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2008)) after determining that
plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to plead willful and
wanton conduct under the Act. Both dismissals were with
prejudice. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the dismissal of
count II only. Plaintiff argues that the warning label on the
volleyball net crank was sufficient to put defendant on
notice that the crank posed a risk of injury, and that
instructing plaintiff to operate the crank bearing the warning
label evinced an utter indifference to or conscious disregard
for plaintiff’s safety. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 112974 Staes
and
Scallan, P.C. v. Orlich Filed 11-6-12 (TJJ)
Staes & Scallan, P.C., a law firm (plaintiff), filed a
verified complaint for breach of contract against defendants,
and former clients, P. Daniel Orlich and Jeffrey Gidney.
Defendants each owned a baseball team in the independent
Northern League, a professional baseball league
(League). Plaintiff sought payment of approximately $56,000 in
fees and costs associated with its defense of defendants in a
lawsuit brought by the League. Prior to trial, and after
having a default judgment and subsequent judgment order
entered against him, Gidney settled with plaintiff for
$28,000. This amount represented approximately half of the
amount plaintiff claimed it was owed from defendants.
Following the bench trial against Orlich, the circuit court
found in plaintiff's favor on the issue of liability
only, taking the issue of damages under advisement. After
allowing Orlich and plaintiff to file written submissions
outlining their respective positions to charges contained in
plaintiff's outstanding invoices, the circuit court
entered judgment against Orlich in the amount of $23,397.35,
plus prejudgment interest. At issue here is whether the
circuit court's judgment order in the amount of $23,392.35,
plus prejudgment interest, is against the manifest weight of
the evidence. We hold that the circuit court's judgment
order is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 112353 Central
Mortgage
Company v. Kamarauli Filed 11-5-12 (TJJ)
In this mortgage foreclosure action, defendants Levan
Kamarauli and Valeria Mourzaeva appeal from orders of the
circuit court denying their motion to quash service of process
and their motion to reconsider that ruling, and from the order
approving the sale and granting possession of their
residential property to plaintiff, Central Mortgage Company.
On appeal, defendants contend that the court erred when it
denied their motion to quash service because abode service was
not properly attained where the family member who
accepted service at their home did not live in their
household. Defendants further argue that service was not
proper because the process server mailed only one copy of the
summons and complaint in an envelope addressed to both
defendants, rather than separately mailing each defendant
individual copies of the summons. Defendants claim that due to
the improper service, the circuit court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them. We affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 100632 Watkins
v.
McCarthy Filed 11-5-12 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Kilroy Watkins, an inmate at Lawrence Correctional
Center, appeals the dismissal of his complaint against
defendant, Garry McCarthy, superintendent of the Chicago
Police Department (Department), seeking to compel disclosure,
under the state Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5
ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2008)), of documents relating to
complaints of misconduct made against two police officers.
Plaintiff alleged that these officers coerced him into making
a confession that led to his first- degree murder and armed
robbery convictions. In an order entered January 5, 2012, we
initially dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction
(Watkins v. McCarthy, 2012 IL App (1st) 100632-U). Pursuant to
a supervisory order (Watkins v. McCarthy, No. 114063
(Ill. May 30, 2012) (supervisory order)), our supreme court
on, May 30, 2012, directed that we vacate our order and
consider the matter on its merits. Having vacated our prior
order, and upon consideration of the merits of this appeal, we
reverse the order granting defendant's motion to dismiss
and remand this cause to the circuit court for an in camera
inspection of the documents requested by plaintiff pursuant to
section 11(f) of the FOIA. 5 ILCS 140/11(f) (West 2008).
No. 2012 IL App (1st) 113007WC Labuz
v.
Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission Filed
11-5-12 (TJJ)
Both the claimant, Antoni Labuz, and JKC Trucking Co., Inc.
(JKC) have appealed from an order of the Circuit Court of Cook
County which confirmed a decision of Illinois Workers'
Compensation Commission (Commission), awarding the
claimant certain benefits pursuant to the Workers'
Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2008)),
for neck, back, and left shoulder injuries sustained while in
the employ of JKC . We consolidated the two appeals for
review.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 120209 Dixon
v.
Weitekamp-Diller Filed 11-5-12 (TJJ)
This case involves three trusts, each of which includes a life
estate in the proceeds from farmland for William Hughes
Diller, Jr. (Hughes), with the res of each trust to be
distributed, at least in part, to Hughes' children at his
death. The trusts further provide, however, that if
Hughes were to die without any children, the res of each trust
would be distributed to his sisters' children per stirpes.
After having spent the first 87 years of his life unmarried,
Hughes married his former assistant, Barbara Weitekamp,
and moved with her to Florida. In August 2010, concerned
about Barbara's role in Hughes' financial affairs and that she
was keeping Hughes away from them, members of Hughes' family
filed a complaint to appoint a successor trustee and for
declaratory relief. Shortly thereafter, Barbara arranged for
then 94-year-old Hughes to adopt three of her adult daughters
from a previous marriage. Hughes did so and died several
months later. Following an exchange of motions, the trial
court ordered the trustees to administer and distribute the
trusts as if Hughes did not have any children, finding, in
pertinent part, that the adoptions of Barbara's daughters were
subterfuge and done "solely to make Barbara's daughters heirs
*** under the three trusts." Barbara and her daughters
appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by granting
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because (1) Illinois
law presumes that an adopted child is the descendant of the
adoptive parent and (2) the court improperly determined that
63 acres Hughes purchased as trustee of one of the family
trusts—which he later transferred to Barbara—should remain
part of the trust. We disagree and affirm.
No. 2012 IL App (4th) 120266 Church
of
the Little Flower v. US Bank Filed 11-5-12 (TJJ)
In June 2010, plaintiff, Church of the Little Flower,
petitioned the trial court for reformation of a trust of which
plaintiff is one of three remaining beneficiaries. Plaintiff
asked the court to apply the doctrine of equitable deviation
to terminate the trust and distribute its assets to the
beneficiaries. One of the named defendants, US Bank, is
currently the trustee of that trust. In December 2011, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. The
court's judgment required US Bank to dissolve the trust
and distribute its assets to plaintiff and the other two
remaining beneficiaries. US Bank appeals, arguing equitable
deviation did not apply and reformation of the trust was thus
improper. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with
directions to enter summary judgment for US Bank.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 110557 People
v.
McPeak Filed 11-2-12 (TJJ)
Following a stipulated bench trial in the circuit court of
Boone County, defendant, Lynette D. McPeak, was found guilty
of driving while her license was suspended and was sentenced
to a 1-year term of probation and 30 days in the Boone County
jail. It was stipulated that on May 10, 2010, a law
enforcement officer conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle
driven by defendant. The abstract of defendant’s driving
record, which was admitted into evidence by stipulation,
showed that a December 6, 2009, arrest in Winnebago County for
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) resulted in the
statutory summary suspension of her driver’s license pursuant
to section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. The abstract
indicated that the statutory summary suspension was in
effect when defendant was stopped on May 10, 2010. Defendant
argues on appeal that, in order to secure a conviction of
DWLS, the State was obligated to prove that she was not
operating the vehicle as allowed by a monitoring device
driving permit. According to defendant, because no
evidence was presented on this point, her conviction must be
reversed. We conclude that the State was under no obligation
to present such evidence and we therefore affirm defendant’s
conviction.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 110767 People
v.
Prado Filed 11-2-12 (TJJ)
Defendant, Martin Prado, appeals the trial court’s sua sponte
dismissal on the merits of his petition for relief from
judgment, filed under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)). Defendant’s
petition was not properly served on the State. He
contends that, under People v. Nitz, 2012 IL App (2d) 091165,
¶¶ 5-6, the trial court acted prematurely and the dismissal
should have been without prejudice. We agree that the
dismissal was premature. However, we decline to follow Nitz,
which resulted in a dismissal without prejudice. Instead, we
vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2012 IL App (2d) 110961 Wells
Fargo
Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey Filed 11-2-12 (TJJ)
In this mortgage foreclosure action, the defendant, Katie
McCluskey, appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition to
vacate the foreclosure judgment. We reverse and remand for
additional proceedings.
No. 2012 IL App (5th)
100584 People
v.
Elliott Filed 11-01-12 (LJD)
Defendant, David K. Elliott, was issued a citation in Perry
County for driving on a suspended driver's license. The
circuit court entered a judgment of guilt. On appeal,
defendant raises the issue of whether the conviction was
proper given that his statutory summary suspension was
rescinded. We reverse.
No. 2012 IL App (1st)
101226 Asset
Recovery
Contracting, LLC v. Walsh Construction Company of Illinois
Filed 11-01-12 (LJD)
2 The instant case arose from a multimillion dollar
redevelopment of the Palmolive Building at 919 North Michigan
Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, to convert the commercial office
building into residential and retail condominiums. Defendant
Walsh Construction Company of Illinois (Walsh) was the general
contractor for the "core and shell" phase of the project,
which generally entails removal of the interior finishes and
mechanical and electrical and plumbing systems in preparation
for build-out work. The trial court found that ARC breached
the subcontract by leaving the project early and entered a
judgment for damages in favor of Walsh in the amount of
$337,020 on Walsh's counterclaim. In its factual
findings, the trial court found that the revised schedule
changed the original completion date from late December 2003
to July 23, 2004. The trial court also found that "ARC
received and reviewed the revised schedule and raised no
objections to the cost projections or the impact that might
result from the revised schedule." Thus, the court concluded
that by accepting changes to the project schedule ARC waived
its claims for additional compensation. Also, the trial
court considered the date of ARC's signature, and not the date
listed on the contract, as the effective date of the
subcontract.
No. 2012 IL 112040
Downtown
Disposal
Services, Inc. v. The City of Chicago Filed
11-01-12 (LJD)
In this case, we must determine whether a complaint for
administrative review filed by a corporation’s president, on
behalf of the corporation, is a nullity because the president
is not an attorney. For the reasons that follow, we conclude
that the complaints are not void.
No. 2012 IL 112362 People
v.
Murdock Filed 11-01-12 (LJD)
Defendant, Germill D. Murdock, was convicted following a jury
trial in the circuit court of Peoria County of first degree
murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. Defendant’s
conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant then filed a
postconviction petition alleging trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements
defendant had made to police. Defendant, a juvenile, alleged
his statements were the product of police coercion that
rendered them involuntary. After conducting an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s petition.
The appellate court reversed and remanded to the trial
court for a suppression hearing.Following the suppression
hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to
suppress. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the
motion to suppress. No. 3-07-0438 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant appeals, arguing his
statements were involuntary, primarily due to the absence of a
concerned adult during his police detention. For the following
reasons, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and
appellate court.